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 John V. Petrocelli 
A DUAL-PROCESS ACCOUNT OF REACTIONS TO  
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC EVENTS: THE ROLES OF  
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING AND PRE-EVENT EXPECTATIONS 
On the basis of a dual-process account of reactions to general and specific cases, 
counterfactual thinking was hypothesized to occur more frequently in response to specific 
events than to general events.  Cognitive reactions to general events were expected to be 
influenced by pre-event expectations, whereas reactions to specific events were expected 
to be influenced by counterfactual thinking.  Such differences in processing may result in 
different comparison cases that ultimately influence reactions to the event as well as 
decisions regarding similar, future events.  When people experience undesirable 
outcomes, counterfactual thoughts allow them to imagine more desirable possibilities, 
and thus greater confidence for future occurrences.  Five experiments were designed to 
investigate these and other related hypotheses.  In Experiment 1, participants were 
visually presented with general or specific outcomes of a golfing competition.  
Experiment 2 asked participants to complete a trivia test and provided them with global 
or specific performance feedback.  Experiment 3 examined the impact of both upward 
and downward counterfactuals following the visual presentation of general or specific 
highlights of a tennis match.  In Experiment 4, participants were asked to play several 
games of blackjack and were provided with global or specific performance feedback.  
Participants in Experiment 5 observed actual horse racing events, received general 
information about the events, or received thought-listing statements made by another 
participant in addition to general information about the events.  In each experiment, some 
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participants were also asked to complete a thought-listing task.  Participants indicated 
their subjective confidence about the outcome of a similar, future event or placed bets on 
the outcome.  Overall, the results supported the hypotheses.  Counterfactual thoughts 
were observed more frequently in response to specific events than to general events.  
Counterfactual thought frequency also mediated the relationships between event type and 
decisions about similar, future events.  A follow-up experiment to Experiment 5 provided 
evidence that counterfactual thought confidence also influences decisions regarding 
similar, future events.  Although pre-event expectations were more clearly linked to 
reactions regarding general events than to specific events in Experiment 1, these links 
were inconsistent across experiments.  Results are discussed in light of related dual-
process theories and decision-making research.   
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
The way that people react to an abstract case or a “general” event may be very 
different from the way they respond to any single, specific event of the same type 
(Sherman, Beike, & Ryalls, 1999; Sherman & McConnell, 1995).  That is, specific 
instances, when compared to general or abstract cases, seem to have a unique impact on 
one’s judgments, evaluations, emotional reactions, and behaviors.  For instance, people 
appear to be much more willing to expend resources to assist specific, identified victims 
of unfortunate events than they are for the same number of unidentified, general, or 
“statistical” victims (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Schelling, 1968).  Perhaps international 
organizations and charities understand this full well.  Rarely do they design television 
commercials that employ general and statistical frames of the current, unfortunate 
situation (e.g., displaying hundreds of ill and impoverished children).  Rather, they tend 
to select one ill and impoverished child and report on the background of his or her life, 
providing specific details that are sure to tug at the heartstrings of most viewers.  
According to Sherman et al. (1999), discrepancies in reactions to general and 
specific cases appear to be prevalent in many domains, such as judgments of prospective 
and current community improvement initiatives, judgments of a group and its individual 
members (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), and subjective confidence estimates in one’s own 
global and specific performance (Sniezek & Buckley, 1991; Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 
1990).  One interesting example is the “NIMBY” (not in my back yard) syndrome, which 
characterizes instances in which some people demand economic developments (or the 
building of more prisons) but later reject any specific plans that emerge within their own 
community.  Another example is the prototypical coach of a professional basketball team.  
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He would probably be more than willing to accept an average of 10 turnovers committed 
by his team per game, and even perceive the attainment of such a goal as exceptionally 
good.  However, even if the general goal is met, in the case of each specific turnover, his 
response may be characterized by a range of negative affects.       
In a somewhat related line of research, Small and Loewenstein’s (2003) work on 
the “identifiable victim effect” suggests that the difference between general and specific 
cases need not be very great to have a significant impact on judgments.  They 
demonstrated that even weak forms of identifiability (i.e., the victim is determined 
without any personalizing information) can produce the “identifiable victim effect,” 
whereby greater compassion and compensation is offered to victims who have been 
identified versus those who have not.  Interestingly, the identifiable victim effect also 
appears to be restricted to a single individual rather than a more general but identified 
group of individuals (Kogut & Ritov, 2005).  Yet, despite these studies and several years 
of social cognition research, the cognitive mechanisms that may underlie the differences 
that emerge from people’s reactions to general and specific events remain unexamined.   
The current investigation was designed to examine postulates drawn from 
Sherman et al.’s (1999) dual-process accounts of inconsistencies in reactions to general 
versus specific cases.  Specifically, Sherman et al.’s postulates that relate to cases 
whereby people consider either their pre-event expectations or mentally simulated 
alternatives to reality, reflecting on “what could have been” (termed, counterfactual 
thinking; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), were tested.  Using five different paradigms, the 
degree to which people differentially engage in counterfactual thinking when processing 
general and specific events was examined.  It was hypothesized that counterfactual 
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thoughts are more likely to emerge when processing specific events than when processing 
general events.  It was also hypothesized that counterfactual thinking mediates the 
relationship between the type of event and subsequent judgments.  On the other hand, 
when people judge general events, it is hypothesized that they rely more on comparison 
cases shaped by their pre-event expectations than they do on counterfactual responses.  
Thus, pre-event expectancies may also moderate the relationship between the type of 
event and judgments.  These hypotheses are based primarily on the assumptions of norm 
theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), the account of different reactions to general and 
specific events outlined by Sherman et al. (1999), and the findings of a preliminary study 
conducted by Petrocelli and Sherman (2005). 
Theoretical Framework 
Sherman et al. (1999) considered the postulates of several dual-process models as 
possible explanations for discrepant reactions to general and specific events.  Among 
their most compelling considerations, and central to the current investigation, was their 
elaboration of Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory.    
Norm theory holds that reactions to an event are very much influenced by the 
overall perceived normality of the event.  Perceivers are believed to construct norms 
(standards of judgment) in an online fashion or to retrieve them from pre-existing 
expectations.  When doing so, people may rely heavily on their prior beliefs and 
expectancies.  However, because people possess the ability to mentally simulate 
alternatives to reality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), they may also counterfactualize or 
mentally undo specific features of an event (especially an undesirable event) that are 
perceived to be abnormal.  Essentially, Kahneman and Miller (1986) argued that, as 
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people perceive the mutability (ease with which features of an event may be cognitively 
altered) of antecedents to increase, the more available considerations of alternatives to 
reality become.  People often find it easier to imagine counterfactual worlds of 
experience when the actual events involve abnormal or unusual features, as well as near 
positive or near negative outcomes (see: Roese & Olson, 1993, 1995).  Subsequently, the 
easier it is for people to imagine how desirable outcomes might have occurred or how 
undesirable outcomes might not have occurred, the easier it is for people to confuse such 
alternatives to reality with what should have or should not have occurred, and the more 
pronounced affective reactions tend to be (Miller & Turnbull, 1990).  In sum, affective, 
evaluative, and behavioral reactions to an event may be intensified to the extent that 
alternatives to reality are easy to imagine.  
Consistent with norm theory, Sherman et al. (1999) argued that the propensity to 
engage in counterfactual thinking is greater when processing specific events than it is 
when judging general or abstract events.  As Sherman et al. suggested, people may 
respond to specific events with counterfactual thoughts more than they do to comparable 
general events because specific events tend to draw people’s attention toward mutable 
features more so than do general events.  Interestingly, however, general events are 
inherently more abstract, and they conceivably assume an infinite number of mutable 
features.  That is, without any specific constraints, there is a considerably wide range of 
possible alternatives to reality.  Any number of features that are not contained or 
described by the general frame of an event may be self-generated and mutated 
accordingly.  On the other hand, counterfactual responses to a specific event are 
relatively more constrained by the specific features of the event.  Consistent with this 
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thinking, and with the theoretical positions of Sherman et al., it appears that, despite the 
greater possibility for counterfactualizable features in general or global events, people are 
more likely to counterfactualize specific events because their mutable features are 
relatively more salient and easier to counterfactualize than are unspecified features that 
first need to be generated or assumed by the observer of general events.   
Sherman et al.’s (1999) discussion of norm theory and dual-process account of 
reactions to general and specific events also sheds some light on mediational mechanism 
hypotheses.  Specifically, counterfactual thinking is expected to mediate the influence 
that the type of event (i.e., general vs. specific) has on affective, evaluative, and 
behavioral reactions.  This hypothesis is grounded in the notion that evaluative, affective, 
and behavioral reactions to an event are very much affected by the comparison case that 
is adopted when processing that event.  If specific, but not general, events increase one’s 
attention toward mutable features, and people tend to counterfactualize such features, 
then the two types of events are likely to possess very different standards of comparison.  
According to Sherman et al. (1999), judgments of general events and outcomes described 
in general terms are shaped largely by comparisons to pre-event expectations.  In the case 
of the basketball coach’s feelings about his team’s average of 10 turnovers per game, he 
may see no viable alternatives to which to compare this rate but the team’s expected 
average (shaped possibly by the team’s previous rate, his ideal, or another team’s rate).  
However, any specific turnover is likely to elicit a number of alternatives, resulting in a 
much different comparison case, and a much different set of responses.  For example, 
specific event information, such as the referee’s interference on the play or a player’s 
untied shoelace, may prompt the coach to generate upward-counterfactuals (i.e., mentally 
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simulated alternatives that improve reality; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 
1993) as a function of his focus on the possibility that the turnover would not have 
occurred had the referee not been in the way or had the player’s shoelace been tied.  
However, when thinking about turnovers in general, this information may not be 
accessible or available, and thus a different reaction (one involving less extreme affect) is 
likely to emerge. 
Clearly, reference points and standards of comparison are important to human 
judgment and perception (see: Biernat & Manis, 1994; Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz & Bless, 
1992; Sherif, 1936).  Sherman et al. (1999) argued that the processing of a specific event 
often involves a comparison case constructed after the event.  Such comparison cases 
may be influenced by the counterfactuals that emerge in response to the event itself.  The 
processing of a comparable general event usually involves a comparison case constructed 
before the event, which may be characterized as a pre-event construction based on pre-
existing beliefs and expectations.  Thus, different comparison standards for general and 
specific events are likely to result in different affective, evaluative, and behavioral 
reactions.  Other areas of research are consistent with this idea.  For instance, it is clear 
from work on temporal construal theory that, when people think about a future event 
from a general or abstract frame of mind, they are likely to make different decisions 
compared to when they think about the same event in light of its specific or concrete 
features (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003). 
On the basis of such reasoning and Sherman et al.’s (1999) use of norm theory, 
Petrocelli and Sherman (2005) examined one of the mediational hypotheses (whether or 
not the relationship between the type of event and a person’s reaction to it is mediated by 
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the presence or absence of counterfactual responses to the event).  Participants in this 
experiment read a brief scenario about a single family (specific) that was robbed, or about 
thousands of families (general) that are robbed each year while away on vacation, as a 
result of acting irresponsibly.  The single target family, as well as the thousands of other 
families, was described as failing to do several things that could have prevented the 
robbery(ies).  Participants then judged how much the family(ies) should be compensated 
by their home-owner’s insurance as well as how responsible they were for the 
robbery(ies).  Results showed that the difference in counterfactualizing a general versus 
specific event statistically mediated the relationship between event frame and 
compensation, but it failed to mediate the relationship between the type of frame and the 
perceived responsibility of the target for the outcome.  Thus, the mediational hypotheses 
have yet to be conclusively demonstrated.   
Problems Addressed by the Current Investigation 
The study conducted by Petrocelli and Sherman (2005) provided some initial 
evidence for the usefulness of norm theory as a framework to explain discrepancies in 
reactions to general and specific events.  However, a possible confound in the Petrocelli 
and Sherman (2005) study involved the clarity of the connection between the actors 
involved in the scenario and their specific behaviors.  Participants who read about the 
specific event could be certain that the target was directly linked with each mutable 
feature described in the event.  However, readers of the general event frame may not have 
been entirely certain that each and every target (each of the families that composed the 
“thousands”) was directly responsible for each and every mutable feature described in the 
event. 
 7
                                                                                           
If a difference did exist between the conditions in their clarity of the connection 
between the actors and their behaviors, then a difference in vividness of the scenarios 
may have emerged as well.  Empirical evidence shows that vividness can enhance 
processing of information (Collins, Taylor, Wood, & Thompson, 1988; Smith & Shaffer, 
2000).  Further, if participants found the specific event frame easier to imagine than the 
general event frame, one might conclude that the perceived likelihood of alternatives to 
the specific event was perceived as significantly greater than alternatives to the general 
event in light of ease of imagination research (e.g., Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & 
Reynolds, 1985).  Any factor that affects the perceived normality of an event and its 
features is also likely to have an indirect effect on counterfactual processing.  Thus, the 
notion that general and specific event frames lead directly to different frequencies of 
counterfactual responses remains somewhat inconclusive.     
  With respect to the assumptions of norm theory, an additional problem emerges 
when employing different written-scenario frames of an event (as employed by Petrocelli 
& Sherman, 2005) to examine reactions to general and specific events.  According to 
norm theory, the perceived normality of event-features plays an essential role in one’s 
reactions to the event.  If a general frame of an event, by its very nature, increases the 
perception that the event is more frequent (e.g., “Thousands of depressed people 
overdose on drugs each year.”), relative to that produced by a specific case of the same 
event (e.g., “After battling depression for years, he overdosed on drugs.”), the general 
frame of the event essentially increases the event’s normality.  Thus, events framed in a 
general way may result in fewer counterfactual thoughts simply because they reduce the 
abnormality and salience of mutable features.  In order to contrast reactions to general 
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and specific events, perceivers need to consider outcomes that do not appear to differ in 
their implied frequency.  Therefore, each of the proposed experiments was designed to 
present participants with general or specific events that vary only in the nature of the 
information that is presented (i.e., specificity) and not in how frequent the outcomes are 
portrayed to occur.  
Finally, the Petrocelli and Sherman (2005) experiment paid no attention to the 
role of pre-event expectations.  Consistent with Sherman et al.’s (1999) dual-process 
account of reactions to general and specific events, pre-event expectancies should play a 
more important role in people’s judgments of general events.  Thus, when feasible, the 
current experiments (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5) include measures of pre-event 
expectancies. 
Overview of Experiments 
 Five experiments (and a follow-up experiment) were designed to examine 
whether or not people respond to specific events with counterfactual responses more 
frequently than they do to general events and whether or not their judgments rely more on 
their pre-event expectations when evaluating general events.  Also of interest is whether 
or not these differences in counterfactual responses and reliance on pre-event 
expectations serve as mechanisms by which the type of event shapes an individual’s 
affective, evaluative, or behavioral reactions to the event.   
Experiment 1 attempted to do this by visually presenting participants with either 
general or specific results of a simulated competition between two targets.  Experiment 2 
attempted to extend the current conceptualization to a person’s judgments of their own 
subjective confidence, by exposing participants to global or specific feedback 
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information regarding their performance on a task.  Experiment 3 was designed to 
investigate the impact of two different types of counterfactuals on event reactions, 
independent of the general and specific distinction, namely, upward counterfactual 
responses and downward counterfactual responses (i.e., mentally simulated alternatives 
that improve or worsen reality respectively; Markman et al., 1993).  Finally, Experiments 
4 and 5 examined the current hypotheses using actual events and betting on the outcomes 
of future events.  Experiment 4 provided participants with either global or specific 
feedback about their actual performance on a task and asked them to place a bet on the 
outcome of a future event.  Experiment 5 asked participants to perform a similar task, but 
involved actual events observed by specific events condition participants, general 
information about the events received by general events condition participants, and 
thought-listing statements by others in addition to general information about the events 
received by “general event + spoon-fed thoughts” condition participants.  The follow-up 
experiment to Experiment 5 examined the possibility that counterfactual thought 
confidence also mediates the relationship between event type and decisions regarding 
similar, future events.    
General Hypotheses 
Four general hypotheses applied to each of the proposed experiments.  First, it 
was hypothesized that counterfactual thoughts would emerge more frequently in response 
to specific events than to general events.  This hypothesis is consistent with Sherman et 
al.’s (1999) use of norm theory, which argued that specific events tend to increase one’s 
focus and attention toward mutable features more so than do general events.   
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Second, this cognitive processing difference is believed to result in different 
comparison cases for the two types of events.  Comparison cases for judging specific 
events may be largely the result of post-event counterfactual processing, whereas 
comparison cases for judging general events may be based on pre-event expectations 
(Sherman et al., 1999).  Thus, the relative frequency of upward and downward 
counterfactual responses to an event was expected to be a stronger predictor of post-event 
judgments than pre-event expectations for specific event condition participants, but in 
experiments that permitted the measurement of pre-event expectations (Experiments 1, 2, 
4, and 5) it was expected that these expectations would be a better predictor of post-event 
judgments than counterfactual response frequency for general event condition 
participants.  Because it was hypothesized that a different factor (expectancies versus 
counterfactuals) should have operated depending on the type of event (general versus 
specific), two separate interaction effects were also expected to emerge in each 
experiment that permitted the measurement of pre-event expectations (Experiments 1, 2, 
4, and 5) such that: 1) the relationships between pre-event expectations and the dependent 
variables were stronger for general event condition participants than for specific event 
condition participants; and 2) the relationships between counterfactual frequency and the 
dependent variables were stronger for specific event condition participants than for 
general event condition participants.   
The standard of comparison that people employ can very much influence the 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions that they have toward an event.  Thus, a 
third hypothesis was drawn such that the link between the type of event (general or 
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specific) and reactions to the event were expected to be mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward and downward counterfactual responses.     
Finally, each of the experiments proposed included conditions whereby 
participants were not asked to list their thoughts.  The effect of the event manipulation on 
the dependent variables was expected to occur regardless of whether participants were 
asked to list their thoughts after being exposed to general or specific event information.  
This examination is relevant to whether or not counterfactual thinking, in response to 
general or specific event information, is a spontaneous activity.  According to Roese, 
Sanna, and Galinsky (2005), counterfactual thinking is similar to other thought processes 
that rely on semantic memory's abstract generalizations about the world.  As such, 
sometimes counterfactual thinking may act as an automatic process and at other times an 
intentional and controlled process (also see Goldinger, Kleider, Azuma, & Beike, 2003).   
Previous accounts of the spontaneity of counterfactual thinking (e.g., Markman et 
al., 1993) have measured spontaneous counterfactualizing by the presence of 
counterfactuals in thought-listing tasks.  However, it may be that the very act of listing 
one’s thoughts increases the likelihood of engaging in counterfactual thinking.  In 
previous experiments, demand characteristics may also be of some concern.  Few 
empirical studies have directly investigated whether or not the effects of counterfactual 
responses are present even when participants are not directly asked to list their thoughts.  
Only from an observation of the same effects for both participants who do and do not list 
their thoughts (i.e., no main effect for thought-listing condition) can it be inferred that 
counterfactual responses, and their mediating effects, emerge spontaneously.  
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CHAPTER 2 – EXPERIMENT 1:  
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC MINIATURE GOLF EVENTS 
The purpose of this first experiment was be to examine: 1) whether or not 
counterfactual thinking occurs more frequently in response to specific events than to 
general events; 2) whether or not people rely more on pre-event expectations for judging 
general events than they do for judging specific events; and 3) whether or not 
counterfactual responses mediate the relationship between the type of event and 
subsequent judgments.  Importantly, the current experiment was designed to visually 
present participants with general or specific event information.  This method should 
address the normality criticism of the Petrocelli and Sherman (2005) study (described 
above), and more directly address the types of general and specific cases about which 
Sherman et al. (1999) first theorized.   
Overview of Experiment 
 Participants were asked to view a pre-recorded video-game presentation of a 
simulated 9-hole miniature golf competition between an Indiana University (IU; in-
group) undergraduate and a Purdue University (PU; out-group) undergraduate.  Before 
learning more about the competition, participants reported their pre-event expectations.  
Participants were randomly assigned to a general or specific event condition in which 
they were exposed to general or specific information about the competition.  In addition, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of four different event trajectories (near 
comeback, blown lead, last-hole defeat of even match, or back-and-forth lead), all of 
which the IU undergraduate ultimately lost by a single stroke.  Half of the participants 
were instructed to list their thoughts after each of the nine holes, whereas the other half of 
 13
                                                                                           
the participants were not instructed to do so.  At the conclusion of the competition, all 
participants reported how pleased they were with the IU golfer, how skilled they believed 
the IU golfer to be, the perceived likelihood that the IU golfer would win in a rematch, 
the likelihood that they would bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, and how much 
they would bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch.  
Hypotheses 
Seven separate hypotheses were tested in Experiment 1:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to the event 
than were participants assigned to the general event condition.  That is, a main effect of 
type of event on the number of upward counterfactuals generated in response to the event 
was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis is consistent with Sherman et al.’s (1999) use 
of norm theory, which argued that specific events tend to increase one’s attention toward 
mutable features more than general events do, as well as the Petrocelli and Sherman 
(2005) experimental findings that support this notion.   
Hypothesis 2: Participants assigned to the blown lead, the last-hole defeat of even 
match, and the back-and-forth lead trajectory conditions were expected to generate a 
greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to the event than were 
participants assigned to the near comeback trajectory condition.  That is, a main effect of 
event trajectory on the number of upward counterfactuals generated in response to the 
event was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis is in accordance with evidence in support 
of the temporal order effect (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Walsh & Byrne, 2004), which 
suggests that, when no causal relation between events exists people hold a preference for 
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mutating events that have occurred more recently in time.  For example, in football, a 
missed field-goal is more likely to be counterfactualized if it occurs in the fourth quarter 
than if it occurs in the first quarter.  Miller and Gunasegaram (1990) have argued that this 
occurs because people tend to perceive an earlier event of a temporal chain of events as a 
fact or a “given,” and are more likely to counterfactualize later events because their 
causal potency is relatively greater as a result of alternative outcomes coming to mind 
more readily.  Accordingly, participants assigned to the blown lead, the last-hole defeat 
of even match, and the back-and-forth lead trajectory conditions were expected to 
perceive the IU golfer as losing the competition due to things that occurred toward the 
end of the competition.  Thus, these participants were more likely to engage in 
counterfactual thinking.  Participants assigned to the near comeback trajectory condition 
were expected to perceive the IU golfer as losing the competition due to things that 
occurred during the earlier stages of the competition.  However, these earlier features of 
the event may be perceived as relatively less causal as they are “presupposed or taken for 
granted” (Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990, p. 1113), thus resulting in relatively fewer 
counterfactual responses by near comeback trajectory condition participants.P1P         
Hypothesis 3: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to report being less pleased with the IU golfer, but rate the IU golfer’s skill more highly, 
report a greater likelihood that the IU golfer would win in a rematch, report a greater 
likelihood that they would bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, and risk a greater bet 
on the IU golfer to win in a rematch than participants assigned to the general event 
condition.  In other words, a main effect of type of event on each of the five dependent 
variables was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis was based on the assumption that 
 15
                                                                                           
Hypothesis 1 would be supported.  If in fact specific event condition participants focus 
more on how the IU golfer could have or should have won the competition than do 
general event condition participants, they should correspondingly perceive the IU golfer 
to be more skilled and worthy of betting on to win in a rematch.  Because the IU golfer 
lost the competition, despite being perceived as more skilled than the PU golfer, specific 
event condition participants were expected to be less pleased with the IU golfer’s 
performance.  This hypothesis (regarding satisfaction with the IU golfer’s performance) 
is also consistent with earlier research that has demonstrated affective contrast effects of 
upward counterfactual thinking (i.e., negative affect brought about by thinking of how 
things could have been better; see Markman et al., 1993; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, 
& McMullen, 1995; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Roese, 1994).        
Hypothesis 4: Participants assigned to the blown lead, the last-hole defeat of even 
match, and the back-and-forth lead trajectory conditions were expected to report being 
less pleased with the IU golfer, but rate the IU golfer’s skill more highly, report a greater 
likelihood that the IU golfer would win in a rematch, report a greater likelihood that they 
would bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, and risk a greater bet on the IU golfer to 
win in a rematch than participants assigned to the near comeback trajectory condition.  
In other words, a main effect of event trajectory on each of the five dependent variables 
was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis was based on the assumption that Hypothesis 3 
would be supported.  If in fact the blown lead, the last-hole defeat of even match, and the 
back-and-forth lead trajectory condition participants focused more on how the IU golfer 
could have or should have won the competition than did near comeback trajectory 
condition participants, they should have been correspondingly less pleased with the IU 
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golfer’s performance; yet they should have perceived the IU golfer as more skilled and 
worthy of betting on to win in a rematch.       
Hypothesis 5: No main effect of thought-listing on any of the dependent variables 
was expected to emerge from the data.  In accordance with Roese et al.’s (2005) and 
Goldinger et al.’s (2003) arguments, counterfactual thinking was expected to act as an 
automatic process in the current experiment.  That is, counterfactual responses (especially 
those by specific event condition participants) were expected to emerge even when 
participants were not deliberately asked to list their thoughts.  If so, then asking or not 
asking participants to list their thoughts should not have affected the data.  However, it 
was important to include the thought-listing manipulation in the current experiment to 
determine whether or not people spontaneously generate counterfactuals and whether or 
not the type of event (general or specific) affects post-event judgments even when 
participants are not asked to list their thoughts about the event.   
Hypothesis 6: The relative frequency of upward counterfactual responses to an 
event was expected to be a stronger predictor of post-event judgments than were pre-
event expectations for specific event condition participants, but pre-event expectations 
were expected to be stronger predictors of post-event judgments than was upward 
counterfactual response frequency for general event condition participants.  This 
hypothesis was based on the notion that the cognitive processing difference (stated in 
Hypothesis 1) resulted in different comparison cases for the two types of events.  
Sherman et al. (1999) argued that comparison cases for judging specific events may be 
largely the result of post-event counterfactual processing, whereas comparison cases for 
judging general events may be based on pre-event expectations.  Furthermore, it is well 
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established that the standard of comparison that people employ can very much influence 
the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions that they have toward the event (e.g., 
see Biernat & Manis, 1994; Schwarz, 1999).   
Hypothesis 7: The relationships between the type of event (general or specific) 
and post-event judgments were expected to be statistically mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward counterfactual responses.  If comparison cases for specific events 
were constructed through the mutation of specific event information, and if comparison 
cases for general events were constructed on the basis of pre-event expectations, 
counterfactuals should have mediated the relationships between the type of event and 
post-event judgments.  Because it was hypothesized that a different factor (expectancies 
versus counterfactuals) should have operated depending on the type of event (general 
versus specific), two separate interaction effects were also expected to emerge such that: 
1) the relationships between pre-event expectations and the dependent variables were 
stronger for general event condition participants than for specific event condition 
participants; and 2) the relationships between counterfactual frequency and the dependent 
variables were stronger for specific event condition participants than for general event 
condition participants. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 370 undergraduate students, enrolled in psychology courses at Indiana 
University, participated in Experiment 1 for partial fulfillment of course credit.  
Experimental sessions involved a maximum of six participants.     
 18
                                                                                           
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by a laboratory assistant who gave them a 
brief oral introduction to the experiment and escorted them to a cubicle equipped with a 
personal computer.  The experiment was introduced as a study of “what people think 
about as they watch sports.”  All experimental materials were presented using MediaLab 
v2004 Research Software (Jarvis, 2004).  The instructions of the experiment were self-
paced, and participants advanced the instructions by pressing the space bar or a response 
key.   
Participants were asked to imagine that they were about to view a simulation of a 
nationally televised, 9-hole miniature golf competition.  In addition, they were asked to 
imagine that the competition was between an Indiana University (IU; in-group) 
undergraduate on the IU golf team and a Purdue University (PU; out-group) 
undergraduate on the PU golf team, and that the proceeds of the competition go to 
charity.  They were then informed that they would be asked to report their judgments 
based on what they learn about the competition.      
Before learning more about the competition, participants were asked to report 
their expectations on four items.  Specifically, participants rated how skilled they 
expected the IU golfer to be on a 7-point scale anchored at very low skill (1) and very 
high skill (7), as well as how likely they thought it was that the IU golfer would win the 
competition and how likely they would be to bet that the IU golfer would win the 
competition on 7-point scales anchored at not at all likely (1) and extremely likely (7), and 
how many dollars they would be willing to bet that the same IU golfer would win the 
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competition if they were given $100 for participating in the experiment (where the 
minimum bet was $10).    
Each participant was then randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions (specific event or general event) and learned about each miniatures golfer’s 
performance on each of the nine holes of the competition.  To increase overall 
attentiveness to the experimental protocol, and to provide a useful check of whether or 
not participants followed instructions, participants were asked to report the score of the 
competition after each hole.      
Specific event condition.  For each hole, participants in the specific event 
condition viewed the course (see Figure 1.1) and then viewed each of the golfer’s strokes 
for each of the nine holes.  During the first hole, participants viewed a video sequence of 
both golfers easily making par (completing the hole with the standard expected number 
of shots) without anything abnormal occurring during play.   
Subsequent holes displayed what may be perceived by participants as poor shots 
made by the IU golfer, lucky shots made by the PU golfer, or normally expected 
performance by both players.  Some holes were won by the IU golfer and others were 
won by the PU golfer.  However, the golfers were presented as making par, or one shot 
above or below par on each hole.  Participants were randomly assigned to view one of 
four different trajectory sequences of clips of the competition, all of which had the IU 
golfer ultimately losing the competition by one stroke.  One sequence displayed the PU 
golfer with a relatively larger lead during the first two-thirds of the competition than the 
last third of the competition (near comeback); one sequence displayed the IU golfer with 
a lead in the first two-thirds of the competition (blown lead); one sequence displayed both 
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golfers in an even competition the entire way through until the final hole (last-hole defeat 
of even match); and one sequence displayed a back-and-forth lead between the two 
golfers until the final hole (back-and-forth lead); see Figure 1.2 for the design of each 
trajectory.  After viewing the play of each hole, each golfer’s number of strokes was 
displayed on a scoreboard for 10 seconds.  Directly following the ninth and final hole, 
participants learned that the IU golfer had lost the competition by one stroke.   
General event condition.  Participants in the general event condition viewed the 
very same video sequence as participants in the specific event condition, but only for the 
first hole (that is, they did not view each of the golfer’s strokes for the remaining eight 
holes).  For the remaining eight holes, participants in the general event condition viewed 
only the course with the golfers positioned at the tee (start point) for five seconds.  
Directly following each hole, the scoreboard was displayed for 10 seconds.  The 
scoreboard listed the same number of strokes for each hole as it did for participants in the 
specific event condition (one of four different trajectory sequences).  As in the specific 
event condition, participants learned that the IU golfer had lost the competition by one 
stroke.   
Thought-listing task.  Following each hole, half of the participants in both 
conditions were asked to complete a 1-minute thought-listing task.  Specifically, 
participants were asked to record any thoughts they had during or after what they 
previously viewed by typing one thought per screen (maximum of three thoughts).  In 
order to assess whether or not the same expected effects occur even when people are not 
directly asked to list their thoughts, the other half of the participants were not asked to 
complete the thought-listing task after each player’s information was received.  However, 
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their participation in the experiment was delayed (with a countdown displayed on the 
screen) for the same amount of time that would have elapsed had they been asked to list 
their thoughts after each hole (i.e., 1-minute).  During this time delay, it was explained to 
these participants that the computer was loading the next frames of the experiment.   
Dependent variables.  At the conclusion of the ninth hole, and after participants 
become aware of the final outcome, participants were asked to report how pleased they 
were with the IU golfer’s performance on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all pleased 
(1) and extremely pleased (7), as well as how skilled they believed the IU golfer to be on 
a 7-point scale anchored at very low skill (1) and very high skill (7).  Three additional 
questions asked participants to report how likely they would be to bet that the same IU 
golfer would win in a rematch against the same PU golfer and how likely they would be 
to bet that the same IU golfer would win a rematch against the same PU golfer on 7-point 
scales anchored at not at all likely (1) and extremely likely (7), as well as how many 
dollars they would be willing to bet that the same IU golfer would win in a rematch 
against the same PU golfer (using a $10 to $100 scale).  These final ratings served as the 
primary dependent variables of the experiment.  Participants were then debriefed and 
thanked for their participation.   
Design and Analyses  
Experiment 1 employed a 2 (type of event: general vs. specific) × 4 (event 
trajectory: near comeback, blown lead, last-hole defeat, back-and-forth) × 2 (thought-
listing: yes vs. no) complete between-groups factorial design.  Dependent variables, and 
the influences of the type of event, thought-listing instructions, pre-event expectancies, 
and counterfactuals, were examined using a combination of analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) statistics as well as correltaional and hierarchical multiple regression 
procedures. 
Results 
 Data from a total of 24 participants (roughly 1.5 participants per the 16 
conditions) were discarded from all of the analyses due to incomplete data as a result of 
computer failure, failure to complete the experiment by their own choice, or failure to 
follow directions.  Participants in the specific events plus thought-listing condition were a 
bit more likely to fail to complete the experiment (perhaps this was due to the relative 
length of the task).  Thus, data from a total of 346 participants were used in the analyses 
that follow.    
Preliminary Analyses 
 Importantly, participants in the two event type conditions (general and specific) 
did not differ in their pre-event expectations about the golf competition (see the top half 
of Table 1.1).  That is, regardless of event type condition, participants held relatively 
equal expectations about the IU golfer’s skill and likelihood of winning the competition, 
as well as their likelihood to bet on the IU golfer to win the competition and how much 
money they would be willing to place as a bet.  Participants also did not differ in their 
expectations with respect to event trajectory condition, thought-listing condition, or the 
possible interactions between these variables and with event type.     
Intercoder Agreement of Thought-Listings 
 A total of 3,749 thoughts were listed by participants in the thought-listing 
condition.  Each thought-listing response was coded by two separate coders as a 
counterfactual response (upward or downward) or a non-counterfactual response.  
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Neither of the coders coded a single thought-listing response as a downward 
counterfactual.  The overall agreement between the two coders was 97.46%.  Smith 
(2000) recommended that satisfactory coder agreement also be evidenced by intercoder 
correlations of .85 of higher for Spearman’s ρ and a Kappa index of at least .80.  With 
respect to these indices, the overall agreement was not as strong, Spearman’s ρ = .71, p < 
.001, Kappa = .71, p < .001.  However, other researchers (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, 
& Lowell, 1953; Smith, Feld, & Franz, 1992) have suggested that a corrected category 
agreement index be computed by dividing the product of two and the number of 
agreements between coders on a category being present by the sum of the number of 
cases scored as that category by coder 1 and the number of cases scored as that category 
by coder 2.  The category agreement index for counterfactual responses was .72 whereas 
the category agreement index for non-counterfactual responses was .98.      
Due to this suboptimal level of agreement between coders, especially for 
counterfactual responses, a third coder was used to resolve the disagreements.  A 
representative selection of counterfactual and non-counterfactual responses submitted by 
participants is displayed in Table 1.2.    
Upward Counterfactuals 
 The average frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by participants in the 
thought-listing condition was 1.39.  This total was out of 27 possible thoughts listed (a 
maximum of three thoughts could be listed following each of the nine holes).  At first 
glance the average frequency of counterfactuals may seem low.  However, upward 
counterfactuals are more likely to emerge in response to undesirable events as opposed to 
desirable ones (Gilovich, 1983; Markman et al., 1993, 1995).  Each hole of the 
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competition, in and of itself, can be regarded as an event, and the IU golfer either won or 
tied half of these holes (regardless of the trajectory).  Thus, the frequency of upward 
counterfactuals listed by participants in the thought-listing condition was not so 
infrequent.    
As stated earlier, participants assigned to the specific event condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
the event than were participants assigned to the general event condition (Hypothesis 1).  
This hypothesis was supported by a main effect of event type on the frequency of upward 
counterfactuals listed by participants, such that specific event condition participants listed 
a greater number of upward counterfactuals (M = 1.95, SD = 1.87) than did general event 
condition participants (M = .86, SD = .93), F(1, 167) = 21.58, p < .001. 
Anderson (2003) suggested that the influence of counterfactual thinking on 
judgment may be more complex than the simple frequency of counterfactual thoughts 
generated in response to an event.  For instance, the potency of counterfactual thinking 
may lie in the subjective ease of counterfactual generation, the amount of time that 
counterfactuals occupy one’s thinking, or the overall weight placed on counterfactual 
thoughts relative to the weight of other thoughts.  In this light, a measure of the degree to 
which upward counterfactual thoughts dominated a participant’s set of cognitive 
responses is of greater interest than the simple frequency.  Thus, analyses involving 
upward counterfactual frequency were conducted using a corrected proportion of upward 
counterfactuals.  To compute the corrected proportion for each participant, the overall 
proportion of upward counterfactuals was computed by simply dividing the number of 
upward counterfactuals by the total number of thoughts listed.  This proportion was then 
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converted to a ratio that represented the expected number of upward counterfactuals to 
thoughts given no information about the type of event.  A Bayesian corrected proportion 
was then computed (number of upward counterfactuals listed + 1 / number of total 
thoughts listed + b; where the weight, b, reflected a ratio equivalent to the average 
proportion of counterfactuals of the entire sample.  In other words, 1 divided by the 
proportion of counterfactuals.  In the current experiment, the mean proportion of upward 
counterfactuals across the entire was .0625; thus, b = 16.  According to this measure of 
upward counterfactual frequency, specific event participants listed a greater proportion of 
upward counterfactuals (M = .08, SD = .05) than did general event participants (M = .05, 
SD = .03), F(1, 167) = 21.55, p < .001.  Although all subsequent analyses examining 
upward counterfactual frequency as a moderator or mediator of other effects were 
computed using the Bayesian corrected proportion, the term “upward counterfactual 
frequency” is retained in the report of these analyses for ease of presentation.         
It was also predicted that participants assigned to the blown lead, the last-hole 
defeat of even match, and the back-and-forth lead trajectory conditions would generate a 
greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to the event than would 
participants assigned to the near comeback trajectory condition (Hypothesis 2).  
However, as revealed by a 2 (type of event) × 4 (event trajectory) ANOVA, trajectory 
failed to affect the frequency of upward counterfactual responses, F(3, 161) = 1.74, ns; 
nor did it interact with event type to affect this frequency, F(3, 161) = 1.03, ns.  Although 
no statistical difference was observed, the overall trend was actually opposite to the 
pattern expected.  That is, participants in the near comeback condition listed a greater 
average of upward counterfactual responses (M = .07, SD = .06) than any of the other 
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trajectory conditions: blown lead (M = .05, SD = .03); last-hole defeat of even match (M 
= .06, SD = .04); back-and-forth lead (M = .05, SD = .03).  Examination of the 
trajectories (see Figure 1.2) shows that the two trajectories with the greatest frequency of 
upward counterfactuals (near comeback and last-hole defeat) also have a greater 
frequency of ties and a smaller frequency of wins in the earlier holes of the competition 
in comparison to the two trajectories with the smallest frequency of upward 
counterfactuals (blown lead and back-and-forth lead).  This aspect of the event 
trajectories (a greater number of near wins for the IU golfer in the earlier stages of the 
competition in the near comeback and last-hole defeat trajectory conditions) may have 
increased the likelihood that participants in these conditions were to make reference to 
earlier holes of the competition (e.g., “He should have been more focused in the early 
holes.”) as well as to the later holes when asked to list thoughts following the 
presentation of later holes (thus, increasing their total frequency of counterfactual 
responses).  An inspection of the thought-listings following the last three holes supports 
this notion.  Of the upward counterfactual responses listed by participants in the near 
comeback trajectory condition following the last three holes, 44% of their counterfactuals 
clearly referenced things that could have or should have occurred differently during the 
earlier stages of the competition.  This figure was 14% for the last-hole defeat trajectory, 
14% for the blown lead trajectory, and 10% for the back-and-forth lead trajectory.  In a 
chi-square analysis of the full 8-cell table (counterfactuals that referenced earlier holes 
vs. counterfactuals that did not reference earlier holes for each of the four trajectories), 
these frequencies did not appear to be significantly different, χP2P (3, N = 40) = 4.42, ns.  
However, when comparing the near comeback condition to all other trajectories in a 4-
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cell test (only the frequency of counterfactuals that referenced earlier holes), the 
frequencies did appear to be significantly different, χP2P (1, N = 40) = 4.34, p < .05.  In this 
respect, it is also important to note that the trajectory conditions did not differ in their 
mean frequencies of upward counterfactuals following the last three holes of the 
competition, F(3, 154) = 1.09, ns.          
Satisfaction with Performance and Perceptions of the IU Golfer’s Skill 
 Two separate 2 (type of event) × 4 (event trajectory) × 2 (thought-listing 
condition) ANOVAs were conducted for satisfaction with the IU golfer’s performance 
and perceptions of the IU golfer’s skill at the conclusion of the competition.  As stated 
earlier, participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected to report being 
less pleased with the IU golfer, but rate the IU golfer’s skill more highly (Hypothesis 3, 
part 1).  This hypothesis was based on the idea that the upward counterfactual responses 
would lead to an affective contrast effect for their satisfaction with the IU golfer’s 
performance but not for their perceptions of the IU golfer’s skill (because it is not an 
affective dimension).  However, the data displayed in the bottom half of Table 1.1 do not 
support the expected affective contrast effect for satisfaction with the IU golfer’s 
performance.  Instead, the data suggest affective assimilation effects of event type on 
satisfaction and perceived skill, such that the group of participants that counterfactualized 
the most (i.e., specific event) reported greater satisfaction and perceptions of greater skill 
for the IU golfer than the general event participants.   
With regard to satisfaction and perceived skill, it was also predicted that 
participants assigned to the blown lead, the last-hole defeat of even match, and the back-
and-forth lead trajectory conditions would report being less pleased with the IU golfer, 
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but rate the IU golfer’s skill more highly (Hypothesis 4, part 1).  A main effect of 
trajectory on satisfaction was observed F(3, 330) = 5.67, p < .01, but a main effect of 
trajectory on perceived skill was not, F(3, 330) = 1.90, ns.  Similar to the pattern of 
means for counterfactual frequency by event trajectory, the pattern of means for 
satisfaction by trajectory was opposite to that originally expected.  Rather than being the 
least pleased with the IU golfer’s performance, participants assigned to the near 
comeback condition reported being more pleased (M = 4.22, SD = 1.41) than did 
participants assigned to the blown lead condition (M = 3.14, SD = 1.80; t(330) = 4.31, p < 
.001), the last-hole defeat condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.73; t(330) = 2.55, p < .05), and the 
back-and-forth lead condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.63; t(330) = 2.27, p < .05).  All of the 
additional pairwise contrasts failed to reveal any additional statistically significant 
differences between the four trajectory conditions for satisfaction with the IU golfer’s 
performance. 
However, the main effects of event type and trajectory for satisfaction were 
qualified by an interaction between event type and trajectory, F(3, 330) = 3.23, p < .05.  
As is evident in Figure 1.3, only when the trajectory of the event was one of a near 
comeback was the satisfaction of specific event condition participants (M = 4.67, SD = 
1.17) greater than that of their general event condition counterparts (M = 3.74, SD = 
1.50), t(330) = 2.66, p < .01.  Specific and general event condition participants did not 
differ significantly in their satisfaction with the IU golfer in any of the other three 
trajectory conditions.  The main effect of event trajectory and its interaction with event 
type, although not expected from the outset of the experiment, provides further support 
for the notion that an affective assimilation effect occurred for participants assigned to 
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the specific event condition.  More specifically, this assimilation effect appears to have 
occurred for participants assigned to the specific event/near comeback cell (the same 
condition that led to the most counterfactualizing), especially toward the end of the 
competition.                              
It is also important to note that the group of null effects included the absence of 
main effects of thought-listing on satisfaction with the IU golfer’s performance and his 
perceived skill.  In addition, thought-listing condition did not interact significantly with 
event type or event trajectory for these dependent variables.  Thus, Hypothesis 5 was 
supported in this respect.  No other statistically significant effects were observed for these 
dependent variables.  
Confidence Regarding a Rematch 
 Three separate 2 (type of event) × 4 (event trajectory) × 2 (thought-listing 
condition) ANOVAs were conducted for the three measures of confidence in the IU 
golfer as it pertained to a rematch with the same PU golfer.  As stated in the second part 
of Hypothesis 3, participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected to 
report a greater likelihood that the IU golfer would win in a rematch, report a greater 
likelihood that they would bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, and risk a greater bet 
on the IU golfer to win in a rematch than were participants assigned to the general event 
condition.  This hypothesis was supported for each of the dependent variables (see the 
bottom half of Table 1.1).   
However, the main effect of event type on the perceived likelihood that the IU 
golfer would win in a rematch was qualified by an unexpected event type by thought-
listing condition interaction, F(1, 330) = 4.38, p < .05.  When participants were not asked 
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to list their thoughts following each hole of the competition, specific event participants 
reported a greater perceived likelihood of an IU win in a rematch (M = 4.87, SD = 1.09) 
than did general event participants (M = 4.23, SD = 1.02), t(330) = 3.18, p < .01.  No 
difference was found between specific event participants (M = 4.46, SD = 1.20) and 
general event participants (M = 4.45, SD = 1.23) when they were asked to list their 
thoughts, t(330) = .05, ns.  Further pairwise contrasts revealed that the two means among 
the general event participants did not differ (t(330) = -1.25, ns), but that the two means 
among the specific event participants did reach a marginal difference t(330) = 1.83, p < 
.10.  This overall pattern of data for the perceived likelihood that the IU golfer would win 
in a rematch may suggest that people rely even more on something other than 
counterfactual responses (e.g., pre-event expectations) when reacting to general event 
information, especially when they are not explicitly asked to list their thoughts about the 
event.  On the other hand, this pattern of data was not found among the other two 
confidence variables, and thus, only moderate confidence in this notion can be supported.              
No other main effects or interactions were observed for the three confidence 
variables.  Therefore, the second part of Hypothesis 4 regarding the main effect of event 
trajectory on the confidence variables, failed to receive support. 
Moderation of Pre-Event Expectations and Upward Counterfactuals 
 The final two hypotheses regarding moderation of pre-event expectations and 
moderation and mediation of post-event counterfactual responses were examined using 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses according to the procedures recommended by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983).  In each of these analyses, the three confidence measures 
served as the dependent variables.   
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Pre-event expectancy and upward counterfactual frequency were tested as 
moderators of the relationship between event type and the three confidence measures in 
six separate hierarchical multiple regression models using the procedures recommended 
by Cohen and Cohen (1983).  To simplify the remainder of the current and subsequent 
experimental analyses, the pre-event expectancy scores were transformed to z-scores and 
summed to create a composite pre-event expectancy variable (each of the four pre-event 
expectancy measures correlated significantly, average r = .32).  All subsequent analyses 
employed event type as a dummy coded variable (general event = 0; specific event = 1) 
and continuous variables were centered.  For each hierarchical multiple regression model, 
event type and one of the proposed moderators were entered in step 1 and their 
interaction term was entered in step 2.        
Of the six tests of moderation, only one was supported statistically; pre-event 
expectancy moderated the relationship between event type and perceived likelihood of 
the IU golfer to win in a rematch.  More specifically, the two main effects of event type 
(β = .11, t(343) = 2.04, p < .05) and pre-event expectancy (β = .20, t(343) = 3.87, p < .01) 
on perceived likelihood of the IU golfer to win in a rematch (RP2P = .05, F(2, 343) = 10.25, 
p < .001) were qualified by an interaction between event type and pre-event expectancy 
(β = -.16, t(342) = -2.18, p < .05; ΔRP2P = .02, ΔF(1, 342) = 4.75, p < .05).  Simple slope 
analyses were examined according to the procedures recommended by Aiken and West 
(1991).  Thus, the simple slopes were plotted and examined at one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of pre-event expectancy (see Figure 1.4).  The simple slope 
analysis showed that the perceived likelihood of the IU golfer to win in a rematch was 
greater in the specific condition than the general condition when pre-event expectancies 
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were relatively low β = .22, t(342) = 3.04, p < .01.  However, as expected, the perceived 
likelihood of the IU golfer to win in a rematch increased with pre-event expectancies 
significantly only when exposed to the general outcome of the competition, β = .43, 
t(342) = 4.65, p < .01.  No other simple slopes were statistically significant.   
Mediation of Upward Counterfactuals 
Next, mediation analyses were examined with the current data according to the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  In each of these analyses, the three 
confidence measures served as the dependent variables.  As stated earlier, upward 
counterfactuals should mediate the relationships between event type and post-event 
judgments (Hypothesis 7).   
First and foremost, there were three separate relationships for upward 
counterfactual frequency to possibly mediate: 1) the relationship between event type and 
perceived likelihood of the IU golfer to win in a rematch, β = .12, t(344) = 2.30, p < .05; 
2) the relationship between event type and perceived likelihood that one would place a 
bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, β = .15, t(344) = 2.82, p < .01; and 3) the 
relationship between event type and hypothetical bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, 
β = .11, t(344) = 1.97, p < .05.     
Upward counterfactual frequency was tested as a mediator of the relationships 
between event type and the three dependent variables (see Figure 1.5).  As indicated 
earlier in a one-way ANOVA, upward counterfactual frequency was significantly 
associated with the specific event condition, β = .34, t(167) = 4.64, p < .001.  As 
displayed in Figure 1.6, when both event type and upward counterfactual frequency were 
entered into the regression model simultaneously, event type was no longer a significant 
 33
                                                                                           
predictor of any of the three dependent variables.  Yet, upward counterfactual frequency 
was a significant predictor of two of the three variables (i.e., perceived likelihood that 
one would place a bet and hypothetical bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch).  
Modified Sobel (1982) tests showed that the reduction in the effect of event type on 
perceived likelihood of the IU golfer to win in a rematch was not a significant reduction, 
z = .56, ns.  However, the reductions in the effect of event type on perceived likelihood 
that one would place a bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, as well as on hypothetical 
bet on the IU golfer to win in a rematch, were statistically significant (z = 2.15, p < .05; z 
= 2.25, p < .05 respectively).  Each of these final three mediational models was 
recomputed controlling for pre-event expectations in an earlier step.  The pattern of 
results was virtually the same; counterfactuals still mediated the relationships between 
event type and two of the DVs (likelihood of betting and hypothetical bet amount). 
Pre-event expectancies as a mediator of the relationships between event type and 
the dependent variables was not examined due to the fact that a major criterion of Baron 
and Kenny (1986) would be violated, namely a causal relationship between the 
independent variable (event type) and the proposed mediator (pre-event expectancy).  It 
was shown earlier that there was no causal relationship between event type and pre-event 
expectancies, nor should one have been expected.  In fact, in the current and all 
subsequent experiments, pre-event expectancies were measured before exposing 
participants to the event information.  Thus, no statistical argument can be made for pre-
event expectations as a mediator.  However, it is certainly possible for an individual to re-
access or revise their initial expectations when forming judgments about a recent event, 
or when asked to form expectations about a similar, future event.  If observers of general 
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event information do rely on their pre-event expectancies as a comparison case to judge 
recently observed and subsequent events, their pre-event expectancies should at least 
statistically reduce any effect that the type of event (general or specific) has on judgments 
and future expectations.  Yet, the paradigm used in the current and all subsequent 
experiments did not include a measure of the extent to which participants re-access or 
revised their initial expectations.   
Discussion 
 Reactions to events are believed to be partially determined by the comparison 
case that one uses as a standard or reference point.  Furthermore, the comparison cases 
used to form judgments about general events may be quite different from the comparison 
cases used to form judgments about specific events.  As the current experiment 
demonstrated, people may not only have different reactions to general and specific 
events, but they may also differ in their perceptions of the probability of particular 
outcomes regarding similar, future events.  The current experiment is the very first to 
demonstrate that counterfactual responses are more likely to emerge in response to 
specific events than they are to general events.  Apparently, people may also differ with 
respect to their perceived likelihood to take risks as well as how risky they expect 
themselves to be as a function on the type of event (general or specific) to which they 
have been previously exposed.  
 The data of Experiment 1 also suggest that the relationship between the type of 
event and satisfaction with its outcome is more complex than first theorized.  For 
instance, the motivation to counterfactualize, whether it be evaluative-comparative or 
experiential, may influence the overall satisfaction with an event’s outcome.  The specific 
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way in which the event unfolds (i.e., event trajectory in the current experiment) also 
appears to influence reactions to the event.  Although the significant effects involving 
event trajectory were in the opposite direction of what was expected, they may still be 
explained by the frequency of upward counterfactual that emerged in the specific event 
condition.  Given McMullen’s (1997) findings, it seems likely that some of the mental 
simulation of alternatives to the outcome miniature golf competition was motivated by 
the experiential mode.  McMullen (1997) showed that under some conditions upward 
counterfactuals can lead to affective assimilation (i.e., positive affect brought about by 
thinking of how things could have been better).  McMullen distinguished between the 
evaluative-comparative and experiential modes of mental simulation.  The use of the 
evaluative-comparative mode may be adopted simply by a desire to evaluate actual 
outcomes, whereas the experiential mode may motivated by a desire to experience the 
counterfactual simulation itself, as if it were real (as in the case of fantasizing).  From 
McMullen’s (1997) experiments, it appears that affective contrast effects tend to result 
from the evaluative-comparative mode of mental simulation, whereas affective 
assimilation effects tend to result from the experiential mode of mental simulation.  It is 
possible that counterfactuals in response to the competition were of an experiential 
nature.  If so, this would lead to an affective assimilation effect rather than an affective 
contrast effect.  In any case, it is also important to recognize that the average level of 
satisfaction reported by specific event condition participants was still below the mid-
point of the scale, suggesting that they were still on average more displeased than pleased 
with the IU golfer’s performance, but less displeased than their general event condition 
counterparts. 
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 Perhaps most important to the current conceptualization of reactions to general 
and specific events were the moderation, and mediation results.  These results suggest 
that the upward counterfactual thoughts that emerge in response to an event play a more 
important role in reactions to specific events, whereas pre-event expectancies play a more 
important role in reactions to general events.  It is theorized that these variables play their 
most important role in shaping the standards of comparison used to form judgments about 
the events themselves.  From the current experiment, it appears that these variables also 
influence one’s expectations about similar, future events, as evidenced by some of the 
tests of mediation.  Yet, the evidence of mediation by way of counterfactualizing specific 
events attained greater support than did moderation by way of pre-event expectations in 
response to general events.  On the other hand, expectations change in response to direct 
experience (i.e., new information) as well as disconfirmed expectations (Olson, Roese, & 
Zanna, 1996).  It is possible that in the relative absence of counterfactual thinking, 
general event condition participants focused more of their attention on the outcome, 
rather than on more desirable alternatives to reality.  If so, perhaps the expectations of 
general event participants were appropriately adjusted by the highly relevant information 
they had recently gained when it came to making judgments about a similar, future event.  
This notion is supported by the relatively moderate expectations and probability estimates 
of the general event condition participants regarding the rematch (see again Table 1.1).     
However, expectations and counterfactuals should matter for reactions to both 
general and specific events.  Certainly no case is made here for the notion that 
counterfactuals do not affect reactions to general events and that pre-event expectancies 
do not affect reactions to specific events.  Rather, because counterfactuals are more likely 
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to emerge in response to specific as opposed to general events, counterfactuals are likely 
to play a larger role in reactions to specific events than in reactions to general events.  In 
the absence of counterfactualized comparison cases, pre-event expectations are likely to 
remain more integral to the reactions of general events than to the reactions of specific 
events.   
Interestingly, another potential influence on the tendency to counterfactualize 
features of an event may be the degree to which one experiences failed expectations (i.e., 
the discrepancy between pre-event expectations and the outcome of the event itself).  
Wong and Weiner (1981) showed that people are usually more motivated to explain 
unexpected outcomes than they are expected ones, and Gilovich (1983) demonstrated that 
people are more likely to counterfactualize unfavorable outcomes than favorable ones.  If 
this was true in Experiment 1, then perhaps the greater the discrepancy between inital 
expectancies and the outcome, the greater was the tendency to counterfactualize features 
of the event.  If so, this increased tendency may have led to an even greater mediational 
role of counterfactual thinking.  Any such tendency is expected to be especially great for 
specific events, where observers have readily accessible event features to mutate.  Data 
from Experiments 4 and 5 were more appropriate to examine such notions because they 
allowed both pre-event expectations and personal outcomes to vary, whereas only pre-
event expectations were permitted to vary in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.  
A particular limitation of the current experiment may be the inconsistency in the 
results among the three confidence variables, all of which correlated with each other 
significantly (average r = .51).  On the other hand, the dependent variables dealt with 
people’s predictions and their own behavioral intentions to place a bet on a particular 
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outcome.  It is well know from studies on attitude-behavior consistency (e.g., Fazio & 
Zanna, 1978; Regan & Fazio, 1977; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 
1981) that consistency is not always found when requesting another person to “put their 
money where their mouth is,” nor should there be much reason to expect “true” 
consistency to exist between one’s predicted behaviors and their actual behaviors (e.g., 
see studies conducted by Sherman, 1980).     
Finally, asking people to explicitly list their thoughts following an event may or 
may not increase their likelihood of counterfactualizing features of the event or the extent 
to which they think about their thoughts.  In any case, the effects of event type on the 
dependent variables were observed regardless of whether or not participants were asked 
to list their thoughts.  Thus, any effect that event type had on the tendency to either re-
access pre-event expectancies or to counterfactualize features of the event appears to 
have not involved the required listing of thoughts. 
Experiment 1 involved reactions to events that participants only observed; that is, 
participants were not in any way in control of the outcome of the event.  It is important to 
examine the current conceptualization of reactions to general and specific events across 
other task domains and for events over which people may feel they have some sort of 
control.  This aspect of general and specific events was examined in Experiment 2 (also 
see Experiments 4 and 5).   
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CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 2:  
GLOBAL AND SPECIFIC TRIVIA TEST PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
Do the different cognitive responses that people have toward general and specific 
cases play roles in estimates of one’s confidence in their own skills or in their estimates 
of their performance for future tasks?  Such questions are relevant to the current model 
being proposed.  Of further interest is whether or not it can be empirically demonstrated 
that these roles stem from different standards of comparison shaped by counterfactual 
responses to specific event information and by pre-event expectancies for global event 
information.   
Some clues to the answers to such inquiries are provided by gambling studies 
conducted by Gilovich (1983).  Gilovich showed that gamblers tend to discount or 
explain away their losses, especially when the salience of a “fluke” occurrence precedes 
the final outcome.  Such fluke occurrences are likely to be a focus of attention only for 
perceivers of specific event information.  In fact, perceivers of general event information 
are typically unaware of abnormal, mutable features present in specific event 
information.  If counterfactual thinking is more likely to occur after receiving specific 
event information about one’s own performance on a task than after receiving global 
information, a different standard of comparison should be used for each type of feedback 
(specific or global).  Essentially, counterfactual thoughts in response to specific instances 
may make more salient how successful one could have or should have been.  These 
counterfactual alternatives are believed to be used as standards of comparison for 
constructing expectations about future global performance on similar tasks as well as 
global estimates of confidence.  As the results of the Gilovich (1983) studies suggest, it is 
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upward counterfactual thinking following undesirable outcomes that prevents people 
from using actual outcome information as the standard of comparison for estimates of 
their own future performance.  Rather, people appear to explain away unfavorable 
outcomes and utilize alternatives to reality as standards of comparison for estimating their 
abilities.  This route may leave a losing individual with a more optimistic sense that their 
abilities are greater than that which has been demonstrated by previous outcomes.  Thus, 
gamblers may continue to gamble even in the face of frequent and consistent losses.    
When receiving specific feedback performance (i.e., following each decision) on 
a task that involves multiple alternatives, such as a multiple choice trivia test, people may 
find it quite easy to counterfactualize those instances in which they receive undesirable 
feedback (i.e., they are told they are incorrect).  “I knew I should have selected C” or “I 
was going to pick that alternative – I should have gone with my gut feeling” are common 
reactions in such cases.  This is because people can easily imagine themselves selecting 
the correct alternative, especially if they actually had considered it before giving their 
final answer.  For people who receive global or aggregated performance feedback 
(following multiple events), counterfactual alternatives should not be as readily available.  
People who receive global feedback should be more likely to use their feedback and their 
initial expectancies as their standards of comparison for constructing expectations about 
future performance on a similar task, as well as global estimates of confidence.  If 
specific instances of feedback, as opposed to more global instances of feedback, lead one 
to counterfactualize reality and use a more optimistic standard of comparison, then 
receiving specific instances of feedback should lead to expectations of better global 
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performance, as well as estimates of greater confidence, than does a single instance of 
global feedback. 
Overview of Experiment 
In Experiment 2, participants were asked to complete a multiple-choice trivia test.  
Before participants began responding to trivia items, they reported their pre-test 
expectations.  After completing each test item (or the entire test, depending on condition), 
participants were presented with either global or specific false feedback (when necessary 
to ensure 35% accuracy rate) regarding their performance.  All participants were led to 
believe that they responded to 35% of the total trivia items correctly regardless of their 
actual performance.  Half of the participants were also asked to complete a thought-
listing task (after each item or after the completion of all trivia items, depending on 
condition).  Participants were then asked to respond to questions regarding how well they 
would expect to perform on a future, similar trivia test, how confident they were that they 
would perform at the rate they expected, and how much they would bet that they would 
improve their performance.   
Hypotheses 
Five separate hypotheses were tested in Experiment 2:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
the feedback than were participants assigned to the global feedback condition.  That is, a 
main effect of type of feedback on the number of upward counterfactuals generated was 
expected.  As with Experiment 1, this hypothesis is consistent with Sherman et al.’s 
(1999) use of norm theory, which argued that specific events tend to increase one’s 
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attention toward mutable features more than general events do.  Participants were also 
expected to generate downward counterfactuals, as some favorable outcomes may have 
been perceived as nearly unfavorable.  For instance, a participant may have had thoughts 
about two possible alternatives as the correct answer to an item, received favorable 
feedback, and experienced a form of relief after counterfactualizing the outcome as a 
“nearly unfavorable” one.  However, upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
nearly favorable outcomes tend to occur with greater frequency (Markman et al., 1993) 
than do downward counterfactual thoughts in response to nearly unfavorable outcomes, 
especially when the antecedents of the outcome are perceived to be controllable 
(Markman et al., 1995).  Favorable outcomes may also be accepted at face value 
(Gilovich, 1983) and thus reduce the likelihood of downward counterfactual responses.  
Therefore, upward counterfactual responses were again expected to dominate among the 
counterfactual responses generated by participants.   
Hypothesis 2: Participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to report greater expectations of improving their performance on a similar 
trivia test, greater subjective confidence in doing so, and were expected to place greater 
bets than were participants assigned to the global feedback condition.  In other words, a 
main effect of type of feedback on each of the three dependent variables was expected to 
emerge.  This hypothesis was based on the assumption that Hypothesis 1 would be 
supported.  If in fact specific feedback condition participants focused more on how they 
could have or should have correctly answered trivia items than did global feedback 
condition participants, they should have been correspondingly more likely to expect 
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better performance on a similar trivia test and feel greater subjective confidence in doing 
so.       
Hypothesis 3: No main effect of thought-listing on any of the dependent variables 
was expected.  Counterfactual responses (especially those by specific feedback condition 
participants) were expected to be generated by participants even when they are not 
deliberately asked to list their thoughts.  The reasoning elaborated in the Hypothesis 5 
section of Experiment 1 was employed here as well.    
Hypothesis 4: The relative frequency of upward counterfactual responses to an 
event was expected to be a stronger predictor of post-test judgments than were pre-test 
expectations for specific feedback condition participants, but pre-test expectations were 
expected to be stronger predictors of post-test judgments than was upward counterfactual 
response frequency for global feedback condition participants.  As described in 
Hypothesis 6 of Experiment 1, this hypothesis was based on the notion that the cognitive 
processing difference (stated in Hypothesis 1) resulted in different comparison cases for 
the two types of events.   
Hypothesis 5: The relationships between the type of feedback (global or specific) 
and post-test judgments were expected to be statistically mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward counterfactual responses.  If comparison cases for specific feedback 
were constructed through the mutation of specific feedback information and comparison 
cases for global feedback were constructed on the basis of pre-test expectations, 
counterfactuals should have mediated the relationships between the type of feedback and 
post-test judgments.  Because it is hypothesized that a different factor (expectancies 
versus counterfactuals) should have operated depending on the type of feedback (global 
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versus specific), two separate interaction effects were also expected to emerge such that: 
1) the relationships between pre-event expectations and the dependent variables were 
stronger for global feedback condition participants than for specific feedback condition 
participants; and 2) the relationships between counterfactual frequency and the dependent 
variables were stronger for specific feedback condition participants than for global 
feedback condition participants. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 132 undergraduate students, enrolled in psychology courses at Indiana 
University, participated in the experiment for partial fulfillment of course credit.  Each 
experimental session included a maximum of four participants.     
Materials 
A goal of the current experiment was to control the level of performance feedback 
given to each participant.  Thus, a set of 36 multiple-choice trivia items was designed 
such that each item’s alternatives were perceived as feasibly correct.  These types of 
items were expected to boost the perceived validity of any false feedback received by 
participants because each foil was a reasonable alternative.  Twenty trivia items (see 
Appendix A) were then selected from the original set of 36 items on the basis of the 
results of a pilot test (N = 33).  Those items that showed a relatively even distribution of 
alternatives selected as the correct answer and that reached a correct response rate 
between 15% and 60% were selected from the larger set.  The remaining 20 items were 
then pilot tested to again determine the correct response rate for each item, as well as the 
overall performance rate for the 20 items (N = 28).P2P  The correct response rate of all 
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items ranged between 10.7% and 71.4%.  The average overall performance rate was 
35.4% correct (M = 7.07, SD = 2.91).  
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by a laboratory assistant who gave them a 
brief oral introduction to the experiment and escorted them to a cubicle equipped with a 
personal computer.  The experiment was introduced as a study of “what people think 
about as they respond to trivia questions.”  All experimental materials were presented 
using MediaLab v2004 Research Software (Jarvis, 2004).  The instructions of the 
experiment were self-paced, and participants advanced the instructions by pressing the 
space bar or a response key.   
Participants were informed that they would be asked to respond to 20 trivia 
questions.  To increase overall motivation and involvement in the task, participants were 
also informed that the names of the top ten high scorers, over the entire experiment, 
would be entered into a drawing for a $30 prize.  It was explained that the better they 
performed on the trivia test, the better their chances would be of winning the drawing.   
Before participants began the trivia test, they were presented with sample items 
on a single screen for the purpose of informing them about the nature of the questions 
included in the trivia test.  These items appeared again while participants were 
completing the test (items 8, 12, and 13)P3P.  Importantly, participants were not be given 
the correct answers to these items, nor were they permitted to respond to them during the 
presentation of the test instructions.  Participants were then asked how many items out of 
20 they expected to answer correctly as well as how confident they were that they would 
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perform at this rate (i.e., response to the previous question) using a 7-point scale 
anchored at not at all confident (1) and extremely confident (7).   
Participants were then presented with the multiple-choice trivia test consisting of 
the 20 items listed in Appendix A (in the order listed).  Items were presented one at a 
time on a computer screen.  Responses were made by clicking on one of three available 
choices (marked as A, B, and C).  Participants were also randomly assigned to one of two 
performance feedback conditions (global or specific).   
Global feedback condition.  After completing the entire trivia test, participants 
assigned to the global feedback condition were informed that they correctly answered 7 
out of the 20 items (35%).  Thus, false feedback was given to participants who did not 
actually perform at this rate (i.e., the majority of the participants).  These participants 
were reminded of the 20 trivia items (one per screen) with the answers they selected in 
parentheses (not the correct answers).  Half of the participants were also asked to 
complete a thought-listing task (typing one thought per screen) for each of the 20 items.  
Specifically, these participants were asked to list thoughts that went through their mind 
during the trivia test, after answering trivia items, or after the global feedback they 
received.  In order to assess whether or not the same expected effects occur even when 
people are not directly asked to list their thoughts, the other half of the global feedback 
participants were not asked to complete a thought-listing task.  However, a delay with a 
countdown was displayed at the bottom of the screen as was described in Experiment 1.   
Specific feedback condition.  Participants in the specific feedback condition were 
also presented with performance feedback.  However, they received feedback after 
responding to each trivia test item.  This feedback informed participants whether or not 
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their response was correct or incorrect.  The correct answer was revealed in cases for 
which they were informed that they were incorrect.  Some of this feedback may have 
been false and was given such that participants were led to believe that they answered 7 
of the 20 items correctly.  That is, regardless of their responses, these participants were 
informed that their response was incorrect for 13 items and correct for 7 items.  However, 
depending on their responses to the items, participants may have differed greatly in the 
sequence of feedback that they received.  In other words, false feedback was given only 
when necessary such that each participant’s performance conformed to 35% correct (7 
out of 20).P4P   
Immediately after receiving their feedback for each item, half of the participants 
were asked to complete a thought-listing task (typing one thought per screen).  During 
this task, each of the trivia questions with the participant’s response (and its “correct” 
response) was displayed on the screen.  At the bottom of the screen, these participants 
were asked to list any thoughts that went through their mind while answering the trivia 
item or after the specific feedback they received.  The other half of the participants were 
not asked to complete a thought-listing task (a countdown was displayed at the bottom of 
the screen).   
Dependent variables.  Following the listing of thoughts (or a delay depending on 
the condition), participants were asked to report how well they would expect to perform 
on a similar trivia test, consisting of 20 new items, by indicating how many items out of 
20 they would expect to answer correctly using a 21-point scale (0/20, 1/20, 
2/20,...20/20).  Participants were also asked to indicate their subjective confidence in 
their ability to perform at this rate (i.e., response to previous question) on another trivia 
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test using a 7-point scale anchored at not at all confident (1) and extremely confident (7).  
Finally, participants were asked the following hypothetical question: “Hypothetically, if 
you had $100, how much of it would you bet on the chance that you would correctly 
answer more than 7 items on a similar, 20-item trivia test?”  Participants were then asked 
about any suspicions they may have had about the validity of the feedback they received; 
they were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  Following the data 
collection phase of the experiment, an electronic drawing was conducted and the winning 
participant was contacted to receive the award. 
Design and Analyses  
Experiment 2 employed a 2 (type of feedback: global vs. specific) × 2 (thought-
listing: yes vs. no) complete between-groups factorial design.  Performance expectation, 
subjective confidence rating, and reported bet value were examined as dependent 
variables.  Dependent variables, and the influences of the type of feedback, thought-
listing instructions, pre-test expectancies, and counterfactuals, were examined using a 
combination of ANOVA statistics as well as correlational and hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses. 
Importantly, all data were analyzed with respect to the actual percentage of items 
that participants answered correctly (rather than the 35% success rate they were given).  
The actual performance of participants was important to consider for a number of 
reasons.  Those participants who actually responded to more items correctly may have 
possessed more knowledge of trivia or may perform better on trivia tests.  Because 
people generally have a good sense of their trivia skills, either of these factors may have 
affected each participant’s pre-test expectancy.  In addition, the further a participant’s 
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actual performance deviated from 35%, the more false feedback they received, and the 
greater their chances of detecting deception.  Thus, beyond simply examining the 
correlation between pre-test expectancy and actual performance rate, actual performance 
rate was used as a covariate when appropriate.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Importantly, participants in the two feedback conditions (global and specific) did 
not differ in their pre-test expectations.  That is, regardless of feedback condition, 
participants held relatively equal expectations about their performance on the trivia test.  
Participants also did not differ in their actual performance on the trivia test nor their 
suspicion of the validity of the feedback they received (see the top half of Table 2.1).  
The total actual number correct for the entire sample was well within the range expected 
from the pilot study data (M = 6.57, SD = 1.98; 32.85% correct).  Suspicion of the 
validity of the feedback was below the mid-point for both feedback conditions.  
Fortunately, yet surprisingly, actual performance did not correlate significantly with 
suspicion of the validity of the feedback, r(130) = .15, ns.  Thus, the manipulation of 
false feedback appeared to be successful.         
Intercoder Agreement of Thought- Listings 
 A total of 3,251 thoughts were listed by participants in the thought-listing 
condition.  Each thought-listing response was coded by two separate coders as a 
counterfactual response (upward or downward) or a non-counterfactual response.  Only 
one of the coders appeared to utilize the downward counterfactual as a category for 
coding thought-listing responses (total = 5).  The overall agreement between the two 
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coders was 96.91%.  The level of intercoder agreement nearly reached the levels 
recommended by Smith (2000); Spearman’s ρ = .80, p < .001, Kappa = .79, p < .001 (the 
five downward counterfactuals were excluded from the Kappa test as it requires a 
symmetric table with matching values for each variable).  The category agreement index 
for upward counterfactual responses was .87, whereas the category agreement index for 
non-counterfactual responses was .99.          
A third coder was used to resolve the disagreements.  A representative selection 
of counterfactual and non-counterfactual responses submitted by participants is displayed 
in Table 2.2.    
Upward Counterfactuals 
 The average frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by participants in the 
thought-listing condition was 2.57.  This total was out of 60 possible thoughts listed (a 
maximum of three thoughts could be listed for each item).  Again, upward 
counterfactuals are more likely to emerge in response to undesirable events as opposed to 
desirable ones (Gilovich, 1983; Markman et al., 1993, 1995).  Each item of the test, in 
and of itself, can be regarded as an event, and participants were told that they were 
correct 35% of the time.  Thus, the frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by 
participants as a spontaneous response should be considered in this light.    
As stated earlier, participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
the event than were participants assigned to the global feedback condition (Hypothesis 1).  
This hypothesis was supported by a main effect of feedback type on the frequency of 
upward counterfactuals listed by participants, such that specific feedback participants 
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listed almost four times the number of upward counterfactuals (M = 4.06, SD = 2.04) as 
did global feedback participants (M = 1.09, SD = 1.51), F(1, 64) = 45.07, p < .001. 
As in Experiment 1, a Bayesian corrected proportion was also computed for 
upward counterfactual frequency.  In the current experiment, the mean proportion of 
upward counterfactuals across the entire was .06; therefore, b = 16 (see p. 27).  
According to this measure of upward counterfactual frequency, specific feedback 
participants listed a greater proportion of upward counterfactuals (M = .08, SD = .03) 
than did global feedback participants (M = .04, SD = .03), F(1, 64) = 30.58, p < .001.  
Although all subsequent analyses examining upward counterfactual frequency as a 
moderator or mediator of other effects were computed using the Bayesian corrected 
proportion, the term “upward counterfactual frequency” is retained in the report of these 
analyses for ease of presentation.         
Confidence Regarding a New Trivia Test 
Three separate 2 (type of feedback) × 2 (thought-listing condition) analyses of 
covariance (ANCOVA) tests were conducted for the three measures of confidence 
pertaining to a new, similar trivia test.  Actual performance on the initial trivia test was 
included as a covariate in the test of differences between the feedback conditions among 
the dependent variables.  However, this covariate was not statistically significant in any 
of the ANCOVAs.  Thus, actual performance was not included in any of the subsequent 
analyses of Experiment 2.  As stated in Hypothesis 2, participants assigned to the specific 
feedback condition were expected to report greater expectations of improving their 
performance on a similar trivia test, greater subjective confidence in doing so, and were 
expected to place greater bets than were participants assigned to the global feedback 
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condition.  This hypothesis was supported for each of the dependent variables (see the 
bottom half of Table 2.1).  There was no main effect of thought-listing condition and no 
interaction between feedback and thought-listing condition.  Thus, the prediction that 
thought-listing instructions would not affect the dependent variables (Hypothesis 3) was 
supported.   
Moderation of Pre-Test Expectations and Upward Counterfactuals 
 The final two hypotheses regarding moderation of pre-event expectations and 
moderation and mediation of post-event counterfactual responses were examined using 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses according to the procedures recommended by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983).  In each of these analyses, the three confidence measures 
served as the dependent variables.   
Pre-test expectancy and subjective confidence, as well as upward counterfactual 
frequency, were tested as moderators of the relationship between feedback type and the 
three confidence measures in nine separate hierarchical multiple regression models using 
the same procedures employed in Experiment 1 (global feedback = 0; specific feedback = 
1; continuous variables were centered; simple slopes were plotted and examined at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of continuous variables).  For each 
hierarchical multiple regression model, feedback type and one of the proposed 
moderators were entered in step 1 and their interaction term was entered in step 2.     
Of the nine tests of moderation, there was one marginal moderation effect and two 
others that were supported statistically; upward counterfactual frequency nearly 
moderated the relationship between feedback type and expected number correct on a new 
trivia test and significantly moderated the relationship between feedback type and 
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subjective confidence for a new trivia test, as well as the relationship between feedback 
type and hypothetical bet on a new trivia test.  Feedback condition failed to reach 
significance in each of the three tests that included upward counterfactual frequency.  
These null effects of feedback type appear to be caused by the reduction of statistical 
significance by the contribution played by upward counterfactual frequency, as the effect 
of feedback type was observed when upward counterfactual frequency was not included 
in the model (see the tests of mediation for more detail on this issue).            
Although there were no significant effects on expected number correct on a new 
trivia test (neither feedback type nor upward counterfactual frequency reached statistical 
main effects), the test of the interaction was marginal, (β = -.38, t(62) = -1.62, p = .11).  
As displayed in Figure 2.1, the expected pattern emerged; the relationship between the 
frequency of upward counterfactuals and expected number correct on a new trivia test 
appeared to be positive but only for specific feedback participants.  Interestingly, the two 
points plotted in Figure 2.1 for specific feedback participants did differ significantly, (β = 
.73, t(62) = 4.39, p < .001).          
Regarding subjective confidence for a new trivia test, a main effect for upward 
counterfactual frequency emerged, β = .57, t(63) = 3.90, p < .001; RP2P = .22, F(2, 63) = 
9.08, p < .001.  However, this main effect was qualified by an interaction between 
feedback type and upward counterfactual frequency, (β = .42, t(62) = 2.04, p < .05; ΔRP2P = 
.05, ΔF(1, 62) = 4.17, p < .05).  As expected, simple slope analysis showed that 
subjective confidence for a new trivia test increased with upward counterfactual 
frequency but only for the specific feedback condition β = .47, t(62) = 3.24, p < .01 (see 
Figure 2.2).  When counterfactual frequency was low, subjective confidence on a new 
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trivia test was associated with the global feedback condition, β = -.42, t(62) = -2.27, p < 
.05.  No other simple slopes were statistically significant.   
For the hypothetical bet on a new trivia test, no main effects were observed in the 
first step of the hierarchical multiple regression model.  However, when upward 
counterfactual frequency was re-examined in the second step of the hierarchical multiple 
regression model, a main effect for upward counterfactual frequency did emerge, β = .56, 
t(62) = 2.12, p < .05.  As was true for subjective confidence, an interaction between 
feedback type and upward counterfactual frequency qualified the main effect of upward 
counterfactual frequency, (β = .46, t(62) = 1.98, p = .05; ΔRP2P = .08, ΔF(1, 62) = 3.93, p = 
.05).  As expected, simple slope analysis showed that the hypothetical bet for a new trivia 
test increased with upward counterfactual frequency but only for the specific feedback 
condition β = .89, t(62) = 5.39, p < .001 (see Figure 2.3).  A marginal difference between 
global and specific feedback was also observed when counterfactual frequency was high, 
β = .28, t(62) = 1.79, p < .08. No other simple slopes were statistically significant.   
In models that examined pre-test expectancy and subjective confidence as 
moderators, main effects were observed for feedback type in each of the three tests that 
included pre-test expectancy (average β = .22, p < .05), and in each of the three tests that 
included pre-test subjective confidence (average β = .19, p < .05).P5P  In addition, pre-test 
expectancy did emerge as a significant predictor of all three of the dependent variables 
(average β = .30, p < .01).  Further, pre-test subjective confidence significantly predicted 
subjective confidence on a new trivia test and hypothetical bet for a new trivia test 
(average β = .32, p < .01).  However, pre-test expectancy and pre-test subjective 
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confidence both failed to moderate the relationships between feedback type and the 
dependent variables.    
Mediation of Upward Counterfactuals 
Next, mediation analyses were examined with the current data according to the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  In each of these analyses, the three 
measures of confidence regarding a new trivia test served as the dependent variables.  As 
stated earlier, upward counterfactuals should mediate the relationships between feedback 
type and post-test judgments regarding performance on a new trivia test (Hypothesis 5).   
First and foremost, there were three separate relationships for upward 
counterfactual frequency to possibly mediate: 1) the relationship between feedback type 
and expected number correct on a new trivia test, β = .22, t(130) = 2.60, p < .05; 2) the 
relationship between feedback type and subjective confidence for a new trivia test, β = 
.24, t(130) = 2.78, p < .01; and 3) the relationship between feedback type and 
hypothetical bet on a new trivia test, β = .24, t(130) = 2.87, p < .01.     
Upward counterfactual frequency was tested as a mediator of the relationships 
between feedback type and the three dependent variables (see Figure 2.4).  As indicated 
earlier in a one-way ANOVA, upward counterfactual frequency was significantly 
associated with the specific feedback condition, β = .57, t(64) = 6.70, p < .001.  As 
displayed in Figure 2.4, when both feedback type and upward counterfactual frequency 
were entered into the regression model simultaneously, feedback type was no longer a 
significant predictor of any of the dependent variables.  Yet, upward counterfactual 
frequency was a significant predictor of one of the three variables (i.e., subjective 
confidence for a new trivia test).  Modified Sobel tests showed that the reduction in the 
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effect of feedback type on expected number correct on a new trivia test was not a 
significant reduction (z = .67, ns), nor was the reduction in the effect of feedback type on 
hypothetical bet on a new trivia test (z = .68, ns).  However, the reduction in the effect of 
feedback type on subjective confidence for a new trivia test was significant (z = 3.08, p < 
.001).   
Discussion 
 Several of the hypotheses tested in Experiment 2 were supported.  As in 
Experiment 1, the results across the three measures of confidence for a new trivia test 
were not entirely consistent.  However, expected number correct on a new test and 
hypothetical bet were the only confidence measures to correlate significantly, r(130) = 
.45, p < .01.  Thus, with respect to the uniqueness of the measures themselves, and a 
plethora of previous research also showing inconsistencies between people’s attitudes, 
expectations, and behavioral intentions, the inconsistencies in the current experiment are 
not too surprising.   
Compared to Experiment 1, where pre-event expectancies appeared to play a 
moderating role and upward counterfactual frequency appeared to play a greater 
mediating role, both pre-test expectations and upward counterfactual frequency appeared 
to play a greater moderating role than a mediating one in the current experiment, 
although there was some evidence that upward counterfactual frequency played both 
roles.  Again, this pattern of results suggests that counterfactual thoughts in reaction to an 
event are most relevant and influential to specific events, and that pre-event expectancies 
seem to be more clearly linked to reactions to general events.   
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The patterns of predicted values from the feedback type × upward counterfactual 
frequency interactions are particularly interesting.  Although the global feedback points 
plotted in Figure 2.3 were not significantly different from each other, and the difference 
between the two high upward counterfactual frequency points reached only marginal 
significance, the pattern is suggestive of a trend that can not be explained by upward 
counterfactual frequency alone.  It is also important to remember that the points plotted in 
Figure 2.3 are predicted points estimated by the regression equation.  An examination of 
the frequency of participants who actually listed a frequency of upward counterfactuals 
that was equal to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean showed that 
specific feedback participants outnumbered global feedback participants 10 to 1.  In other 
words, the specific feedback/high upward frequency “cell” was well represented by one-
fifth of the sample, whereas the global feedback/high upward counterfactual frequency 
cell was virtually empty.  However, this particular regression equation still suggests that 
had the global event been counterfactualized as much as the specific event, a difference 
in the dependent variable may have been observed between the two types of events.  This 
possibility presents an interesting question.  People may not typically counterfactualize 
general events, but if they do, will their counterfactuals affect their judgments as they do 
for observers of specific events?   
The patterns of moderation in the current data hint that the answer to such a 
question is no.  One proposal for why this is might be the case involves the degree of 
validity that people attach to their thoughts (i.e., thought confidence; see Petty, Briñol, & 
Tormala, 2002).  It is possible that people hold greater confidence in the counterfactuals 
they generate while thinking about and responding to specific events than they do for 
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general events.  When one’s confidence in their own simulated alternative is high, it 
seems likely that they will be more likely to perceive the likelihood of that alternative 
outcome to occur in the future and may be more willing to behave in a manner consistent 
with the alternative (e.g., bet on it).  Such notions are consistent with related research 
showing that attitudes held with high, rather than low, certainty yield greater attitude-
behavior correspondence (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Rucker & Petty, 2004; Tormala & Petty, 
2002).  Thus, not only may it be easier to generate alternatives to specific events 
compared to general events, but one may also hold greater confidence in the validity or 
likelihood of simulated alternatives to reality generated in response to specific events as 
opposed to general events.   
Furthermore, Roese and Maniar (1997) and Roese and Olson (1996) have 
demonstrated that counterfactual thinking is complementary to hindsight bias, (Fischhoff, 
1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), whereby people consistently 
overestimate what could have been anticipated in foresight.  Thus, thinking that one 
should have gotten the right answer to a trivia question may lead one to believe that they 
actually did know the answer.  Whether it is rooted in the hindsight bias or counterfactual 
thinking, the more certain one is that a particular outcome was predictable, the more 
confident they may feel that a change in an antecedent would have led to a change in the 
outcome (i.e., a sort of counterfactual thought confidence).  Specific feedback 
participants would still be likely to feel greater confidence in this respect due to the 
nature of their feedback relative to that of the general feedback condition.  Specific 
feedback participants were well aware of the items they “missed,” thus they possessed 
information that may have helped them focus any counterfactual activity on particular 
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items.  On the other hand, general feedback participants were not even sure of which 
items they missed.  In their cases, any counterfactual thoughts would be less potent with 
regard to confidence because they lacked specific information that would support any 
claims as to what could have or should have been.      
Another aspect of the results to consider involves the level of specificity of the 
counterfactuals that emerged for global and specific feedback participants.  
Counterfactuals in response to specific events are likely to be framed in specific ways, 
including the mutation of specific event features, whereas counterfactuals in response to 
general events are likely to be global and abstract in nature.  Such a difference is 
compatible with the counterfactual thought confidence explanation.  People who find that 
they are capable of supporting a claim should feel more confident about the claim’s truth.  
Their sense of this capability is likely to be positively associated with the level of 
specificity of the information that they are using to support their claim in the first place.  
The perceived demonstrability of a counterfactual claim (e.g., “I could have performed 
better.”) would seem to be positively correlated with counterfactual thought confidence 
(see Laughlin & Ellis, 1986).  Thus, the role of counterfactual thought confidence in 
reaction to general versus specific cases warrants further investigation. 
Another variable that did not appear to affect the dependent variables, but may 
still have an impact on judgments, is that of one’s actual performance on the task.  
However, participants were unaware of their actual performance, and they were all led to 
believe that they responded to 35% of the items correctly.  Yet, one’s “true” performance 
(i.e., the level they were told that they performed) should serve as a salient reference 
point for expectations and judgments about similar, future events.  This should be 
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especially true for global performance feedback individuals because they were less likely 
to entertain how they could have or should have performed better on the test.  Because 
the current experiment involved false feedback that participants apparently believed, such 
notions could not be adequately tested here.  This topic is more appropriately examined 
in Experiments 4 and 5.   
Finally, the current results should also be considered in light of the results of the 
Sniezek and Buckley (1991) and Sniezek et al. (1990) experiments.  In their experiments 
they measured how confident their participants felt at the time they responded to trivia 
questions, not after receiving feedback as in the current experiment.  They showed that, 
when their participants who had completed a trivia test were asked about the probability 
of being correct for individual items, they tended to display classic overconfidence 
effects in their judgments.  However, when their participants were asked to estimate their 
overall success rate across the entire set of items (an aggregate performance estimate), 
they failed to display overconfidence.  In fact, on average, their participants appeared to 
be somewhat under-confident in estimates of their aggregate performance.P6P  In studies 
conducted by Sniezek and her colleagues, participants were not provided with 
performance feedback nor were they required to complete thought-listing tasks.  
Overconfidence for how correct one is before receiving feedback would seem to be at 
odds with the likelihood of imagining selecting an alternative answer for an item.  Yet, a 
single trivia item seems to permit the generation of more thoughts about why one is 
correct than does a set of items.  Thus, greater cognitive elaboration in response to 
specific items compared to global performance may drive the discrepancy found in 
confidence.  With respect to the Sniezek et al. studies and the current experiment, it 
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seems that overconfidence for correctness on a specific item can either emerge before 
feedback is given or it can emerge for expectations regarding global performance on a 
new test, especially if people are given specific feedback item feedback.  The tendency to 
be overconfident for current items and for future global performance on such items 
appears to be accounted for by the specificity of the judgment (i.e., confidence for global 
performance vs. confidence for a specific item) and the cognitive responses that follow 
the different levels of feedback specificity (i.e., global feedback vs. specific feedback) 
respectively.  This latter notion was evidenced by its account of 41% of the variance in 
upward counterfactual frequency.   
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT 3: 
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC TENNIS MATCH EVENTS 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, counterfactual thoughts were examined in 
Experiment 3 as a mediator of the relationship between the type of event and target-
evaluation associations.  However, the designs of the previous experiments were clearly 
likely to lead to upward counterfactuals responses (mentally simulated alternatives that 
improve on reality).  It is uncertain whether or not downward counterfactuals (mentally 
simulated alternatives that worsen reality) also result from specific events more so than 
they do from general events and whether or not they have a similar effect on judgments.  
That is, like upward counterfactual responses to events, do downward counterfactuals 
also affect decisions and confidence regarding similar, future events?  Unlike 
Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 was designed such that both upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking would be expected to reduce confidence.   
Overview of Experiment 
In the current experiment, participants were presented with a general or specific 
report of the results of a simulated semi-final tennis match modified from Kahneman and 
Miller’s (1986) and Markman et al.’s (1995) use of the “tennis match scenario.”  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two additional conditions, one that was 
likely to elicit upward counterfactuals (i.e., considering what may have gone through the 
mind of Tom, the loser of a close tennis match) or one that was likely to elicit downward 
counterfactuals (i.e., considering what may have gone through the mind of Jim, the 
winner of a close tennis match).P7P  Two-thirds of the entire sample of participants were 
asked to list thoughts in a thought-listing task in this regard, whereas the other third was 
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not asked to complete a thought listing-task.  Participants then reported their reactions to 
the event by indicating how skilled they believed each player to be, whom they would be 
more likely to bet on if there was a rematch between the players, how likely they think 
Tom or Jim would be to win in a rematch, and how likely they think Jim is to win the 
championship match versus the other semi-final winner.   
Hypotheses 
Five separate hypotheses were tested in Experiment 3:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to generate a greater number of upward and downward counterfactual thoughts (total 
counterfactuals) in response to the event than were participants assigned to the general 
event condition.  That is, a main effect of type of event on the number of counterfactuals 
generated in response to the event (both upward and downward) was expected to emerge.  
Even participants who were exposed to general event information were expected to list 
counterfactuals in Experiment 3 because they were prompted to do so by the instructions 
of their thought-listing task.  However, consistent with Sherman et al.’s (1999) arguments 
that specific events increase one’s focus on mutable features, a greater number of upward 
and downward counterfactuals was expected for specific event condition participants.   
Hypothesis 2: Participants assigned to list thoughts that may have gone through 
the mind of Tom (the loser of a close tennis match) were expected to generate a greater 
number of upward counterfactuals but a fewer number of downward counterfactuals than 
were participants assigned to list thoughts that may have gone through the mind of Jim 
(the winner of a close tennis match).  In other words, an interaction between thought-
listing instructions and type of counterfactual (upward versus downward – used as a 
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within-subjects variable) for the number of counterfactuals generated in response to the 
event was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis is in accordance with the findings of 
Markman et al. (1995), which showed that people can easily generate both upward and 
downward counterfactuals to the same event by changing the locus of perceived focus.  
For participants who listed thoughts that might have gone through the mind of the loser, 
Tom, it should have been easier to generate upward as opposed to downward 
counterfactuals that entertained ways in which he might have won the match.  On the 
other hand, for participants who listed thoughts that might have gone through the mind of 
the winner, Jim, it should have been easier to generate downward as opposed to upward 
counterfactuals that entertained ways in which he might have lost the match.  
Hypothesis 3: Participants assigned to the general event condition were expected 
to report a more favorable evaluation of Jim (perceived as more skilled, more likely to 
bet on in a rematch, and perceived as more likely to win in a rematch) relative to Tom, 
than were participants assigned to the specific event condition.  That is, main effects of 
event type on the post-event evaluations were expected to emerge.  This hypothesis was 
based on the assumption that Hypothesis 1 would be supported.  If specific event 
condition participants focused more on how either Jim might have lost or on how Tom 
might have won than general event condition participants, it is feasible to expect 
participants to be less likely to perceive the players as differing to a significant degree.  In 
other words, the increased counterfactualizing by specific event condition participants 
was expected to reduce any differences that may have emerged in the perceived skill 
level and rematch promise of the players.           
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Hypothesis 4: A main effect of thought-listing instructions on each of the 
dependent variables was not expected to emerge from the data.  As in Experiments 1 and 
2, counterfactual thought responses were expected to be spontaneous in the current 
experiment.  Participants who did not list thoughts were not encouraged to focus directly 
on how Jim almost lost, or how Tom almost won, the match.  Thus, the counterfactual 
responses of the no-thought listing condition were not expected to be upward or 
downward exclusively.  These participants were not expected to engage in counterfactual 
thinking to a lesser extent, but it seems likely that they would not feel as psychologically 
involved with the event as did participants in the other two thought-listing conditions.  
Having no identification with either player may have led to less confidence in the 
probability of any counterfactual simulation.  However, the counterfactual thought 
responses of the no-thought-listing participants were expected to be as frequent as the 
other two thought-listing conditions (if not, more frequent because they were not 
bounded by the thought-listing instructions and were more likely to generate of a mixture 
of both upward and downward counterfactuals).  Therefore, no main effect of thought-
listing instructions was expected to emerge for the dependent variables.   
Hypothesis 5: The relationships between the type of event (general or specific) 
and post-event judgments were expected to be statistically mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward and downward counterfactual responses.  If comparison cases for 
specific events were constructed through the mutation of specific event information, 
counterfactuals should have mediated the relationship between the type of event and post-
event judgments.     
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 185 undergraduate students, enrolled in psychology courses at Indiana 
University, participated in the experiment for partial fulfillment of course credit.  Only 
participants with knowledge of the basic rules of tennis were asked to participate in this 
experiment.  Experimental sessions involved a maximum of six participants.       
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by a laboratory assistant who gave them a 
brief oral introduction to the experiment and escorted them to a cubicle equipped with a 
personal computer.  The experiment was introduced as a study of “what people think 
about as they watch sports.”  All experimental materials were presented using MediaLab 
v2004 Research Software (Jarvis, 2004).  The instructions of the experiment were self-
paced, and participants advanced the instructions by pressing the space bar or a response 
key.   
Participants were presented with a general or specific report of the results of a 
simulated semi-final tennis match between two tennis players, Jim and Tom.  Information 
for both types of events (general and specific) was presented by audio-visual display.  All 
participants were informed that they would be presented with the scores, and some 
highlights, of a tennis match between Jim and Tom. 
General event condition.  Participants assigned to the general event condition 
viewed two highlight clips, randomly presented, with nothing abnormal occurring in 
either one (both beginning in mid-volley, with one ending in a point scored by a regular 
shot made by Jim and the other ending in a point scored by a regular shot made by Tom).  
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The highlight clips consisted of the tennis players volleying the ball for approximately 
10-15 seconds (see Figure 3.1).  Corresponding commentary conformed to the display of 
the highlight clips.  General event condition participants were informed only of the scores 
of the four sets, two of which involved tie-breakers (similar to the design of Experiment 
1).  The score of the match was displayed on a scoreboard as 6-4, 3-6, 7-6 (7-4), 7-6(7-5) 
with Jim winning the match.  During the display of the scoreboard it was explained to 
participants that Jim won the first set, Tom won the second set, and that Jim won the third 
and fourth sets, both ending in tie-breakers (via audio presentation).        
 Specific event condition.  The same procedures employed for the general event 
condition were used for participants assigned to the specific event condition with two 
exceptions.  First, six additional 10-15 seconds highlight clips were displayed.  These 
highlight clips were well within what one might expect from a highlight sequence of a 
tennis match; that is, they included several features that varied in their perceived 
mutability (i.e., close shots and not so close shots).  Specifically, these participants were 
presented with the following eight-highlight clip sequence: 1) a first set clip that began in 
mid-volley and ended with a failed shot made by Tom that came close to but missed the 
white line as it went out of play; 2) a second set clip that began in mid-volley and ended 
with a failed shot made by Jim that came close to but missed the white line and went out 
of play; 3) the same clip presented to general event condition participants that ended with 
Jim scoring the point (third set); 4) the same clip presented to general event condition 
participants that ended with Tom scoring the point (third set); 5) a third set tie-breaker 
clip that began with Tom serving the ball and ended with a shot made by Jim that hit the 
net but bounced over to Tom’s side before it went out of play; 6) a fourth set clip that 
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began with Jim serving the ball and ended with Tom scoring the point on a return with a 
shot that came close to the line; 7) a fourth set tie-breaker clip that began with a serve by 
Jim and ended with a shot made by Jim that came close to the white line but stayed in 
before Tom was able to return the ball; and 8) a fourth set tie-breaker clip that began with 
a serve by Tom and ended with a shot made by Jim that came close to the line.  Thus, 
there were events that could be mutated to change the outcome in Tom’s or Jim’s favor.  
Again, corresponding commentary conformed to the display of the highlight clips.     
Thought-listing task.  Following the highlights, scoreboard, and commentary, one 
third of the sample of participants was asked to imagine only what might have gone 
through the mind of Tom after the match and to list these thoughts in the form of a 
thought-listing task (one thought per screen).  Another third of the sample of participants 
was asked to imagine only what might have gone through the mind of Jim after the match 
and to list these thoughts in the form of a thought-listing task (one thought per screen).  
The final third of the sample of the participants was not asked to complete a thought-
listing task, nor were they asked to take the perspective of one of the tennis players.         
Dependent variables.  In the final task of the experiment, participants were asked 
to respond to four evaluative questions.  Specifically, they were asked to indicate which 
tennis player they thought was more skilled by rating them on a 7-point scale anchored at 
Tom is more skilled than Jim (1) and Jim is more skilled than Tom (7), how likely they 
would be to bet on Tom or Jim if they were to play a rematch on a 7-point scale anchored 
at I would definitely bet on Tom to win in a rematch (1) and I would definitely bet on Jim 
to win in a rematch (7), and who they thought would be more likely to win in a rematch 
on a 7-point scale anchored at Tom is most likely to win in a rematch (1) and Jim is most 
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likely to win in a rematch (7).  A final item was used to ask participants how likely they 
thought Jim was to win the championship match versus the other semi-final winner on a 
7-point scale anchored at not at all likely (1) and extremely likely (7).  Participants were 
then debriefed and thanked for their participation.   
Design and Analyses  
Experiment 3 employed a 2 (type of event frame: general vs. specific) × 3 
(thought-listing instructions: what went through the mind of Tom; what went through the 
mind of Jim; no thought-listing) between-groups factorial design.  Dependent variables, 
and the influences of the type of event, thought-listing instructions, and counterfactuals, 
were examined using a combination of ANOVA statistics as well as correlational and 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses.  
Results 
Intercoder Agreement of Thought-Listings 
A total of 880 thoughts were listed by participants in the thought-listing 
conditions.  Each thought-listing response was coded by two separate coders as a 
counterfactual response (upward or downward) or a non-counterfactual response.  The 
overall agreement between the two coders was 92.72%.  The level of intercoder 
agreement failed to reach recommended levels; Spearman’s ρ = .65, p < .001, Kappa = 
.64, p < .001.  The category agreement index for non-counterfactual responses was .96, 
whereas the category agreement index was .67 for upward counterfactual responses and 
.67 for downward counterfactual responses. 
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Due to this suboptimal level of agreement between coders, a third coder was used 
to resolve the disagreements.  A representative selection of counterfactual and non-
counterfactual responses submitted by participants is displayed in Table 3.1.    
Upward and Downward Counterfactuals 
 The average frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by participants in the 
thought-listing condition was .91, whereas the average frequency of downward 
counterfactuals was only .25.  These totals were out of 10 possible thoughts listed.      
As stated earlier, participants assigned to the specific event condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of counterfactual thoughts (in general) in response 
to the event than were participants assigned to the general event condition (Hypothesis 1).  
This hypothesis was supported by a marginal main effect of event type on the frequency 
of counterfactuals listed by participants, such that specific event condition participants 
listed a greater number of counterfactuals (M = 1.35, SD = 1.36) than did general event 
condition participants (M = .96, SD = .92), F(1, 122) = 3.41, p = .06. 
A Bayesian corrected proportion was then computed and tested.  In the current 
experiment, the mean proportion of total counterfactuals was .18; therefore, b = 5.5 (see 
p. 27).  With this measure, Hypothesis 1 was supported statistically such that specific 
event condition participants listed a greater proportion of counterfactuals (M = .20, SD = 
.12) than did general event condition participants (M = .15, SD = .08), F(1, 122) = 4.01, p 
< .05. 
Bayesian corrected proportions were also computed with respect to the type of 
counterfactual.  In the current experiment, the mean proportion of upward counterfactuals 
was .14 and the mean proportion of downward counterfactuals was .04; therefore, bBuB = 7 
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and bBdB = 25 (see p. 27).  Although all subsequent analyses examining upward and 
downward counterfactual frequency as moderators or mediators of other effects were 
computed using the Bayesian corrected proportion, the terms “upward counterfactual 
frequency” and “downward counterfactual frequency” were retained in the report of these 
analyses for ease of presentation. 
In order to test whether or not the manipulation of counterfactual generation had 
operated in the directions intended, a 2 (type of event) × 2 (thought-listing instructions) × 
2 (type of counterfactual) ANOVA was conducted with type of counterfactual used as a 
within-subjects factor (the no-thought-listing condition was not included in this analysis).  
See Figure 3.2 for a display of these results.  From this analysis, a significant main effect 
of event type was again observed such that specific event participants listed a greater 
number of counterfactuals than did general event participants, F(1, 120) = 4.01, p < .05.  
A main effect of thought-listing instructions showed that participants who were asked to 
list thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Tom listed a greater number of 
counterfactuals than did participants who were asked to list thoughts that might have 
gone through the mind of Jim, F(1, 120) = 18.83, p < .001.  As clearly shown in Figure 
3.2, participants also listed more upward counterfactuals than they did downward 
counterfactuals, F(1, 120) = 201.12, p < .001.   
These main effects were qualified by two two-way interactions.  First, event type 
significantly interacted with thought-listing instructions, F(1, 120) = 4.18, p < .05.  When 
participants were asked to list thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Jim, no 
difference in the frequency of counterfactuals listed was observed with regard to event 
type, t(120) = .02, ns.  When participants were asked to list thoughts that might have 
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gone through the mind of Tom, specific event participants listed more counterfactuals 
than did general event participants, t(120) = 2.93, p < .01.   
More important with regard to Hypothesis 2, the interaction between thought-
listing instructions and type of counterfactuals was also significant, F(1, 120) = 39.52, p 
< .001.  As expected, a comparison of the upward counterfactual frequencies across the 
Jim-thoughts versus Tom-thoughts conditions showed that participants who were asked 
to list thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Tom listed a greater frequency 
of upward counterfactuals than did participants who were asked to list thoughts that 
might have gone through the mind of Jim, t(120) = 8.20, p < .001.  Although the means 
were in the direction expected, a comparison of the downward counterfactual frequencies 
across the Jim-thoughts versus Tom-thoughts conditions showed that participants in the 
two thought-listing conditions failed to differ in their frequency of listing downward 
counterfactuals, t(120) = 1.34, ns. 
Surprisingly, the two-way interactions were qualified by the three-way 
interaction, F(1, 120) = 6.94, p < .01.  As clearly shown in Figure 3.2, participants did not 
differ in their frequency of downward counterfactuals regardless of the conditions 
compared.  When comparing upward counterfactual frequency by thought-listing 
condition, participants who were asked to list thoughts that might have gone through the 
mind of Tom listed a greater frequency than did participants who were asked to list 
thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Jim in both the general event (t(120) 
= 3.09, p < .01) and the specific event conditions (t(120) = 7.88, p < .001).  Across 
participants who were asked to list thoughts that might have gone through the mind of 
Jim, participants in the two event conditions listed an equal number of upward 
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counterfactuals, t(120) = .54, ns.  However, across participants who were asked to list 
thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Tom, participants in the specific event 
condition listed a greater number of upward counterfactuals than did participants in the 
general event condition, t(120) = 4.28, p < .001.  Essentially, the three-way interaction 
(as well as the two-way interactions) appears to be driven largely by the upward 
counterfactuals generated by the specific event/Tom-thoughts condition participants.  
Finally, the main effect of type of counterfactual was observed in each of the four 
conditions such that upward counterfactual frequency was significantly greater than 
downward counterfactual frequency, average t(120) = 7.29, p < .001 (t-values ranged 
from 3.55, p < .001 to 12.75, p < .001).    
Post-Event Evaluations and Judgments 
 As stated in Hypothesis 3, the increased conterfactualizing by specific event 
condition participants was expected to reduce any differences that may have emerged in 
the perceived skill level and rematch promise of the players.  Thought-listing instructions 
were also expected to have an impact on the dependent measures, such that evaluations 
among no-thought-listing participants would favor Jim more so than either of the other 
two thought-listing conditions (Hypothesis 4).  To examine Hypotheses 3 and 4, a 
separate 2 (type of event) × 3 (thought-listing instructions) ANOVA was conducted for 
the four dependent measures.  When appropriate (a main effect for thought-listing 
instructions), planned comparisons were computed to examine differences that may have 
emerged between the no-thought-listing condition and the other two thought-listing 
conditions (using the following coefficients: 1, -.5, -.5).  For the purpose of interpreting 
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the results, it is important to remember that 4 was the mid-point on each of the dependent 
variable scales.    
Regarding perceived skill, neither of the main effects nor the interaction was 
statistically significant.  In other words, participants perceived the tennis skill of Jim and 
Tom to be equal regardless of event type or thought-listing instructions condition. 
For evaluations pertaining to which player was more likely to win in a rematch, 
only a main effect for thought-listing instructions reached significance, F(2, 179) = 4.00, 
p < .05.  This result showed that participants who were asked to list thoughts that might 
have gone through the mind of Tom did not perceive Jim to be any more likely to win in 
a rematch (M = 4.56, SD = 1.79) than did participants who were asked to list thoughts 
that might have gone through the mind of Jim (M = 4.41, SD = 1.68), t(179) = .47, ns.  
Yet, no-thought-listing participants did perceive Jim to be more likely to win in a rematch 
(M = 5.25, SD = 1.74) than did the other two thought-listing conditions, t(179) = 2.81, p 
< .01.  It is feasible to conclude that this finding was due to either a reduced confidence in 
counterfactual thoughts among the no-thought-listing condition or a reduced tendency to 
counterfactualize the event in the first place (because they were not likely to feel that they 
identified with either player compared to the other two thought-listing conditions).  
Regarding expectations about betting on one of the tennis players to win in a 
rematch, only a marginal main effect of thought-listing instructions was observed, F(2, 
179) = 2.13, p = .12.  Although the pattern of means was in the direction expected, the 
two thought-listing conditions (Tom-thoughts condition: M = 4.39, SD = 1.65; Jim-
thoughts condition: M = 4.73, SD = 1.66) differed only marginally from that of the no-
thought-listing condition, (M = 5.02, SD = 1.67), t(179) = 1.77, p < .08.  
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Interestingly, when participants considered how likely Jim was to win the 
championship match, an interaction between event type and thought-listing instructions 
was observed, F(2, 179) = 4.16, p < .05.  Among participants who were assigned to the 
general event condition, the no-thought-listing condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.08) did not 
differ from the other two thought-listing conditions (Tom-thoughts condition: M = 4.93, 
SD = 1.31; Jim-thoughts condition: M = 4.91, SD = 1.03), t(179) = 1.14, ns.  However, 
among participants who were assigned to the specific event condition, the no-thought-
listing condition reported a greater likelihood that Jim would win the championship (M = 
5.10, SD = 1.52) than the other two thought-listing conditions (Tom-thoughts condition: 
M = 4.19, SD = 1.25; Jim-thoughts condition: M = 4.45, SD = 1.15), t(179) = 2.84, p < 
.01.  The only other comparison that reached significance was that among participants 
who were asked to list thoughts that might have gone through the mind of Tom; general 
event participants reported a greater likelihood that Jim would win the championship than 
specific event participants, t(179) = 2.35, p < .05.   
With respect to the pattern of results observed across all four of the dependent 
variables, greater support was observed for Hypothesis 4 than for Hypothesis 3.  
Explanations for the null results are considered in the Discussion section below.             
Mediation of Upward and Downward Counterfactuals 
The possibility that variance in counterfactual thinking, caused by event type and 
thought listing instructions, served as a mediating mechanism (Hypothesis 5) was 
examined using a series of correlational and hierarchical regression analyses.  The 
correlational links between event type and counterfactual thinking, and between thought-
listing instructions and counterfactual thinking, mirrored those reported earlier in the 
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ANOVA results.  Because event type failed to affect any of the dependent variables, it 
was more appropriate to test the counterfactual frequencies as mediators of the 
relationships between thought-listing instructions and the dependent variables.  In any 
case, all possible tests of mediation showed that neither upward nor downward 
counterfactual frequency significantly correlated with the dependent variables in models 
that controlled for either event type or thought-listing instructions.       
Although all of the correlations between counterfactual frequencies and the 
dependent variables were not statistically significant, it came as no surprise that all of the 
correlations were negative.  That is, there was a trend suggesting that the more 
participants had simulated alternatives to reality (either in an upward or downward 
fashion) the less likely they were to perceive Jim to have more skill and rematch promise 
than Tom.  The correlations between the two counterfactual frequencies and the 
perceived likelihood of Jim winning the rematch were also negative, suggesting that the 
more one had engaged in counterfactual thinking the less likely they were to expect Jim 
to win the rematch.  Explanations for these null results are also discussed below. 
Discussion 
Only a sub-set of the hypotheses of Experiment 3 were supported.  As in earlier 
experiments, counterfactual thinking was again more frequently observed in response to a 
specific event than in response to a general event.  However, event type appeared to be 
relevant only for how likely Jim was perceived to win the championship match versus the 
other semifinal match winner to the extent that it interacted with thought listing-
instructions.  All of the dependent variables, with the exception of perceived skill, 
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appeared to be more influenced by the thought-listing instructions than by the other 
variables.    
Greater support was observed for Hypothesis 4 than for Hypothesis 3.  These 
hypotheses were based on the idea that counterfactual thinking (upward or downward) 
would reduce any differences that may have emerged in the perceived skill level and 
rematch promise of the players.  Specific event participants were expected to 
counterfactualize more than general event participants, both in an upward and a 
downward fashion (depending on thought-listing instructions).  Either type of 
counterfactualizing would bring to mind how the outcome of Jim winning (or Tom 
losing) could have been easily reversed.  Thus, differences were expected to be found in 
the general event condition but not in the specific event condition.  This same reasoning 
was employed in arguments for a main effect of thought-listing instructions.  Yet, only a 
difference in upward counterfactual thinking was observed (most frequently in the 
specific event/Tom-thoughts condition as expected).  Still, participants in each of the 
conditions (even the general event conditions) engaged in a fair amount of upward 
counterfactual thinking, and certainly more than they engaged in downward 
counterfactual thinking.  Surprisingly, upward counterfactual thinking was even more 
frequent than downward counterfactual thinking in the Jim-thoughts conditions (e.g., 
“Had I not made those mistakes, I wouldn’t have needed tie-breakers to win;” and “I 
should have won this earlier, but Tom kept the pressure on.”). 
These tendencies are relevant to the null mediation results.  Participants in the 
thought-listing conditions were essentially prompted to engage in counterfactual thinking 
in one direction or the other, both of which were expected to reduce perceptions of 
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superiority of Jim over Tom.  Yet, the thought-listing instructions manipulation may have 
“worked” too well to the extent that it caused participants in the general event conditions 
to also engage in upward counterfactual thinking.  With regard to Bayesian corrected 
proportions, participants in the current experiment engaged in more counterfactual 
thinking than did participants in either of the first two experiments.  Further, a large 
majority of the thought-listing responses that were coded as counterfactuals tended to be 
some of the very first responses listed by participants.  In fact, approximately 72% of all 
counterfactuals were listed within the first four thought-listing response screens (this 
tendency did not differ by event type or thought-listing condition).  It is also possible that 
a single counterfactual response was as potent as two or three when it came to 
influencing one’s evaluations and judgments.  Given that the majority of the participants 
who listed counterfactual responses did so rather early in the thought-listing task, 
counterfactual thought confidence was likely to be relatively high to the extent that 
accessibility signaled thought confidence (see Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007).  If 
this was the case, variance in counterfactual frequency would do little for predicting 
variance in the dependent variables.          
Although they were not provided with thought-listing instructions designed to 
promote a particular type of counterfactual thinking, the no-thought-listing condition 
participants may have also engaged in counterfactual thinking as they appeared to in 
earlier experiments.  In fact, had they engaged in such cognitive activity, they were likely 
to generate a mixture of upward and downward counterfactual responses (most likely 
upward for Tom and most likely both upward and downward for Jim).  Such possibilities 
may have further reduced the possibility of observing differences across the thought-
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listing conditions.  Future studies that examine the impact of both upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking on evaluations and judgments of general and specific events may 
improve upon the current paradigm by employing a task in which participants experience 
an event that creates a clearer divide between upward and downward simulations of 
reality while keeping the actor of the event constant.  For instance, it would be important 
to determine whether or not people make different decisions and judgments for similar, 
future events depending on the direction of their counterfactual responses (i.e., upward 
vs. downward) and whether or not such a difference interacts with the type of event (i.e., 
general vs. specific).                     
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CHAPTER 5 – EXPERIMENT 4:  
GLOBAL AND SPECIFIC BLACKJACK PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK 
Experiment 4 examined how people react to actual general and specific events, 
and how these reactions affect their decisions to bet on the outcomes of similar, future 
events.  Because Experiment 4 deals with betting on the outcomes of events (i.e., 
blackjack), it relates very much to the work of Gilovich (1983) on gambling.  Although 
Gilovich did not explicitly use counterfactual thoughts to explain his findings, the results 
of his experiments suggested that gamblers will continue to gamble, partially due to the 
upward counterfactuals that they generate following losses.  Such effects are most likely 
to be found when a “freak” or abnormal occurrence takes place.  However, the same type 
of effect (gambling despite losses) is expected to occur even in the normal observation of 
gambling events that do not involve highly abnormal or exceptional features.  It is 
theorized that people show a greater tendency to counterfactualize a lost gamble when 
they are exposed to the specific features of the event than when exposed to the event’s 
general outcome, even when the event does not involve anything that is regarded as 
exceptional or highly abnormal.   
This thinking is in line with Hofstadter’s (1979) intuitions about the pervasiveness 
of counterfactual thinking: “In everyday thought we are constantly manufacturing mental 
variants on situations we face, ideas we have, or events that happen, and we let some 
features stay exactly the same while others ‘slip’” (p. 641).  Such notions are also in line 
with the arguments of other researchers regarding the conditions in which people tend to 
counterfactualize events.  For instance, the results of studies conducted by Zeelenberg, 
van den Bos, van Dijk, and Pieters (2002) suggest that feelings of regret and 
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counterfactual responses can follow events characterized by normal causes (i.e., 
“inactions”) just as easily as can events that involve abnormal causes (i.e., actions), 
especially when prior and relevant outcomes are known.  Thus, it appears that factors, 
beyond that of the perceived abnormality of a causal feature, may influence the 
pervasiveness of counterfactual thinking.  It is proposed that the type of event (general or 
specific) may be one of these factors.  On the basis of the arguments outlined by Sherman 
et al. (1999), it is proposed that people are more likely to counterfactualize their gambles 
when they are exposed to the specific features of a gamble than they are when they are 
exposed only to the general outcome of the very same gamble. 
Overview of Experiment 
Experiment 4 is somewhat similar to Experiment 2 to the extent that it involved 
participants reacting to real-time events that occurred while they were participating in the 
laboratory.  However, Experiment 4 did not involve false feedback regarding the events 
they experienced.  Rather, Experiment 4 was designed to examine a person’s judgments 
of their own confidence, after exposing them to global or specific event information 
about their own actual performance on a task.  The current experiment also differs from 
the earlier experiments in that it involves gambling behavior under uncertainty.  Similar 
to previous experiments that used money or points (e.g., Crowne & Liverant, 1963; 
Shipley, Powell, & Harley, 1970), confidence was operationalized as the number of 
tickets (for a chance to an electronic drawing) that participants were willing to place as 
bets.   
In the current experiment, participants were asked to play 10 games of blackjack.  
It was explained to participants that their task was to win as many games of blackjack as 
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they could, and that they would have a chance to win a $30 drawing in another part of the 
experiment.  It was made clear to participants that their chances of winning the $30 
drawing depended on how well they performed in the experiment (i.e., how well they 
performed at playing blackjack).  Before playing these games, participants reported their 
pre-event expectations.  During the games, a global versus specific feedback 
manipulation was implemented.  Half of the participants received global feedback 
information, whereas the other half received specific feedback information.  Half of the 
participants also listed their thoughts while playing blackjack.   
After the 10 games had been completed, participants were informed that they 
would play a final “bonus” game of blackjack.  Before the bonus game was played, 
participants were given a small sheet of paper, reading “100 Tickets.”  Participants were 
instructed to write their E-mail address on the paper.  They were informed that their 
tickets would be entered into an electronic drawing for $30 at the conclusion of the entire 
experiment.  It was explained further that the more tickets they had to enter, the better 
their chances would be of winning the drawing.  For a chance to increase their number of 
tickets, all participants were permitted to place a bet on winning the bonus game using 
any amount of their 100 tickets.  They were informed that, if they placed a bet and won, 
the number of tickets that they bet would be added to their initial 100 tickets.  This total 
would then be entered into the drawing.  However, if they placed a bet and lost, the 
number of tickets that they bet would be subtracted from their initial 100 tickets.  This 
total would then be entered into the drawing.  Participants were instructed to report how 
likely they felt they were to win the bonus game, and to report their subjective confidence 
in winning the bonus game.   
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Hypotheses 
Five separate hypotheses were tested in Experiment 4:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
the event than were participants assigned to the global feedback condition.  That is, a 
main effect of type of feedback on the number of upward counterfactuals generated in 
response to the event was expected to emerge.  As with Experiment 1, this hypothesis is 
consistent with Sherman et al.’s (1999) use of norm theory (see discussion of hypothesis 
1 of Experiment 2). 
Hypothesis 2: Participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to report greater chances of winning the bonus game, report greater subjective 
confidence of winning the bonus game, and record a greater number of their tickets as 
bets on winning the bonus game than were participants assigned to the global feedback 
condition.  In other words, a main effect of type of feedback on each of the three 
dependent variables was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that Hypothesis 1 would be supported.  If in fact specific feedback condition 
participants focused more on how they could have or should have won games of 
blackjack than did global feedback condition participants, they should have been 
correspondingly more likely to place greater bets, and feel greater subjective confidence 
in winning the bonus game.       
Hypothesis 3: No main effect of thought-listing on any of the dependent variables 
was expected to emerge from the data.  Counterfactual responses (especially those by 
specific feedback condition participants) were expected to be salient for participants even 
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when they were not deliberately asked to list their thoughts.  The reasoning elaborated in 
the Hypothesis 5 section of Experiment 1 was employed here as well.    
Hypothesis 4: The relative frequency of upward counterfactual responses to an 
event was expected to be a stronger predictor of post-event judgments than were pre-
event expectations for specific feedback condition participants, but pre-event 
expectations were expected to be stronger predictors of post-event judgments than was 
upward counterfactual response frequency for global feedback condition participants.  
As described in Hypothesis 6 of Experiment 1, this hypothesis was based on the notion 
that the cognitive processing difference (stated in Hypothesis 1) resulted in different 
comparison cases for the two types of events.   
Hypothesis 5: The relationships between the type of feedback (global or specific) 
and post-event judgments were expected to be statistically mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward counterfactual responses.  If comparison cases for specific feedback 
participants were constructed through the mutation of specific feedback information and 
comparison cases for global feedback participants were constructed on the basis of pre-
event expectations, counterfactuals should have mediated the relationships between the 
type of feedback and post-event judgments.  Because it was hypothesized that a different 
factor (expectancies versus counterfactuals) should have operated depending on the type 
of event (general versus specific), two separate interaction effects were also expected to 
emerge such that: 1) the relationships between pre-event expectations and the dependent 
variables were stronger for general event condition participants than for specific event 
condition participants; and 2) the relationships between counterfactual frequency and the 
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dependent variables were stronger for specific event condition participants than for 
general event condition participants. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 120 undergraduate students, enrolled in psychology courses at Indiana 
University, participated in Experiment 4 for partial fulfillment of course credit.  Each 
experimental session involved a single participant.  Only participants with basic 
knowledge of how blackjack is played were recruited to participate in the experiment.  
However, a total of 20 participants expressed at some point during the session that they 
were not entirely familiar with the game of blackjack, and additional instructions were 
provided to ensure that they understood the rules and objectives of the game.  The data of 
these participants were excluded from all analyses, resulting in 100 participants for the 
final sample.  
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by a laboratory assistant who gave them a 
brief oral introduction to the experiment.  Similar to the cover story employed by 
Markman et al.’s (1993) study, the experiment was introduced as a study of “what people 
think about as they gamble.”   
Participants were then asked to play 10 games of standard blackjack (without 
splits or double downs).  To ensure that participants understood the basic rules of the 
game, a brief introduction was provided with examples.  It was also highlighted that most 
gambling games involve luck, but that blackjack is one of the few gambling games that 
involves some luck but just as much skill and decision making.   
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For each hand of blackjack, participants were informed that they would play only 
against the dealer (the experimental assistant) and that they were to get as close to 21 as 
they could without “busting.”  It was explained to participants that ties between the dealer 
and a participant were counted as a win for the dealer, because the dealer was required to 
hit when dealt 16 or less.   
To increase overall motivation and involvement in the task, it was explained to 
participants that their task was to win as many games of blackjack as they could, and that 
they would have a chance to win an electronic $30 drawing in another part of the 
experiment.  It was made clear to participants that their chances of winning the $30 
drawing depended on how well they performed in playing blackjack.   
Before the first game was dealt, participants were asked to indicate on a piece of 
paper the number of games out of 10 that they expected to win.  In addition, participants 
were asked to rate how confident they felt that they would win at least the number of 
games they predicted they would win on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all confident 
(1) and extremely confident (7). 
Participants sat at a table directly across from the dealer (the laboratory assistant).  
For each game of blackjack, the dealer first shuffled the cards and dealt two cards (one 
face-down and one face-up) to the participant and himself.  The dealer then gave another 
face-up card to the participant each time the participant “hit.”  No additional cards were 
given to the participant when the participant “stayed.”    
Global feedback condition.  For participants assigned to the global feedback 
condition, a slightly modified version of blackjack was employed for the 10 games.  At 
the conclusion of each game (when the dealer stayed or busted), all participants were 
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instructed to turn over their face-down card.  However, for each game the dealer did not 
turn over his face-down card.  In addition, any additional cards dealt to the dealer were 
dealt face-down and at no time revealed to participants.  These participants were only 
informed of whether or not they won the game.  Thus, the dealer recorded the winner of 
each game and recorded the number of games won by each participant on a sheet of 
paper.  Directly following each instance of feedback, half of the participants were 
instructed to list on a sheet of paper any thoughts that went through their minds during 
the game or after learning about the outcome.  The other half of these participants were 
not asked to list their thoughts.    
 Specific feedback condition.  The procedures used for participants assigned to the 
specific feedback condition were the same as the procedures used for the participants 
assigned to the global feedback condition with one exception.  When the player decided 
to stop taking cards during a game, the dealer turned over his face-down card and 
continued to take cards when required (at or below 16).  The dealer did not turn over his 
face-down card in games whereby the player busted (went beyond 21).  Similar to the 
procedures used for the global feedback condition participants, half of the specific 
feedback condition participants were asked to list any thoughts that went through their 
minds during each game or after discovering the results of the game.  The other half of 
these participants were not asked to list their thoughts.     
Bonus game and dependent variables.  Following the feedback manipulation, 
participants were reminded about the possibility of winning an electronic drawing for a 
$30 prize.  Before the bonus game was played, participants were given a small sheet of 
paper, reading “100 Tickets;” and it was implied that their number of tickets was based 
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on how well they performed in the 10 games (i.e., “You performed within the 100 tickets 
range.”).  It was explained to participants that their participant number would be attached 
to their E-mail address for the purpose of the electronic drawing.  They were then 
informed that their tickets would be entered into an electronic drawing for $30 at the 
conclusion of the entire experiment.  It was explained further that the more tickets they 
had to enter, the better their chances would be of winning the drawing.  For a chance to 
increase their number of tickets, all participants were permitted to place a bet on winning 
the bonus game (any amount between 10% and 100% of their available tickets).  All 
participants, regardless of the number of games they won, were informed that they had 
attained 100 tickets to enter into the electronic drawing.  They were then informed that, if 
they placed a bet and won, the number of tickets that they bet would be added to their 
initial 100 tickets.  This total would then be entered into the drawing.  However, if they 
placed a bet and lost, the number of tickets that they bet would be subtracted from their 
initial 100 tickets.  This total would then be entered into the drawing.  Participants in both 
event conditions were informed that they would see all of the dealer’s cards for the bonus 
game, as they would in a standard version of blackjack.  Participants were then instructed 
to record their bet on the piece of paper given to them by the laboratory assistant.  The 
nature of blackjack (i.e., it involves skill and luck) was stated again, just before 
participants placed their bets.  Participants were also asked to indicate their perceived 
chances of winning the bonus game on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all likely (1) and 
extremely likely (7), and their subjective confidence in winning the bonus game on a 7-
point scale anchored at not at all confident (1) and extremely confident (7).  Following the 
conclusion of the bonus game, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
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participation.  Following the data collection phase of the experiment, an electronic 
drawing was conducted and the winning participant was contacted to receive the award.                
Design and Analyses  
Experiment 4 employed a 2 (type of event feedback: global vs. specific) × 2 
(thought-listing: yes vs. no) complete between-groups factorial design.  The perceived 
chances of winning the bonus game, subjective confidence rating, and total bets 
(percentage of total points available) were examined as dependent variables.  Dependent 
variables, and the influences of the type of event, thought-listing instructions, pre-event 
expectancies, and counterfactuals, were examined using a combination of ANOVA 
statistics as well as correlational and hierarchical multiple regression analyses.  The 
number of games won by the participant was also included as a covariate in some of these 
analyses.  Mediation analyses were examined according to the procedures outlined by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Importantly, participants in the two feedback conditions (global and specific) did 
not differ in their pre-event expectations (i.e., the number of games they expected to win 
and their subjective confidence in winning at least that number).  That is, regardless of 
feedback condition, participants held relatively equal expectations about the number of 
games they expected to win as well as how subjectively confident they were at winning 
the number of games they expected to win.  Participants also did not differ in the number 
of games they actually won (see the top half of Table 4.1).   
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Intercoder Agreement of Thought-Listings 
 A total of 500 thoughts were listed by participants in the thought-listing condition.  
Each thought-listing response was coded by two separate coders as a counterfactual 
response (upward or downward) or a non-counterfactual response.  The overall 
agreement between the two coders was 94.00%.  The level of intercoder agreement 
nearly reached the levels recommended by Smith (2000); Spearman’s ρ = .82, p < .001, 
Kappa = .82, p < .001.  The category agreement indexes were .96 for non-counterfactual 
responses, .87 for upward counterfactual responses, and .71 for downward counterfactual 
responses.        
A third coder was used to resolve the disagreements.  A representative selection 
of counterfactual and non-counterfactual responses submitted by participants in the 
thought-listing conditions is displayed in Table 4.2.    
Upward and Downward Counterfactuals 
 The average frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by participants in the 
thought-listing condition was 2.10, whereas the average number of downward 
counterfactuals was .20.  These totals were out of 10 possible thoughts listed.  In 
gambling, upward counterfactuals are more likely to emerge in response to losses as 
opposed to wins, and wins are often taken at face value (Gilovich, 1983).  Each game of 
blackjack, in and of itself, can be regarded as an event.  On average, participants won 
approximately 40% of their games.  Thus, the frequency of counterfactuals listed by 
participants as a spontaneous response should be considered in this light.    
As stated earlier, participants assigned to the specific feedback condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
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the event than were participants assigned to the global feedback condition (Hypothesis 1).  
This hypothesis was supported by a main effect of feedback type on the frequency of 
upward counterfactuals listed by participants, such that specific feedback participants 
listed more than twice the number of upward counterfactuals (M = 2.92, SD = 1.18) as 
did global feedback participants (M = 1.28, SD = .84), F(1, 48) = 31.72, p < .001.  The 
feedback conditions did not differ in their frequency of downward counterfactuals, F(1, 
48) = .39, ns. 
In addition to the influence of type of event, one possible mechanism that may 
increase the tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking may be a general motivation to 
explain disconfirmed expectancies (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  In fact, Wong and 
Weiner (1981) showed that people tend to be more motivated to explain unexpected 
outcomes than they are expected ones.  As suggested by Olson et al. (1996), perhaps the 
greater the discrepancy between expectancies and the outcome, the greater there is a 
tendency to counterfactualize features of an event.  Any such tendency would be 
expected to be especially great for specific events in which observers have readily 
accessible event features to mutate.   
These notions were tested by creating a variable that represented the discrepancy 
between expected number of blackjack game wins and the actual number of games of 
blackjack won (actual - expected).  As expected, this discrepancy variable had a 
significant relationship with upward counterfactual frequency (r(48) = -.28, p < .05), such 
that upward counterfactual frequency increased as the discrepancy between the actual 
games won and expected number of wins grew larger in the negative direction (i.e., fewer 
wins than expected).  However, when the data were split with respect to feedback type 
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(global vs. specific) a Fisher’s z-transformation comparison of independent correlations 
failed to show a difference between the two correlations, z = -.45, ns.  In addition, the 
magnitude of the discrepancy variable, itself, did not vary by feedback condition, F(1, 
98) = .08, ns.  Thus, neither the relationship between disconfirmed expectations and 
upward counterfactual frequency nor the degree of disconfirmed expectations was 
influenced by the type of feedback provided.  Rather, upward counterfactual frequency 
appears to have been caused by the nature of the feedback given to participants and was 
associated with the degree to which participants experienced failed expectations.  It is 
also worth noting that expected number of wins correlated negatively with the 
discrepancy variable, r(48) = -.57, p < .001, and positively with upward counterfactual 
frequency, r(48) = .35, p < .05.  These results suggest, of course, that high expectations 
alone can lead a greater likelihood of experiencing disconfirmed expectations and 
subsequently more frequent counterfactual responses to the event.      
A Bayesian corrected proportion was not computed for the current experiment.  
This is because all of the participants assigned to the thought-listing conditions managed 
to complete one thought after each game of blackjack.  Thus, the total number of 
thoughts listed did not vary from 10.  Any transformation using total number of thoughts 
and upward counterfactual frequency would have resulted in identical conclusions.           
Confidence Regarding the Bonus Game 
Three separate 2 (type of feedback) × 2 (thought-listing condition) ANCOVA 
tests were conducted for the three measures of confidence pertaining to the bonus game 
(the three dependent variables correlated significantly with one another, average r(98) = 
.44, p < .01).  Number of games of blackjack won was included as the covariate in the 
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test of differences between the feedback conditions among the dependent variables.  This 
covariate reached statistical significance for perceived likelihood of winning the bonus 
game, F(1, 97) = 11.87, p < .01 (r = .36, p < .01), and for subjective confidence in 
winning the bonus game, F(1, 97) = 9.79, p < .01 (r = .30, p < .01), but not for tickets bet 
on winning the bonus game, F(1, 97) = .26, ns (r = .07, ns).   
As stated in Hypothesis 2, participants assigned to the specific feedback condition 
were expected to report greater chances of winning the bonus game, report greater 
subjective confidence of winning the bonus game, and record a greater number of their 
tickets as bets on winning the bonus game than were participants assigned to the global 
feedback condition.  This hypothesis was supported for each of the dependent variables 
(see the bottom half of Table 4.1).  There was no main effect of thought-listing condition 
and no interaction between feedback and thought-listing condition.  Thus, the prediction 
that thought-listing instructions would not affect the dependent variables (Hypothesis 3) 
was supported.       
Moderation of Pre-Event Expectations and Upward Counterfactuals 
 The final two hypotheses regarding moderation of pre-event expectations and 
moderation and mediation of post-event counterfactual responses were examined using 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses according to the procedures recommended by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983).  In each of these analyses, the three confidence measures 
served as the dependent variables.   
Pre-event expectancy and subjective confidence, as well as upward counterfactual 
frequency, were tested as moderators of the relationships between feedback type and the 
three post-event measures in nine separate hierarchical multiple regression models using 
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the same procedures employed in Experiments 1 and 2 (global feedback = 0; specific 
feedback = 1; continuous variables were centered; simple slopes were plotted and 
examined at one standard deviation above and below the mean of continuous variables).  
For each hierarchical multiple regression model computed, step 1 was employed to 
statistically control for number of games of blackjack won and the expectancy variables.  
Feedback type and one of the proposed moderators were entered in step 2 and their 
interaction term was entered in step 3.   
Nine tests of moderation were examined.  Each of the six models that examined 
pre-event expectancy and subjective confidence as moderators failed to reveal significant 
interaction effects.  However, there were two tests of moderation that were supported 
statistically; upward counterfactual frequency moderated the relationship between 
feedback type and perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game as well as the 
relationship between feedback type and subjective confidence in winning the bonus 
game.  Feedback condition failed to reach a significant main effect in each of the nine 
tests.  These null effects of feedback type appeared to be caused by the reduction of 
significance by the contribution played by upward counterfactual frequency, as the effect 
of feedback type was observed when upward counterfactual frequency was not included 
in the model (see the tests of mediation for more detail on this issue).   
Regarding perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game, main effects of pre-
event expectancy, (β = .37, t(46) = 2.79, p < .01) and of pre-event confidence (β = .27, 
t(46) = 2.02, p = .05) emerged in the first step of the analysis, RP2P = .22, F(3, 46) = 4.43, p 
< .01.  No other main effects were observed.  However, the main effects were qualified 
by an interaction between feedback type and upward counterfactual frequency in the third 
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step, (β = .54, t(43) = 2.18, p < .05; ΔRP2P = .08, ΔF(1, 43) = 4.77, p < .05).  As expected, 
simple slope analysis showed that perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game 
increased with upward counterfactual frequency but only for the specific feedback 
condition β = .71, t(43) = 3.99, p < .001 (see Figure 4.1).  No other simple slopes were 
statistically significant.   
For subjective confidence in winning the bonus game, only a main effect of pre-
event expectancy, (β = .43, t(46) = 2.79, p < .01) was observed in the first step of the 
analysis, RP2P = .24, F(3, 46) = 4.77, p < .01.  As was true for perceived likelihood of 
winning the bonus game, an interaction between feedback type and upward 
counterfactual frequency qualified the main effect, (β = .66, t(43) = 2.76, p < .01; ΔRP2P = 
.12, ΔF(1, 43) = 7.66, p < .01).  As expected, simple slope analysis showed that 
subjective confidence in winning the bonus game increased with upward counterfactual 
frequency but only for the specific feedback condition β = .88, t(43) = 5.22, p < .001 (see 
Figure 4.2).  When upward counterfactual frequency was high, confidence in winning the 
bonus game was marginally greater for specific feedback participants than it was for 
global feedback participants, β = .49, t(43) = 1.85, p < .08.  No other simple slopes were 
statistically significant.   
Two additional variables were considered as a moderator of the relationships 
between feedback type and the dependent variables.  As discussed earlier in the 
ANCOVA results, the dependent variables generally increased with the number of games 
of blackjack won.  This information (the number of games they had just won out of ten) 
was readily available to all of the participants.  Further, direct experience (i.e., newly 
encountered information) plays a primary role in expectancies and expectancy revision.  
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Olson et al. (1996) argued on the basis of their model of expectancy process that 
disconfirmation of expectancies is directly linked to expectancy revision under conditions 
of systematic and effortful processing.  In this light, it was reasoned that pre-event 
expectancies may have moderated the relationship between feedback type and the 
dependent variables because expectations regarding future judgments were partly revised 
by the experience of the task itself (i.e., the outcomes of playing 10 games of blackjack).  
This should be especially true in the global feedback condition where counterfactualizing 
appeared to be less likely to occur in response to the event compared to that of the 
specific feedback condition, and a greater amount of one’s available cognitive resources 
could be devoted to self-evaluation with respect to the task at hand.  If expectations are 
“revised” when highly relevant and salient information is made readily available, one 
should expect to find confidence in winning future games of blackjack to be positively 
correlated with previous win percentage.   
To test this possibility, the number of games of blackjack won was tested as a 
moderator of the relationship between feedback type and the dependent variables.  In 
these tests, only a marginal interaction between feedback type and the number of games 
won was found for the number of tickets bet on winning the bonus game, β = -.24, t(96) = 
-1.70, p < .10, RP2P = .08, F(3, 96) = 2.81, p < .05.  The predicted points of the regression 
equation are displayed in Figure 4.3.  Although the results appear to trend in the direction 
expected, the two points plotted for the global feedback condition reached only marginal 
significance, β = .38, t(96) = 1.75, p < .09.  Because the two points plotted for the 
specific feedback condition did not differ, the results suggest that, even when specific 
feedback condition participants did not win very many games of blackjack, they felt as 
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confident as did participants who did win a lot by betting a substantial number of tickets 
on winning the bonus game.  However, the difference in the number of tickets bet on 
winning the bonus game between global and specific feedback condition participants who 
won a relatively low number of games (β = .39, t(96) = 2.81, p < .01) may reflect greater 
confidence in simulated alternatives considered among specific feedback condition 
participants (no other simple slopes were statistically significant).  Thus, it is important to 
determine whether or not the confidence that a person holds in any could have, would 
have, or should have statements that they generate, in addition to counterfactual 
frequency, also impacts judgments of recently experienced events and similar, future 
events (see Experiment 5).  That is, the notion that people vary in the conviction to which 
they believe something different could have actually occurred, as a result of exposure to 
general versus specific event information, should be studied further. 
Finally, with regard to moderation, it was reasoned that, for specific feedback 
participants, an upward counterfactual in response to a lost game of blackjack could 
function perceptually as a win (i.e., a proxy for a win), when evaluating one’s skill at 
playing blackjack.  This may be especially true if the outcome is perceived as a near win.  
Thus, the sum of the number of games of blackjack won plus the number upward 
counterfactual responses (made after losing games) was tested as a potential moderator.  
It was expected that the dependent variables would increase with this summed variable, 
but especially for specific feedback participants.  In fact, evidence for moderation by the 
sum of games won and upward counterfactuals following losing games was found for 
perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game; that is, an interaction between feedback 
type and the summed variable was supported statistically, β = .57, t(46) = 2.14, p < .05, 
 98
                                                                                           
RP2P = .20, F(3, 46) = 3.70, p < .02.  The predicted points of the regression equation are 
displayed in Figure 4.4.  As predicted, perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game 
increased significantly with the sum of the number of games of blackjack won and 
upward counterfactuals, but only for the specific feedback condition, β = .53, t(46) = 
3.38, p < .01.  In addition, when the summed variable was high, specific feedback 
participants tended to report a greater perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game 
than did global feedback participants, β = .38, t(46) = 2.01, p < .05.  No other simple 
slopes were statistically significant. 
Mediation of Upward Counterfactuals 
Next, mediation analyses were examined with the current data according to the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  In each of these analyses, the three 
measures of confidence regarding the bonus game served as the dependent variables and 
the number of games of blackjack won was controlled for in an initial step.  As stated 
earlier, upward counterfactuals should mediate the relationships between feedback type 
and post-event judgments regarding the bonus game (Hypothesis 5).   
First and foremost, there were three separate relationships for upward 
counterfactual frequency to possibly mediate: 1) the relationship between feedback type 
and perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game, β = .22, t(98) = 2.20, p < .05; 2) the 
relationship between feedback type and subjective confidence in winning the bonus 
game, β = .21, t(98) = 2.12, p < .05; and 3) the relationship between feedback type and 
tickets bet on winning the bonus game, β = .23, t(98) = 2.28, p < .05.     
Upward counterfactual frequency was tested as a mediator of the relationships 
between feedback type and the three dependent variables (see Figure 4.5).  As indicated 
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earlier in a one-way ANOVA, upward counterfactual frequency was significantly 
associated with the specific feedback condition, β = .63, t(48) = 5.63, p < .001.  As 
displayed in Figure 4.5, when both feedback type and upward counterfactual frequency 
were entered into the regression model simultaneously, feedback type was no longer a 
significant predictor of any of the three dependent variables.  Yet, upward counterfactual 
frequency was a significant predictor of one of the three variables (i.e., tickets bet on 
winning the bonus game).  Modified Sobel tests showed that the reductions in the effect 
of feedback type on perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game (z = .46, ns) and 
subjective confidence in winning the bonus game were not significant reductions (z = .78, 
ns).  However, the reduction in the effect of feedback type on tickets bet on winning the 
bonus game was significant, z = 2.25, p < .05.  Thus, evidence of mediation via upward 
counterfactual frequency was strongest for the relationship between feedback type and 
tickets bet on winning the bonus game.  The same result was found when controlling 
statistically for the number of games of blackjack won.        
Discussion 
 Several of the hypotheses of Experiment 4 were supported.  Upward 
counterfactual thoughts emerged more frequently in response to specific event feedback 
than in response to global event feedback.  Again, correlational analyses showed that 
upward counterfactual frequency appeared to be more relevant to judgments following 
specific feedback.  The null effects of pre-event expectancies and subjective confidence 
may have been overshadowed by newly revised expectancies, especially those of global 
feedback participants.  Some support for this was found by the trend of data revealed in 
the test of number of games of blackjack won as a moderator of the relationship between 
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feedback type and tickets bet on winning the bonus game.  Thus, the central notion of the 
current dual-process conceptualization of reactions to general and specific events, that 
observation of general versus specific events lead to the formation of different standards 
of comparison, was partially supported.  However, it appears that pre-event expectations 
can be revised by the incorporation of recently obtained information.  Therefore, the pre-
event expectations measured in the current experiment were not likely to serve as potent 
predictors of expectations for similar, future events.    
On the other hand, upward counterfactual frequency either moderated the 
relationships between feedback type and the dependent variables (i.e., perceived 
likelihood of winning the bonus game and subjective confidence in winning the bonus 
game), or it mediated the relationships between feedback type and the dependent 
variables (i.e., tickets bet on winning the bonus game).  Although not originally 
predicted, there was some evidence for the notion that counterfactuals following losses 
could be treated perceptually as wins, especially for the condition that was expected to 
lead to the most counterfactual responses (i.e., the specific feedback condition).  This was 
evidenced by the interaction between feedback type and the sum of wins and upward 
counterfactual frequency for the perceived likelihood of winning the bonus game, 
whereby the sum of wins and counterfactuals expressed by specific feedback condition 
participants was positively related to this perception.   
The moderation of the summed variable is consistent with Miller and Turnbull’s 
(1990) notion of the counterfactual fallacy, whereby people confuse what might have 
been with what should have been.  However, it would be interesting to determine in 
subsequent studies whether or not perceivers go a step further, that is, rather than simply 
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confuse what might have been with what should have been, do perceivers sometimes 
confuse what might have been with what was?  With respect to earlier research on the 
accuracy of one’s memory, the answer appears to be yes. 
In studies on the “illusion of control,” Langer and Roth (1975) showed that, when 
people thought there was some skill involved in guessing the outcomes of coin tosses, 
they overestimated how many they guessed correctly following 30 trials (also see Langer, 
1975).  Likewise, participants in the current experiment were reminded twice that 
blackjack is a game that involves some skill.  Further, Garry and Polaschek (2000) have 
argued that people can misremember a counterfactualized outcome as a truth, as a 
function of source confusion or familiarity.  These researchers also argued that a source 
monitoring problem would be more likely to occur when a time delay is introduced 
between the event and the moment of recall; that is, the source confusion would be more 
likely to emerge if the recall isn’t requested directly after the event itself.  It is uncertain 
how many wins participants thought they had before they were reminded of this total 
following the 10PthP and final game (just before being informed about the bonus game).  
However, it seems likely that, if either feedback condition was to overestimate their total 
number of wins, it would have been the specific feedback condition because of their 
increased tendency to counterfactualize losses.  Future examinations of such questions 
may do well by first determining whether or not upward counterfactual frequency is 
positively correlated with the frequency of misremembered desirable events.    
Perhaps most important, and in contrast to Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the current 
experiment dealt with actual events that participants experienced themselves (without any 
false feedback).  The current experiment did not employ false feedback, nor did it involve 
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abnormal events.  The results provide further evidence that people may mentally simulate 
alternatives to reality even when nothing out of the ordinary occurs.  Thus, the current 
conceptualization of a dual-process model of reactions to general and specific events may 
apply to personally-experienced, “normal” events as well as passively-observed, unusual 
events.   
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CHAPTER 6 – EXPERIMENT 5:  
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC HORSE RACE BETTING EVENTS 
The purposes of Experiment 5 are similar to those of Experiment 4.  However, it 
is important to replicate and examine the proposed psychological hypotheses in multiple 
situations and contexts (Cohen, 1994; Meehl, 1967; Popper, 1959).  Thus, a paradigm 
involving a different type of task within a different context (i.e., betting on the outcome 
of horse races) was employed in Experiment 5.  The current experiment differs from 
Experiment 4 in that the participants, themselves, were both actors and observers of the 
event that they experienced (as are many other types of events that one may bet on, such 
as betting on the outcome of a sporting event).   
A second purpose of Experiment 5 was to examine whether or not counterfactual 
responses to specific versus general events must be self-generated in order to demonstrate 
the mediating role of counterfactual thinking.  That is, do counterfactuals play as potent a 
role in reactions to general and specific events when counterfactuals are provided by 
other observers (“spoon-fed”) as do counterfactuals that are self-generated?  Answering 
this question would help to determine if a counterfactual response itself, regardless of its 
origin, is a key factor in the generation of different reactions to general and specific 
events.  At first glance, one may argue that, if counterfactual thoughts affect one’s 
comparison case for an event (which subsequently affects perceptions and judgments), 
then counterfactual thoughts should do so even when they are not initially generated by 
the perceiver.  Thus, an alternative to reality should have the same effect on one’s 
judgments, regardless of whether it is entirely self-generated or whether it is information 
provided by another observer of the event. 
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Although intuitive, this particular notion is not supported by the available social 
cognition literature.  For instance, studies that have examined the effect of counterfactual 
thoughts on persuasion have revealed that attitude changes persist over time only when 
counterfactual responses are self-generated, and not when counterfactuals are spoon-fed 
to social perceivers (Tal-Or, Boninger, Poran, & Gleicher 2004).  Mussweiler and 
Neumann (2000) have concluded that judgments of social targets are more likely to be 
consistent with internally generated cognitions compared to externally provided 
knowledge.  Their studies suggest that people are relatively better equipped with the 
cognitive resources to correct for the influence of externally provided primes than they 
are to correct for the influence of internally provided primes when judging ambiguously 
described social targets.  It is also possible that people are motivated to react against 
“outside” influences.   
However, earlier experiments have shown that people’s opinions can move 
toward the position implied by reading scripts or by sincerely playing the role of others 
(Zimbardo, 1965).  In a somewhat related vein, McGuire and Papageorgis (1961) showed 
that, under some conditions, actively participating in generating counterarguments, as 
opposed to using the arguments provided by another person, does not always lead to 
more potent inoculations against persuasive attempts (although McGuire (1964) reported 
that active participation of defense generation typically augments the internalization of 
attitudes).  On the other hand, a more recent study conducted by Wänke, Bless, and Biller 
(1996) examined the effects of generating arguments that support one’s attitude toward a 
specific issue versus simply reading arguments generated by other individuals.  These 
researchers found clear evidence for the notion that the subjective experience associated 
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with generating one’s own thoughts is more influential to the construction of his or her 
attitudes compared to the experience of reading another person’s arguments.  Wänke and 
her colleagues demonstrated counterintuitive, ease of generation effects for those 
participants who generated their own arguments.  That is, participants who generated 
their own arguments reported attitudes that reflected the implications of their argument 
generating experience.  They later reported attitudes that conformed to their arguments, 
but only after completing an easy argument generation task (generating three arguments) 
and not after completing a more difficult argument generation task (generating seven 
arguments).  For participants who read arguments generated by other participants, a 
“number” heuristic effect was supported.  The attitudes of these participants were more 
strongly influenced by the number of arguments they read for or against the issue, 
seemingly because they lacked the subjective experience of ease or difficulty that 
accompanies self-generated arguments.   
Thus, the available research that has examined self-generated versus other-
generated cognitions suggests that a difference in the potency of self-generated versus 
other-generated counterfactuals for judgments may also exist.  Thus, the current 
experiment implemented a third condition in addition to the general and specific event 
conditions, namely a general event + “spoon-fed thoughts” condition.  Participants 
assigned to this condition were presented with the same information that general event 
condition participants received.  In addition, general event + spoon-fed thoughts 
condition participants were exposed to the thought-listing responses recorded by specific 
event condition participants.  In light of earlier empirical findings, it was hypothesized 
that the pattern of data provided by specific event condition participants would differ 
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significantly from that of the data provided by general event + spoon-fed thoughts 
condition participants.  However, even if counterfactual responses affect judgments when 
they are not self-generated (as would be the case for general event + spoon-fed thoughts 
condition participants), this would be an important finding.   
Overview of Experiment 
All participants were informed that they would view pre-recorded videos of seven 
professional horse races, and that they were to imagine that these races were taking place 
live.  Participants were informed that they would be given some information about each 
horse in each race before placing a two-dollar bet (using fake money given to them by a 
laboratory assistant) on a horse to win, place, or show (finish first, second, or third, 
respectively).  It was explained to participants that their task was to win as much fake 
money as possible, and that they would later have a chance to win a $30 drawing in 
another part of the experiment.  It was made clear to participants that their chances of 
winning the $30 drawing depended on how well they performed in their betting.  
Participants then indicated their pre-race expectations regarding how many races out of 
six they expected to place a bet that won them money, and how confident they were in 
this estimation.   
Participants were assigned to one of three experimental conditions (specific event, 
general event, or general event + spoon-fed thoughts) in which they gained information 
about each of the first six of seven horse races.  Specific event condition participants 
viewed videos of the first six races and the payoffs, whereas general event condition 
participants were provided only with the general results of each race (the order in which 
the horses finished and the payoffs).  General event + spoon-fed thoughts event condition 
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participants were provided with the same information as those participants assigned to the 
general event condition, but they were also provided with thought-listing responses 
recorded by participants assigned to the specific event condition who selected the same 
horse.     
At the conclusion of each race (or after being informed of the result – depending 
on condition), payouts (in the form of fake money) were awarded to participants on the 
basis of the horse they selected, the horse’s finishing position, and the horse’s pre-race 
odds.  All of the participants were instructed to list their thoughts at any time after 
learning about the results of each race.  As expected, the previous experiments 
(Experiments 1, 2, and 4) supported the notion that counterfactual thinking affected the 
dependent variables regardless of whether or not participants were asked to explicitly list 
their thoughts, as evidenced by the null effects of thought-listing condition.  To simplify 
the overall design, a thought-listing manipulation was not employed in the current 
experiment.     
At the conclusion of the first six horse races, participants were informed that, for 
the next phase of the experiment, they would view a video of a seventh and final race (all 
participants viewed this race).  After being informed that they had “100 tickets,” they 
were informed that their tickets would be entered into an electronic drawing for $30 at 
the conclusion of the entire experiment.  It was explained further that the more tickets 
they had to enter, the better their chances would be of winning the drawing.  For a chance 
to increase their number of tickets, all participants were permitted to place a bet on a 
horse for the final race using any number of their 100 tickets.  They were then informed 
that if they placed a bet, the number of tickets they could enter in the drawing depended 
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on the pre-race odds, the number of tickets they bet, and the payout schedule (similar to 
the previous races).  Participants were also asked to indicate the subjective confidence 
they felt that the horse they picked would finish in first, second, or third.        
Hypotheses 
Six separate hypotheses were tested in Experiment 5:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to the event 
than were participants assigned to the general event condition.  That is, a main effect of 
type of event on the number of upward counterfactuals generated in response to the event 
was expected to emerge.  As with Experiment 1, this hypothesis was based on Sherman et 
al.’s (1999) use of norm theory, which argued that specific events tend to increase one’s 
attention toward mutable features more than general events.  Downward counterfactuals 
may have also emerged, especially in the case of a close win by a horse that was picked 
to win.  However, because most participants were likely to experience more losses than 
wins, most of the counterfactual responses listed by participants were expected to be 
upward counterfactuals.   
Hypothesis 2: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to place a greater number of their tickets as bets on the horse they picked to win the final 
race, and report greater subjective confidence in their bets, than were participants 
assigned to the general event condition.  In other words, a main effect of type of event 
(general or specific) on both dependent variables was expected to emerge.  This 
hypothesis was based on the assumption that Hypothesis 1 would be supported.  If in fact 
specific event participants focused more on how the previous races could have, would 
 109
                                                                                           
have, or should have turned out differently, they should be correspondingly more likely 
to place greater bets, and feel greater subjective confidence in winning the final race.       
Hypothesis 3: Participants assigned to the specific event condition were expected 
to place a greater number of their tickets as bets on the horse they picked to win the final 
race, and report greater subjective confidence in their bets, than were participants 
assigned to the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition.  In other words, a main 
effect of type of event (specific or general event + spoon-fed thoughts) on both dependent 
variables was expected to emerge.  This hypothesis was based on the research findings 
outlined above (Mussweiler & Neumann, 2000; Tal-Or et al., 2004; Wänke et al., 1996), 
which suggested that counterfactuals should have an effect on reactions to an event, 
especially when those counterfactuals are self-generated.  Thus, self-generated 
counterfactual responses, as opposed to other-generated counterfactuals responses, were 
expected to have a more potent influence on the construction of comparison standards 
used by participants.      
Hypothesis 4: The relative frequency of upward counterfactual responses to an 
event was expected to be a stronger predictor of post-event judgments than were pre-
event expectations for specific event condition participants, but pre-event expectations 
were expected to be stronger predictors of post-event judgments than was upward 
counterfactual response frequency for general event condition participants.  As described 
in Hypothesis 6 of Experiment 1, this hypothesis was based on the notion that the 
cognitive processing difference (stated in Hypothesis 1) results in different comparison 
cases for the two types of event (general and specific).   
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Hypothesis 5: The relationships between the type of event (general or specific) 
and post-event judgments were expected to be statistically mediated by the relative 
frequency of upward counterfactual responses.  If comparison cases for specific event 
condition participants were constructed through the mutation of specific event 
information, and comparison cases for general event condition participants were 
constructed on the basis of pre-event expectations, counterfactuals should have mediated 
the relationships between the type of event and post-event judgments.  Because it was 
hypothesized that a different factor (expectancies versus counterfactuals) should have 
operated depending on the type of event (general versus specific), two separate 
interaction effects were also expected to emerge such that: 1) the relationships between 
pre-event expectations and the dependent variables were stronger for general event 
condition participants than for specific event condition participants; and 2) the 
relationships between counterfactual frequency and the dependent variables were 
stronger for specific event condition participants than for general event condition 
participants. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 144 undergraduate students, enrolled in psychology courses at Indiana 
University, participated in Experiment 5 for partial fulfillment of course credit.  Only 
participants who were familiar with horse racing and betting were asked to participate in 
this experiment.  Experimental sessions involved a maximum of six participants.     
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Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were greeted by a laboratory assistant who gave them a 
brief oral introduction to the experiment.  The experiment was introduced as a study of 
“what people think about as they watch sports.”  All experimental materials were 
presented using MediaLab v2004 Research Software (Jarvis, 2004).  The instructions of 
the experiment were self-paced, and participants advanced the instructions by pressing 
the space bar or a response key.   
Participants were informed that they would be presented with the outcomes of six 
professional horse races, and that they were to imagine they were betting on these races at 
the track.  Each race consisted of eight horses.  Participants were informed that they 
would be given some information about each horse in each race before placing a two-
dollar bet (using fake money provided by a laboratory assistant) on a horse to win, place, 
or show (finish first, second, or third, respectively).  It was explained to participants that 
their task was to win as much fake money as possible, and that they would have a chance 
to win a $30 electronic drawing in another part of the experiment.  It was made clear to 
participants that their chances of winning the $30 drawing depended on how well they 
performed in their betting.     
A brief tutorial explaining the general betting rules was also given to participants 
before the first race.  Specifically, it was explained that, if they picked a horse to win, the 
horse must win the race in order to receive the win-payout.  If they picked a horse to 
place, the horse must win or place, but in either case they would receive the place-payout.  
If they picked a horse to show, the horse must win, place, or show, but in any case they 
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would receive the show-payout.  An example of a finish position and payout schedule 
(see Figure 5.1) was displayed to participants when these details were being described.  
Before each race, participants were provided with accurate information about 
each of the actual horses, including the names of the horses, the racing numbers of the 
horses, the number of races run by each horse, the breakdown of their total wins, places, 
and shows, and their fastest time at the same distance to be run in the upcoming race (see 
Figure 5.2 for an example of the race program).  When the fastest time of a horse at the 
distance to be run was unavailable, because it had yet to run the distance of the upcoming 
race, “First race at this distance” was displayed for the horse.  Participants were also 
provided with the closing odds (e.g., 1/1; 3/1; 5/2; 25/1) that were actually posted at the 
time of each race.  Payouts for each race, made in fake money, were based on the payout 
schedule given at the end of the actual race.  Participants were assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions (specific event, general event, or general event + spoon-fed 
thoughts) in which they gained information about each of races.   
Before learning about the horses of the first race and placing bets, participants 
indicated their pre-race expectations regarding how many races out of six they expected 
to place a bet that would win them money.  In addition, they were asked to indicate how 
confident they were in their estimation on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all confident 
(1) and extremely confident (7), and how successful they thought they would be at 
performing the task on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all successful (1) and extremely 
successful (7).   
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Specific event condition.  Specific event condition participants viewed videos of 
the first six races.  All of the participants were instructed to list any thoughts that went 
through their minds during their race or after the outcome of the race was discovered.     
General event condition.  The same procedures that were used for participants 
assigned to the specific event condition, involving the information given before each race 
and the payouts, were also used for participants assigned to the general event condition.  
However, general event condition participants did not view any of the videos of the first 
six races.  These participants were provided only with the general results of each race (the 
order in which the horses finished).  Specifically, they were instructed to review the 
finish position and payout schedule for each race.  The same thought-listing procedures 
used for participants assigned to the specific event condition were used for participants 
assigned to the general event condition.   
General event + spoon-fed thoughts condition.  General event + spoon-fed 
thoughts condition participants were exposed to the same procedures and information as 
those participants assigned to the general event condition.  However, these participants 
were also provided with thought-listing responses listed by a participant assigned to the 
specific event condition who picked the same horse.  That is, general event + spoon-fed 
thoughts participants were randomly yoked to a thought-listing response set provided by 
a specific event condition participant.  General event + spoon-fed thoughts participants 
were instructed to review the statements listed by a specific event condition participant 
directly after reviewing the finish position and payout schedule for the race.P8P  These 
statements were presented to general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition participants as 
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comments made by another person who bet on the same horse and actually watched the 
race.     
Dependent variables.  At the conclusion of the first six horse races, participants 
were informed about how much fake money they had attained over the course of the 
horse race betting task.  They were then informed that, for the next phase of the 
experiment, they would view a video of a seventh and final race (all participants viewed 
this race).  At this point, all participants were informed that they now possessed 100 
tickets to be entered into an electronic drawing for $30 at the conclusion of the entire 
experiment.  It was explained further that the more tickets they had to enter, the better 
their chances would be of winning the drawing.  For a chance to increase their number of 
tickets, all participants were permitted to place a bet on a horse for the final race using 
their tickets (any amount between 10% and 100% of their available tickets).  They were 
informed that if they placed a winning bet, the number of tickets they won would depend 
on the pre-race odds, the number of tickets they bet, and the payout schedule (as were the 
previous six races).  Participants were also asked to indicate the subjective confidence 
they felt that the horse they picked would finish in first, second, or third using a 7-point 
scale anchored at not at all confident in winning this bet (1) and extremely confident in 
winning this bet (7).  The bet placed and the rating of confidence served as the primary 
dependent variables of the experiment.  The seventh and final race was then displayed to 
all participants.  Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Following the data collection phase of the experiment, an electronic drawing was 
conducted and the winning participant was contacted to receive the award. 
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Design and Analyses  
Experiment 5 employed a between-groups (type of event: general, specific, or 
general + spoon-fed thoughts) factorial design.  Dependent variables, and the influences 
of the type of event, pre-event expectancies, and counterfactuals, were examined using 
correlational and hierarchical multiple regression analyses.  The actual winnings (or 
losings) over the first six races were also included as a covariate in these analyses. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Importantly, participants in the three event type conditions (general, specific, and 
general + spoon-fed thoughts) did not differ in their pre-event expectations about the 
horse race betting task (see the top half of Table 5.1).  That is, regardless of event type 
condition, participants held relatively equal expectations about their expected 
performance on the task, and held relatively equal levels of confidence in their expected 
levels of success.  However, the ANOVA for expected number of winning bets nearly 
reached a marginal level of significance (p = .11), and so it was considered as a covariate 
in the test of differences between the event conditions among the dependent variables.  
Also, as shown in the middle of Table 5.1, the number of winning bets participants had 
placed and the total cash winnings they accumulated over the course of the six races did 
not differ across the type of event conditions.  
Intercoder Agreement of Thought-Listings 
 A total of 2,880 thoughts were listed by participants.  Each thought-listing 
response was coded by two separate coders as a counterfactual response (upward or 
downward) or a non-counterfactual response.  Each response was coded with respect to 
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the context in which the response was listed (the type of bet placed and the finish position 
of the horse bet on).  For instance, the response “My horse should have won by a larger 
margin,” was not coded as a counterfactual response for a participant who had placed a 
win bet on the winning horse; nor was the response “My horse almost won the race,” for 
a participant whose horse actually finished 6PthP, 7PthP, or 8PthP.  Only one of the coders 
appeared to utilize the downward counterfactual as a category for coding thought-listing 
responses (total = 14).  The overall agreement between the two coders was 95.86%; 
Spearman’s ρ = .70, p < .001, Kappa = .70, p < .001 (the 14 downward counterfactuals 
were excluded from the Kappa test as it requires a symmetric table with matching values 
for each variable).  The category agreement index for upward counterfactual responses 
was .73, whereas the category agreement index for non-counterfactual responses was .98.   
Due to this suboptimal level of agreement between coders, especially for 
counterfactual responses, a third coder was used to resolve the disagreements.  A 
representative selection of counterfactual and non-counterfactual responses submitted by 
participants is displayed in Table 5.2.    
Upward Counterfactuals 
 The average frequency of upward counterfactuals listed by participants was 2.66.  
This total was out of 30 possible thoughts listed (a maximum of five thoughts could be 
listed following each of the six races).  With respect to the fact that participants placed 
2.28 winning bets (out of six possible), on average, the total upward counterfactual 
frequency may be considered moderate to high.    
As stated earlier, participants assigned to the specific event condition were 
expected to generate a greater number of upward counterfactual thoughts in response to 
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the event than were participants assigned to the general event condition (Hypothesis 1).  
This hypothesis was tested using an ANCOVA controlling for pre-event expectancy and 
number of winning bets placed.  To simplify the remainder of the current and subsequent 
experimental analyses, a single pre-event expectancy variable was created by summing 
the z-scores of each of the three pre-event expectancy measures (average r(142) = .53, p 
< .001).  These variables were included as covariates because high expectations and 
confidence were expected to increase the frequency of counterfactual thinking for the 
reasons outlined in the Results section of Experiment 4 (i.e., high expectations can lead to 
greater expectancy disconfirmation, triggering counterfactual thinking).  Hypothesis 1 
was supported by a main effect of event type on the frequency of upward counterfactuals 
listed by participants, F(2, 139) = 15.24, p < .001.  Specifically, specific event condition 
participants listed a greater number of upward counterfactuals (M = 3.35, SE = 1.87) than 
did general event condition participants (M = 1.37, SE = .29), t(139) = 4.93, p < .001.  
Participants assigned to the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition were also 
exposed to more upward counterfactuals (M = 3.26, SE = .29) than the participants in the 
general event condition had listed, t(139) = 4.71, p < .001.  The pre-event expectancy 
composite variable and the number of winning bets failed to reach statistical significance 
as covariates.  
As in earlier experiments, a Bayesian corrected proportion was also computed for 
upward counterfactual frequency.  In the current experiment, the mean proportion of 
upward counterfactuals across the entire was .15; therefore, b = 6.5 (see p. 27).  
According to this measure of upward counterfactual frequency, Hypothesis 1 was again 
supported by a main effect of event type on the proportion of upward counterfactuals 
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listed by participants, F(2, 139) = 19.63, p < .001.  Specifically, specific event condition 
participants listed a greater proportion of upward counterfactuals (M = .42, SE = .16) than 
did general event condition participants (M = .29, SE = .13), t(139) = 5.03, p < .001.  
Participants assigned to the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition were also 
exposed to a greater proportion of upward counterfactuals (M = .45, SE = .07) than the 
participants in the general event condition had listed, t(139) = 6.19, p < .001.  The pre-
event expectancy composite variable and the number of winning bets again failed to 
reach statistical significance as covariates.   Although all subsequent analyses examining 
upward counterfactual frequency as a moderator or mediator of other effects were 
computed using the Bayesian corrected proportion, the term “upward counterfactual 
frequency” is retained in the report of these analyses for ease of presentation.         
Unlike Experiment 4, the discrepancy between expected number of winning bets 
and the actual number of bets won (actual - expected) was not significantly correlated 
with upward counterfactual frequency.  However, the differences between playing 
blackjack and betting on horse races are great, and there are several more aspects of a 
horse race that may be mutated compared to those of a game of blackjack (the odds of 
winning a game of blackjack may also be significantly higher than those of winning a bet 
on a horse race).  Thus, disconfirmed expectancies may be a very salient trigger of 
counterfactual thinking in a simple game of blackjack, whereas in horse race betting, 
disconfirmed expectancies may be only one of several triggers of counterfactual thinking.  
Counterfactual thinking in the current experiment appears to have been caused by the 
nature of the event manipulation, as the frequency did not appear to be augmented by 
disconfirmed expectations.        
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Confidence Regarding the Bonus Race 
As stated in Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, participants assigned to the specific 
feedback condition were expected to place a greater number of their tickets as bets on the 
horse they selected to win, place, or show in the bonus race, and report greater subjective 
confidence in their bets, than were participants assigned to either the general event 
condition or the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition (the two dependent 
variables were correlated positively, r(146) = .72, p < .001).  Two additional one-way 
ANCOVAs were conducted for the two measures of confidence pertaining to the bonus 
race, where type of event condition served as the independent variable.  As was done in 
the examination of upward counterfactual frequency, the pre-event expectancy composite 
variable and the number of winning bets were included as covariates.  In both tests, the 
number of winning bets reached marginal significance as a covariate for tickets bet on 
winning the bonus race, F(1, 139) = 3.89, p < .10 (r = -.12, p < .12), and statistical 
significance for subjective confidence in winning the bonus game, F(1, 139) = 5.47, p < 
.05 (r = -.20, p < .02).P9P  However, the pre-event expectancy composite variable did not 
reach significance as a covariate in either test.   
With regard to the hypotheses, partial support was found for Hypothesis 2 and full 
support was found for Hypothesis 3.  As displayed in the bottom third of Table 5.1, a 
main effect of event type was found for tickets bet on winning the bonus race and 
subjective confidence in winning the bonus game.  However, the number of tickets bet on 
the bonus race was statistically equivalent among the specific event condition and the 
general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition.  Participants assigned to both of these 
conditions bet more tickets than participants assigned to the general event condition.  
 120
                                                                                           
When it came to subjective confidence in their bets for the bonus race, specific event 
condition participants reported greater confidence than both of the other event conditions.         
Moderation of Upward Counterfactuals 
 The final two hypotheses regarding moderation of pre-event expectations and 
moderation and mediation of post-event counterfactual responses were examined using 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses according to the procedures recommended by 
Cohen and Cohen (1983).  In each of these analyses, the two confidence measures served 
as the dependent variables.    
Pre-event expectations and upward counterfactual frequency were tested as 
moderators of the relationship between event type and the two confidence measures in 
four separate hierarchical multiple regression models using the procedures recommended 
by Cohen and Cohen (1983).  All subsequent analyses employed event type as a dummy 
coded variable (general event = 0; specific event = 1) and continuous variables were 
centered.  For each hierarchical multiple regression model, event type and one of the 
proposed moderators were entered in step 1 and their interaction term was entered in step 
2.        
There was no evidence of moderation via pre-event expectancies or upward 
counterfactuals in the current experiment.  An additional moderator (number of winning 
bets) was tested, but the same null interaction effect was found.  All of these analyses 
used only those participants assigned to the general and specific event conditions.  Using 
two dummy code variables, the same tests were computed using all three event types.  
Still, no evidence for moderation was observed.   
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Mediation of Upward Counterfactuals 
Next, mediation analyses were examined with the current data according to the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  In each of these analyses, the two 
measures of confidence regarding the bonus race served as the dependent variables and 
the number of games of blackjack won was controlled for in an initial step.  As stated 
earlier, upward counterfactuals should mediate the relationships between feedback type 
and post-event judgments regarding the bonus game (Hypothesis 5).  For these analyses, 
only the data from the general and specific event conditions were used.   
First and foremost, there was only one relationship for upward counterfactual 
frequency to possibly mediate: the relationship between event type and tickets bet on 
winning the bonus race, β = .28, t(94) = 2.83, p < .01.  The relationship between event 
type and subjective confidence for the bonus race did not reach statistical significance, β 
= .15, t(94) = 1.51, p = .13.  However, after controlling for pre-event expectancy and 
number of winning bets in an earlier step, event type did reveal a significant effect for 
subjective confidence in the bonus race bet, β = .20, t(92) = 1.99, p < .05.     
Upward counterfactual frequency was tested as a mediator of the relationships 
between event type and the two dependent variables (see Figure 5.3).  As indicated earlier 
in a one-way ANOVA, upward counterfactual frequency was significantly associated 
with the specific event condition, β = .39, t(94) = 4.08, p < .001.  As displayed in the top 
panel of Figure 5.3, when both event type and upward counterfactual frequency were 
entered into the regression model simultaneously, event type was no longer a significant 
predictor of tickets bet on winning the bonus race.  Yet, upward counterfactual frequency 
was a significant predictor of tickets bet on winning the bonus race.  A modified Sobel 
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test showed that the reduction in the effect of event type on tickets bet on winning the 
bonus race was a significant reduction, z = 2.19, p < .05.  
Upward counterfactual frequency failed to mediate the relationship between event 
type and subjective confidence in the bonus race bet as shown in the bottom panel of 
Figure 5.3.  In the model predicting subjective confidence in one’s bet on the bonus race 
with event type, after controlling for pre-event expectancy and number of winning bets in 
an earlier step, upward counterfactual frequency reduced the effect of event type to non-
significance, β = .15, t(91) = 1.35, ns.  However, upward counterfactual frequency was 
not a significant predictor in this model either, β = .09, t(91) = .85, ns.  This pattern of 
results (i.e., mediation by upward counterfactuals for tickets bet but not for subjective 
confidence) is similar to that of the pattern of results found in the blackjack experiment 
(Experiment 4). 
Follow-up Horse Racing Experiment 
 As discussed in Experiments 2 and 4, upward counterfactuals in response to 
undesirable events may differ on another dimension.  That is, rather than differing in their 
frequency of upward counterfactual responses, observers of general and specific events 
may differ in their conviction or confidence that simulated alternatives could have, would 
have, or should have actually occurred.  This type of thought confidence may also serve 
as a mechanism to impact judgments of recently experienced events and similar, future 
events.  It was not feasible to ask participants to respond to counterfactual thought 
confidence items in each of the previous experiments as such items may have triggered 
counterfactual thinking itself and subsequently affected the dependent variables.  Doing 
so may have defeated one of the goals of the current investigation, which was to examine 
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spontaneous reactions to general and specific events rather than ones induced by the 
experiment.   
To this end, 48 participants were recruited to participate in a modified version of 
Experiment 5.  Only the general event and specific event conditions were employed and 
the same basic procedures used in Experiment 5 were employed here.  Participants were 
asked to respond to five additional items in reference to their confidence in a better 
performance on the horse race betting task.  These items were embedded between the 
outcome of the sixth race and the presentation of program information for the bonus race.      
Specifically, participants were reminded that they began the horse race betting 
task with $12, and were informed about their current cash total.  Next, they were asked to 
respond to five counterfactual thought confidence items: 1) How confident are you that 
your performance on the horse race betting task could have been better? on a 7-point 
scale anchored at not at all confident (1) and extremely confident (7); 2) How sure are 
you that you should have performed better on the horse race betting task? on a 7-point 
scale anchored at not at all sure (1) and extremely sure (7); 3) How sure are you that the 
horses you bet on could have or should have performed better in the races? on a 7-point 
scale anchored at not at all sure (1) and extremely sure (7); 4) How much do you feel that 
your choices in the races, or the outcomes of the races, might have been different? on a 7-
point scale anchored at not at all (1) and very much (7); and 5) How easy is it for you to 
imagine doing something, or not doing something, that would have led to a greater cash 
total? on a 7-point scale anchored at not at all easy (1) and extremely easy (7). 
It was hypothesized that participants assigned to the specific event condition 
would report greater confidence that a more desirable outcome on the horse race betting 
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task could have, should have, or might have occurred than would participants assigned to 
the general event condition.  Upward counterfactual frequency should also be correlated 
with counterfactual confidence.  Both upward counterfactual frequency and 
counterfactual confidence were also expected to mediate any relationships found between 
the type of event and the dependent variables.  These expectations were tested using a 
series of ANOVA, correlation, and multiple regression analyses. 
To simplify the analyses, the five counterfactual thought confidence items were 
combined into a single value (i.e., averaged).  However, before doing so, the items were 
examined for internal consistency.  Only items 1, 2, and 4 were significantly correlated 
with each other; this combination of items was also associated with the greatest internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .71).  As expected, participants assigned to the specific 
event condition reported greater counterfactual thought confidence (M = 4.93, SD = 1.17) 
than did participants assigned to the general event condition (M = 3.83, SD = 1.21), F(1, 
46) = 10.14, p < .01; r(46) = .43, p < .01.   
As was found in Experiment 5, participants in the specific event condition listed 
more upward counterfactuals (M = 2.67, SD = 2.75) than did participants in general event 
condition (M = 1.29, SD = 2.11), F(1, 46) = 3.78, p < .05.  A Bayesian corrected 
proportion was also computed for this experiment.  In the current experiment, the mean 
proportion of upward counterfactuals across the entire sample was .09; therefore, b = 11 
(see p. 27).  According to this measure of upward counterfactual frequency, participants 
assigned to the specific event condition reported a greater proportion of counterfactual 
thoughts (M = .11, SD = .05) than did participants assigned to the general event condition 
(M = 07, SD = .05), F(1, 46) = 5.25, p < .05.  Although all subsequent analyses 
 125
                                                                                           
examining upward counterfactual frequency as a moderator or mediator of other effects 
were computed using the Bayesian corrected proportion, the term “upward counterfactual 
frequency” is retained in the report of these analyses for ease of presentation.  
Surprisingly, upward counterfactual frequency and counterfactual thought 
confidence reached only marginal significance, r(46) = .26, p = .07.  However, upward 
counterfactual frequency did correlate significantly with the first counterfactual thought 
confidence item, r(46) = .29, p < .05.  Although these conclusions warrant some caution, 
it is reasonable to expect multiple, qualitatively different, counterfactuals (i.e., not simply 
the same counterfactual repeated multiple times) to increase one’s confidence that an 
alternative outcome was actually likely to occur.  It is also important to remember that 
each thought listed in the thought-listing task was spontaneous to the extent that 
participants were asked only to list their thoughts about the races and not to list what 
might have or could have occurred.  Participants were not asked to consider what might 
have been; they were asked only to list any thoughts that went through their minds as 
they discovered the results of the races.  In this respect, and with respect to the nature of 
the event itself, there are an infinite number of things that a participant might have 
thought about or commented on.  It is possible that many of the participants did generate 
upward counterfactual thoughts well after the thought-listing tasks had ended.  Such 
thoughts would be expected to contribute to counterfactual thought confidence, yet they 
would not have been detected in the current experiment.   
More importantly, it was essential to determine whether or not counterfactual 
thought confidence mediated the relationship between event type and the dependent 
variables, as upward counterfactual frequency had in earlier experiments.  First, event 
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type significantly predicted tickets bet on winning the bonus race (β = .27, t(46) = 1.96, p 
= .05), but did not significantly predict subjective confidence in winning the bonus race 
bet (β = .13, t(46) = .88, ns).  According to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommendations, 
there was only one event type/dependent variable path to mediate in this case.  More 
recently, researchers (Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) have argued that 
the first requirement of mediation recommended by Baron and Kenny is not entirely 
necessary, especially when there is an a priori belief that the effect of the initial predictor 
of the criterion is small.  In each of the previous experiments that included a test of the 
effect of event type on subjective confidence for a similar, future event (i.e., a rematch, a 
new trivia test, a bonus game of blackjack, or a bonus horse race), the effect was small 
(usually RP2P = .04 or .05).  Thus, mediation analyses were carried out for both of the 
dependent variables.   
Interestingly, when counterfactual thought confidence was tested as a mediator of 
the relationship between event type and tickets bet on the bonus race, its presence in the 
model statistically reduced the effect of event type to nonsignificance, yet failed to reach 
significance itself.  One possibility for this null finding is inadequate sample size.  
Although the two event type conditions differed in their levels of counterfactual thought 
confidence, a primary source of counterfactual thought confidence (upward 
counterfactual frequency) failed to correlate significantly with confidence (as stated 
above).  Thus, it is also possible that counterfactual confidence may not have reached a 
level necessary to affect one’s bet after controlling for the type of event.       
Ignoring the first requirement of mediation according to Baron and Kenny (1986), 
counterfactual thought confidence was strongly associated with subjective confidence in 
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winning the bonus race bet, β = .56, t(45) = 4.03, p < .001.  This same relationship was 
found even when controlling statistically for event type, expected number of bets to be 
won, and actual number of bets won.  Interestingly, after splitting the data by event type 
condition and controlling statistically for expected number of bets to be won and actual 
number of bets won, the relationship between counterfactual thought confidence and 
subjective confidence in winning the bonus race remained significant, but only among 
participants assigned to the specific event condition (β = .45, t(20) = 2.07, p < .05), and 
not among participants assigned to the general event condition (β = .42, t(20) = 1.92, ns). 
Discussion 
 Several of the hypotheses of Experiment 5 were supported.  As in earlier 
experiments, upward counterfactual thoughts emerged more frequently in response to a 
specific event than in response to a general event.  Participants assigned to the specific 
event condition were more confident in terms of the number of tickets they were willing 
to place as a bet, and in terms of their subjective confidence for the bet, than were general 
event condition participants.  
An apparent inconsistency was found among the general event + spoon-fed 
thoughts condition, with regard to their number of tickets placed as a bet and their 
subjective confidence for their the bonus race bet.  When it came to their bet, they looked 
much like the specific event condition participants, but when it came to their subjective 
confidence in their bet, they looked more like the general event condition participants.  
Thus, exposure to the thoughts of another individual, some of which were likely to be 
upward counterfactuals, seemed potent enough to affect a participant’s bet on the bonus 
race, but not potent enough for them to feel confident about it.  This pattern of findings 
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resembles that of the blackjack experiment (Experiment 4) to the extent that upward 
counterfactuals (associated with the specific feedback condition) mediated the 
relationship between feedback type and one’s bet on a bonus game, but not the 
relationship between feedback type and subjective confidence.P10P  However, there is some 
reason to believe that general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition participants 
possessed less counterfactual thought confidence.  The results of the follow-up 
experiment are essential to such an argument to the extent that it showed counterfactual 
thought confidence to be a strong predictor of subjective confidence for one’s bet on the 
bonus race.  General event + spoon-fed thoughts condition participants were exposed to 
the number of counterfactuals that specific event condition participants had listed, yet 
spoon-fed participants were probably not as likely to feel as confident that they might 
have performed better on the horse race betting task because they were not exposed to the 
specific features of the event that would be expected to boost such confidence.  Any 
particular set of thought-listings that spoon-fed participants read may or may not have 
given some clues as to the specific features of the event (e.g., how close their horse was 
to placing).  However, another stranger’s comments that allude to specific features of the 
event are not as potent as is specific event information gained from actually watching the 
race.  On the other hand, with the significant increase in considering counterfactual 
thoughts, general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition may have been prompted to at 
least feel as though they should have performed better at the task (attained more tickets 
for the drawing), while at the same time not having the specific event information that 
may have permitted them to feel confident about such a notion.  Thus, specific event 
condition participants may have placed significantly higher bets because they felt 
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relatively more confident in their horse race betting ability, whereas spoon-fed 
participants may have employed a “go for broke” strategy without corresponding 
confidence in winning such a bet.  Further, it should not be too surprising that a more 
behavioral-based item (bet placed on for the bonus race) and subjective confidence for 
the bet showed some inconsistencies across the conditions given the large body of 
literature revealing the inconsistencies between behavioral, affective, and cognitive 
components of attitudes (see Breckler, 1984, and Zanna & Rempel, 1988), especially 
among a group of individuals who received a mixture of general event information via 
their own experience and pieces of specific event information in the form of specific 
event thought-listings constructed by another source.          
Correlational analyses showed that pre-event expectancies appeared to be more 
relevant to judgments following a general event, whereas upward counterfactual 
frequency appeared to be more relevant to judgments following a specific event.  
However, when participants were exposed to the general event as well as thought 
responses listed by specific event condition participants, neither variable appeared to be 
linked to the dependent variables.  Instead, the number of winning bets was correlated 
with subjective confidence in the bonus race bet.  It seems feasible to expect this 
correlation to be positive, as better performance should suggest to an individual that they 
have some skill or luck at the task.  Subsequently they should feel more confident in 
similar, future tasks.  Yet, the relationship between winning bets and subjective 
confidence was negative.  Thus, it seems that the opposite causal direction is also 
possible.  That is, people who have more experience with or knowledge about horse race 
betting do perform better than others with less experience and knowledge, but they are 
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well aware of the level of difficulty involved in consistently picking winning horses.  
Thus, they appropriately place less confidence in their bets than others with less 
experience and knowledge.  In any case, the correlation between the number of winning 
bets and subjective confidence for the bonus race among the general event + spoon-fed 
thoughts condition participants is suggestive of a more complex mediational 
event/reaction process than first proposed.   
Although the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition was a hybrid of two 
different types of event conditions, it did have some “real world” commonalities.  For 
instance, an individual may learn about the general outcome of her favorite tennis 
player’s match (general event), observe the match (specific event), or read about the 
match in a newspaper article whereby she learns of the general outcome and some of the 
specific features (some that may be counterfactualized) written by the author.  Thus, the 
processes involved in reacting to general events, while also being exposed to the thoughts 
of others, may be worthy of studying in its own right.  In fact, the majority of events are 
experienced in a social context.  If people are provided with the opportunity to interact 
with others, as their reactions to events develop, they may increase their confidence in 
their thoughts through this interaction as demonstrated in group polarization-like effects 
(see: Myers & Lamm, 1976; Visser & Mirabile, 2004) or go so far as to adopt another 
person’s reactions as demonstrated in two-factor emotion-like effects (see Schachter & 
Singer, 1962).  These effects may occur in contexts much like that experienced in the 
general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition.      
Neither pre-event expectancies nor upward counterfactual frequency appeared to 
play a role in the moderation of the relationships between event type and the dependent 
 131
                                                                                           
variables.  Similar to the pattern found in Experiment 4, upward counterfactual frequency 
mediated the relationship between event type and tickets bet on a bonus race, but not the 
relationship between event type and subjective confidence in that bet.   
One might argue that, just because counterfactuals were directly spoon-fed to 
participants in the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition, this does not mean that 
they did not generate some of the same reactions themselves.  However, this possibility 
seems unlikely.  Essentially, the two conditions were exposed to different frames of the 
same event.  If the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition generated the same 
cognitive reactions as did the specific event condition, then the general condition would 
not have been likely to show a difference from the specific event condition in their 
frequency of upward counterfactuals either; but this, in fact, was not the case. 
Another surprising finding of Experiment 5 was that the number of winning bets 
was negatively (marginally) related to tickets bet on winning the bonus race and 
negatively related to subjective confidence in winning the bonus race.  That is, the more 
bets that participants had won during the first six races, the less confident they were in 
winning the bonus race.  These negative correlations appeared to be driven mainly by the 
data from the participants assigned to the general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition.  
The fact that the number of winning bets did not correlate significantly with tickets 
placed as a bet, but did with subjective confidence, for spoon-fed participants partially 
supports the argument made earlier that these participants were less confident for the 
bonus race in terms of their subjective confidence than they were in terms of the tickets 
they were willing to place as a bet (despite winning just as many bets as both of the other 
event conditions).    
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The negative correlations with regard to number of winning bets may also be 
explained by the nature of horse race betting, itself, and the strategies employed by 
experienced bettors.  To minimize losses, a common strategy is to make place- or show-
bets on the first or second favorite horses, in terms of the set of closing odds (Asch & 
Quandt, 1986).  Experienced bettors are more likely to make win-bets only when they are 
highly confident in a particular horse.  Placing win-bets obviously reduces the chances 
that they’ll end up with a winning bet.  The less confident place- or show-bettors may 
win more races, but their total cash winning often do not amount to much (especially 
when the bet is made at the minimum of $2.00).  So even though some participants ended 
the task with relatively greater number of winning bets (in the first six races), their 
confidence was apparently unaffected by any success they experienced in the first six 
races, and they tended to be underconfident in the task in general (as evidenced by 
placing a majority of show-bets).  In support of this notion, the number of winning bets 
was positively correlated with the dominant type of bet placed (i.e., win-, place-, or 
show-bet), r(142) = .28, p < .01.  Apparently, people who are knowledgeable about horse 
race betting are aware that it is not so easy to pick winning horses or win money at the 
task; and therefore, they are appropriately not so confident in doing so.     
Another explanation for the unexpected negative correlations between the number 
of winning bets and bonus race confidence measures relates to people’s misperceptions of 
representativeness in a series of outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  According to 
the “gambler’s fallacy,” people sometimes believe that prior random events have an 
influence on subsequent random events.  It seems likely that this misconception applies to 
horse race betting as well, as people have been shown to make predictions about various 
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outcomes (e.g., their own performance on a task) based on this misconception of 
randomness (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985).  When 
gambling on a series of outcomes, a winning bet may be considered likely to occur 
because it has not happened for a period of time, whereas a losing bet may be considered 
likely to occur for the same reason.  Thus, participants who won “their share” of bets may 
have perceived a loss to be in store by the time they considered the bonus race, whereas 
participants who had not won very many bets expected a winning bet to be in store – and 
both groups bet accordingly with corresponding confidence.  However, according to the 
belief in the existence of streaks (the “hot hand” fallacy) in the sequence of random 
events it is also possible to consider a winning bet as more likely to occur because it 
occurred recently, and it is possible to perceive a losing bet as more likely to occur for the 
same reason (especially in cases whereby information about the underlying process 
generating the events is not perceived to be entirely random; see Burns & Corpus, 2004).  
Yet, the former possibility seems more likely, as participants were expected to protect 
their previous winnings (i.e., chances in the form of tickets to enter into the drawing) or 
make up for missed opportunities.   
Future experiments of the role of counterfactual thinking in reaction to general 
versus specific events may do well to examine other, potentially more sensitive, measures 
of counterfactual thinking.  Other measures of counterfactual thinking such as the simple 
proportion of counterfactual thoughts may be more representative of the degree to which 
counterfactuals actually dominate an individual’s cognitive reaction to an event.  Earlier 
experiments in the current investigation varied little in the total number of thoughts listed 
in general.  Thus, counterfactual proportion did not vary as much as it did in the relatively 
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smaller follow-up experimental sample.  It seems possible that the variance in total 
number of thoughts in response to an event is also likely to vary with the specific type of 
event being processed.  Yet, other types of counterfactual measures may reveal other 
dimensions of counterfactual thinking that have yet to be fully investigated.  For instance, 
the amount of time that a person ruminates within a counterfactual mindset may serve as 
an important marker of the weight that people place on such unique cognitions when 
judging confidence or deciding what to do next time given the event’s features, outcome, 
and reactions to it.       
Follow-up Experiment    
The follow-up experiment answered questions that the earlier experiments did 
not.  The evidence of the follow-up experiment, although partly mixed, suggested that the 
counterfactuals that observers of general and specific events generate are different in 
another way.  That is, when people are exposed to enough features of an event that they 
are likely to counterfactualize it, they appear to hold greater confidence in the likelihood 
of simulated alternatives than when they are only aware of the general outcome of the 
event.  Interestingly, the difference on this dimension does not appear to be linked to how 
much people counterfactualize the same event.  However, it does seem reasonable to 
expect multiple, and qualitatively different, counterfactuals to increase one’s confidence 
that an alternative outcome was actually likely to occur.  Further, if an individual is 
afforded the resources and is motivated to cognitively elaborate on such mental 
simulations, counterfactual thought confidence seems likely to increase (see more 
discussion on the issue of counterfactual thought confidence in the General Discussion).   
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CHAPTER 7 – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Overall, the results of the experiments supported the hypotheses drawn from 
Sherman et al.’s (1999) discussion of dual-process accounts of reactions to general and 
specific cases.  Counterfactual thoughts were observed more frequently in response to 
specific events than to general events, and pre-event expectations were more clearly 
linked to reactions regarding general events than to specific events.P11P  The overall pattern 
of results suggests that people may construct a standard of comparison influenced by 
counterfactual thinking (in addition to pre-event event expectations) when reacting to 
specific events.  Standards of comparison for general events appear to be influenced by 
some combination of pre-event expectations and possibly information gained from 
recent, relevant events.  These standards of comparison also appear to affect decisions 
regarding similar, future events (e.g., betting on a horse race).   
 However, evidence for counterfactual thought frequency as a mediator of the 
relationships between event type and decisions about similar, future events was stronger 
than that for pre-event expectations as a moderator.  In most cases, pre-event expectations 
simply failed to remain correlated with the outcome variables after controlling for the 
effect of the type of event (i.e., general vs. specific).  Apparently, pre-event expectations 
are less important to cognitive reactions and decisions regarding similar, future events 
than is the specificity of the event information to which people are exposed.  Some 
evidence, coming primarily from Experiment 4, suggests that general event condition 
participants revised their expectations for similar, future events by appropriately 
adjusting them with respect to the outcomes of recent, relevant events.  Unfortunately, 
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such notions could not be directly tested.  Yet, such tendencies would be consistent with 
Olson et al.’s (1996) model of expectancies.   
At this point, the link between event type and counterfactual thinking, as well as 
that between counterfactual thinking and the types of dependent variables studied in the 
current investigation, appear to be unique to upward counterfactual thinking.  The follow-
up experiment to Experiment 5 provided evidence that confidence in counterfactual 
thoughts is also associated with subjective confidence in decisions regarding similar, 
future events.   
It is important to state that the current model of reactions to general and specific 
events does not hold that pre-event expectations are unimportant to reactions toward 
specific events and that counterfactual thought responses are not important to reactions 
toward general events.  The overall pattern of results suggests that pre-event expectations 
and counterfactual thoughts are sometimes associated with both types of events.  
Although it may be difficult to dissect the influences of these variables on event reactions 
and judgments regarding similar, future events, the current investigation suggests that 
comparison cases for general and specific events are constructed with different 
information in mind.  
There were, of course, other novel findings produced by the current investigation.  
Previous examinations of counterfactual thought concluded that such cognitive responses 
were most likely to occur in reaction to exceptional events (Gavanski & Wells, 1989) or 
when abnormal features were encountered (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982).  However, the types of events used in the current investigation typically 
did not involve abnormal features (some of the tennis match clips in Experiment 3 being 
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the exceptions).  Counterfactuals are also thought to be triggered primarily by unexpected 
outcomes (Roese & Olson, 1995).  Each of the current experiments involved events that 
contained features well within the range of normal expectations.  Nothing extremely 
abnormal, out of the ordinary, strange, or absurd occurred in these events.  Yet, 
counterfactual thoughts were observed in each of the experiments.   
In comparison to general events, participants counterfactualized features of the 
events to a larger degree when exposed to specific event information.  However, with the 
exception of Experiment 3, participants were likely to have been at least moderately 
motivated to see their in-group member succeed (Experiment 1) or to increase their 
chances of winning a monetary award (Experiments 2, 4, and 5).  Thus, it seems essential 
for people to desire a particular outcome (i.e., experience of success and desirable 
outcomes and avoidance of failure and undesirable outcomes) in order for them to be 
motivated to engage in counterfactual thinking.  It seems likely that reactions to events 
with “real world” consequences may lead to even stronger cognitive and affective 
reactions than those observed in the current investigation.  When personal relevance and 
involvement are high, and the importance of the situation is also high, people may begin 
to engage in selective exposure of information and higher levels of cognitive elaboration 
(Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995).  This increased elaboration should lead 
to even greater possibilities of counterfactual thinking.  Thus, a moderate to strong 
personal relevance or interest in the event and a desire for a particular outcome may be 
the only requirements necessary to prompt counterfactual thinking.  Perhaps when people 
are motivated enough to see a particular outcome unfold, but they experience an 
undesirable one, they search for an explanation that may involve counterfactual thought 
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(even when nothing abnormal occurred).  Such motivation could be driven by a desire to 
either experience the simulated alternative (experiential mode of counterfactual thinking; 
see McMullen, 1997) or to bolster one’s expectations for a favorable outcome regarding 
similar, future events. 
For counterfactual thoughts to emerge for the general event observer, yet be just 
as specific as those counterfactuals generate by the specific event observer, he or she 
would first have to make additional assumptions to “fill-in” the “missing pieces” of the 
event and then counterfactualize them (e.g., “The final score of the football game was 31 
to 30.  Maybe they were penalized unfairly or the team stars didn’t play as well as they 
could have.  They should have won that game.”).  This processing is likely to require 
greater cognitive resources than one may be willing to expend, and it is clearly just 
guessing about reality.  Further, this process is unlikely to be associated with much 
counterfactual thought confidence.   
Instead, the reactions of general event observers, and their predictions about 
similar, future events may be influenced by pre-event expectations.  Revision of 
expectations should be considered when exposed to relevant specific event information as 
well, especially when expectations are disconfirmed.  However, as suggested by the 
current investigation, sometimes pre-event expectations or revised ones are 
overshadowed by a tendency to upward counterfactualize undesirable outcomes, possibly 
in the direction of more extreme expectations of an “inevitable,” desirable outcome (i.e., 
as was found in specific event conditions).  Although general event observers may 
engage in counterfactual thinking (as many of the participants in the current experiments 
did), it is unlikely for counterfactuals generated by general event observers to be as rich, 
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specific, and potent as those generated by specific event observers.  Thus, counterfactual 
thought specificity and strength may differ between general event and specific event 
observers who engage in the same degree of counterfactual thinking.  In future 
experiments that investigate the validity of the current model, it may be interesting to 
examine the impact of the specificity of the counterfactuals generated.  
Another possibility is that a difference in counterfactual specificity by event type 
could serve as a mechanism by which the type of event affects counterfactual thought 
confidence.  This notion was partially (yet inadequately) examined in Experiment 2 when 
investigating whether or not the level of specificity embedded in the counterfactual 
responses was responsible for the moderation findings.  It appears that the cognitive 
responses of general and specific event observers may differ on this dimension, but 
further study is warranted before such conclusions can be supported.     
Theoretical Compatibility 
 In addition to theoretical speculations based on the use of different comparison 
cases for events (one being shaped by pre-event expectations and one influenced by post-
event counterfactual constructions), Sherman et al. (1999) considered several other dual-
process theories that may account for the discrepancies observed in reactions to general 
and specific cases.  For instance, assimilation and contrast models offer feasible 
explanations for discrepancies in evaluations of general and specific categories, such as 
evaluations of politicians in general versus specific politicians following the prime of 
scandalous politicians (Schwarz & Bless, 1992).  The examples examined by Schwarz 
and Bless, as well as others (Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983; Stapel, Koomen, 
& van der Pligt, 1996), showed that general categories may be assimilated to a prime, 
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whereas specific cases are contrasted away from the prime.  The primary explanation for 
these results was that the same prime can serve as a salient standard of comparison 
leading to different evaluations for general and specific targets.  Thus, the explanation 
has an important similarity to the current conceptualization of reactions to general and 
specific events.  However, the current model departs to the extent that different 
comparison standards are constructed for general and specific events all together.          
Because the current investigation involved general and specific events and 
people’s cognitive responses to those events, rather than evaluations of general categories 
and exemplars, it seemed more feasible and appropriate to test speculations made by 
Sherman et al. (1999) on the basis of a theory that also involves comparison standards but 
could be applied to perceptions of events (i.e., norm theory; Kahneman & Miller, 1986).  
On the other hand, the current model also has some conceptual similarities to Hamilton 
and Sherman’s (1996) model of impression formation.  Their model assumes that 
impression formation for groups (general) tends to be memory-based (i.e., rely on the 
recall of previously stored information), whereas impression formation for individual 
targets (specific) tends to be on-line (i.e., made as the information is received).  The 
current model is compatible with this aspect of Hamilton and Sherman’s model to the 
extent that specific event observers construct or revise their standards of comparison at 
the time of the event and to the extent that general event observers form a standard of 
comparison by recalling earlier information.  On the other hand, Experiment 4 revealed 
some evidence for the possibility that general event observers may also revise their 
standards of comparison at the time of the event by adjusting their new expectations for 
subsequent events on the basis of recent event outcomes.  However, the cognitive 
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processes involved in forming evaluations of groups or individual targets can be very 
different from those involved in making predictions about the outcomes of similar, future 
events.    
The current model of reactions to general and specific events also assumes that 
greater cognitive elaboration, in the form of considering what might have occurred, 
occurs more frequently in response to specific events than to general events.  Because the 
event type conditions did not differ across experiments with regard to their number of 
thought listings, and differed only in their counterfactual thought frequencies, it may be 
more accurate to conclude that cognitive elaboration differs between the two event types 
on a qualitative dimension rather than magnitude.  Such findings are consistent with what 
may be expected from Petty and Cacioppo’s (1981, 1986) elaboration likelihood model 
(ELM), whereby reactions to general events would tend to be products of peripheral-
route processing and reactions to specific events would tend to be products of central-
route processing.  Thus, general event observers may rely on a simplified, heuristic “feel” 
of general event information to form judgments, whereas specific event observers may 
rely more on a careful and deliberative analysis of the event information to form 
judgments.   
Unfortunately, greater cognitive elaboration is not always associated with rational 
decision making and desirable outcomes.  As argued by Sherman and McConnell (1995), 
more thoughts do not always lead to more rational thoughts, and rational decision making 
strategies do not always lead to desirable outcomes.  Interestingly, some seemingly 
irrational effects, such as the ease of retrieval effect, have been observed primarily under 
conditions of high elaboration (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002).  Thus, if reactions to 
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specific events are more closely linked to high elaboration, it is still possible to form 
irrational judgments. 
In apparent conflict with the ELM-based predictions are the predictions drawn 
from Epstein’s (1983, 1985) cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST).  Specifically, the 
CEST predicts that a less rational and automatic processing system, whereby people rely 
on the information’s feel, may be associated with judging specific events because such 
events are typically more emotionally engaging and personally relevant than are general 
events.  According to Epstein’s model, a more deliberative and rule-based reasoning 
approach would be appropriate for reactions to events that are not as personally relevant 
(general events) because it is typically not necessary that such reactions occur 
immediately.  Thus, one’s own philosophical musings and the development of their own 
worldview may be handled by a rational processing system.             
If Epstein’s model is correct in that people rely on the feel of information to form 
judgments about specific cases, it seems possible that strong affective reactions can cause 
people to elaborate further, given the opportunity and motivation.  In fact, under some 
conditions both positive and negative affect can serve as moderators leading to higher 
levels of cognitive elaboration (Petty, Cacioppo, Sedikides, & Strathman, 1988; Petty, 
Gleicher, & Baker, 1991; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995).  Thus, even if initial reactions 
to specific events are more affectively-based, people may still be more likely to 
counterfactualize specific events than general events given the time, motivation, and 
resources to engage in cognitive elaboration.  Take, for instance, reactions to marketing 
attempts made by charitable organizations in support of poor and impoverished children.  
Perhaps simple, evaluative cognitive responses that are less likely to be characterized by 
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counterfactual thoughts, such as “That’s terrible,” or “What a pity,” are likely to emerge 
when the persuasive attempt is presented as a general frame.  When presented in the form 
of a specific frame, perhaps cognitive responses are initially likely to be characterized by 
simple, evaluative cognitive responses, but given the time, motivation, and resources to 
engage in cognitive elaboration, they may become characterized by counterfactual 
thought (e.g., “That shouldn’t be,” or “That type of thing shouldn’t happen to that 
child.”).  These possibilities warrant future investigation.  Also, in light of such 
techniques designed to persuade people into action, or to reduce their natural resistance 
forces that impede action, one possibly interesting route to continue investigation on 
general and specific cases is to determine whether or not reactions to general and specific 
events differ in their relation to subsequent attitude-behavior correspondence. 
Counterfactual Thought Confidence 
Results of the follow-up to Experiment 5 suggest that, when people are exposed to 
enough features of an undesirable event that make it easier to counterfactualize the event 
(i.e., specific event), they appear to hold greater confidence in the likelihood of simulated 
alternatives than when they are aware only of the general outcome of the event.  
Interestingly, the difference on this confidence dimension does not appear to be linked to 
how much people counterfactualize the event (one counterfactual appears to be as 
effective as two or three).  However, it does seem reasonable to expect multiple, and 
qualitatively different, counterfactuals to increase one’s confidence that an alternative 
outcome was actually likely to occur.  Further, if an individual is afforded the resources 
and is motivated to cognitively elaborate on such mental simulations, counterfactual 
thought confidence seems likely to increase.   
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Much like the confirmation bias, whereby people remember information that 
supports their view, or test those cases that have the best chance of verifying their current 
beliefs rather than those that have best chance of falsifying them (Klayman & Ha, 1987), 
people may just as easily confirm their belief in the likelihood of a single simulated 
alternative to reality.  This possibility seems to be especially likely when processing 
events that provide enough specific information to draw an explanatory hypothesis for the 
outcome.  Borrowing from Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff’s (1980) model of 
confidence, the random search for an explanation may be shaped by the counterfactual 
alternatives that are likely to come to mind more easily, as the antecedents of a specific 
event’s outcome are more salient than the antecedents of a general event’s outcome.  
Often, observers of general events are not even aware of such antecedents.  Further, the 
other steps of the belief confirmation process (i.e., informal hypothesis testing of only the 
initial hypothesis, biased search for supportive evidence, and ignorance of alternative 
explanations) that contribute to thought confidence (Koriat et al., 1980) seem more likely 
to be “fed” by the richness of information provided by specific events as compared to that 
provided by general events.  
Counterfactual thought confidence is relevant to other cognitive biases, such as 
the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975).  For instance, one may be 
given the answer to a question and subsequently overestimate the likelihood that they 
would have known the answer had it not been given to them.  Tversky et al. (1992) 
characterized this overestimation as a kind of “counterfactual metacognitive confidence 
judgment” (p. 377).  It is interesting to note that a reduction of this type of bias can be 
accomplished via an intentional form of counterfactual thinking, the consideration of why 
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and how an event’s outcome may have turned out differently (Hirt & Markman, 1995; 
Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977).P12P  It may be interesting to determine through future 
experimentation whether or not the richness of information provided by specific events, 
compared to that of general events, also aids in such de-biasing techniques.   
The accessibility of counterfactual thoughts is a feasible explanation for why 
observers of specific events possess more counterfactual thought confidence than 
observers of general events in the first place.  Because observers of specific events are 
afforded specific feature information, it may not only be easier for them to generate 
counterfactual simulations but they may also do so more quickly.  It is well established 
that ease of thought generation (i.e., accessibility) is correlated with attitude strength and 
related variables that are conceptually similar to thought confidence (see Krosnick, 
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993).  Direct experience, as opposed to indirect 
experience, is also closely linked to attitude accessibility (Fazio, 1995).  In the current 
experiments, specific event participants gained more direct experience than did general 
events participants.   Furthermore, Petrocelli et al. (2007) demonstrated that a common 
accessibility manipulation can be used to influence a form of attitude certainty (i.e., 
attitude clarity).  Thus, specific event participants may have been more confident in their 
mental simulations of alternative outcomes than general event participants due to their 
increased counterfactual thought accessibility, signaling greater certainty in their 
cognitive responses through metacognitive means (for more on this issue, see Petty et al., 
2002).   
Another possibility for the discrepancy in counterfactual thought confidence by 
event type appears to be that specific events provide an observer with information 
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relevant to the perceived demonstrability of a counterfactual thought.  That is, specific 
event observers have information about the event that general event observers do not, and 
this may aid them in their attempts to support their likelihood estimates of an alternative 
outcome given a change in an antecedent.  Take for instance a boxing match in which one 
unbiased observer watches the bout and another unbiased observer is presented with only 
some random highlight clips and general statistics about the bout (similar to the tennis 
match paradigm used in Experiment 3 and the horse racing paradigm used in Experiment 
5).  Observers who are cognizant of specific information (e.g., subjective estimates of the 
height, weight, and speed of each boxer) are likely to be more accurate in their estimates 
of just how likely something else could have, should have, or might have occurred 
differently than the observer who is aware only of the general statistics and outcome of 
the match.  Even if both observers generate the counterfactual, “Ali should have won that 
bout,” the specific event observer is likely to have seemingly stronger evidence, from his 
or her event knowledge base, to support any such claim than would the general event 
observer.  For instance, perhaps Ali appeared to be bloated and sluggish in the early 
rounds, or perhaps his opponent gave him a punch below the belt.   
As in Experiment 5, some general event observers whose horse came in second 
place may have been just as likely as specific event observers (who bet on the same 
horse) to generate the close counterfactual: “My horse almost won the race.”  Yet, the 
general event observer was not aware of how close the race actually was or the 
circumstances of the near win, whereas the specific event observer was aware of this 
feature.  Thus, such a counterfactual may be perceived as more likely for the specific 
event observer.  Furthermore, the specific event observer may possess readily available 
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and plausible information regarding other antecedents that may have changed the 
outcome had they been different (e.g., “Had my horse began his kick earlier, I might have 
won my bet”).P13P   
Clearly, possession of sufficient information is a requirement for the 
demonstrability and plausibility of an argument (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986), and attitudinal 
confidence is believed to be associated with knowledge and an ability to demonstrate 
evidence for one’s arguments (Gross, Holtz, & Miller, 1995).  With the knowledge 
provided by specific events, specific event observers would be expected to generate more 
convincing arguments for their claims than would general event observers.  However, it 
seems that very little objective evidence may actually be needed to feel confident in one’s 
counterfactual argument.  According to the “illusion of validity” (Einhorn & Hogarth; 
1977), people often fail to recognize that some of their beliefs rest on inadequate 
evidence.  Unjustifiably, people often appear to go a step further such that they regard 
their beliefs as a matter of objective evidence rather than as a matter of opinion or 
value.P14P   
Alternative Considerations and Counterfactual Measurement 
 The paradigm employed in the current experiments varied the amount of 
information that general and specific event condition participants were given.  Thus, it 
may be argued that specific event condition participants experienced a greater cognitive 
load; that is, they had more event information to think about than did general event 
participants.  On the other hand, this difference in information reflects the essential 
difference in the current conceptualizations of general and specific events.  Also, across 
experiments the two conditions did not differ in their overall number of thought 
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responses generated by participants.  Still, the additional event information may have 
given specific event observers the sense that they were more fully informed about the 
antecedents of an event’s outcome than were general event observers and in a better 
(more informed) position to make decisions about similar, future events.  This notion 
was, in part, the thinking behind the hypothesis that counterfactual thought confidence 
would play an important role in reactions to events with varying degrees of specificity 
and in subsequent decisions regarding similar, future events.   
However, all of the participants in the current experiments were cognizant of the 
outcomes of the events, and simply being more or less informed about how the events 
unfolded fails to explain the differences observed in subjective confidence or betting 
behavior regarding similar, future events.  In other words, it seems likely that the 
difference in reactions to events and decisions regarding similar, future events depended 
more on how the event information was processed than on the amount of information 
given.  The evidence for mediation of the event type-judgment relationship by 
counterfactual thought frequency supports this notion.  Further, the amount of additional 
information given to specific condition participants was in some cases very minimal (e.g., 
the point value of hit cards taken by the dealer in Experiment 4).  It is also worth noting 
that participants in each experiment were recruited on the basis of their knowledge and 
understanding of the type of event about which they would gain information (e.g., only 
those with knowledge about the rules and objective of blackjack were asked to participate 
in Experiment 4).  Thus, participants were presumably familiar with the types of events 
they learned about.   
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Although the current set of experiments was more concerned with what people do 
with different levels of event information specificity than how well informed they felt 
about the event, the design of future experiments may rule out this potential confound by 
accounting for the potential influence of one’s subjective sense of being informed about 
the event.  Perhaps this variable can be controlled statistically by simply surveying event 
observers for how well informed they feel.  Another possibility for future experiments is 
to increase the cognitive load of general event observers to match it against the cognitive 
load experienced by specific event observers.  Adoption of the latter method may even 
increase the difference in counterfactual thought frequency between general and specific 
event observers by further reducing the chances that general event observers will engage 
in counterfactual thinking.     
Another important consideration relevant to the current model is the affective 
involvement that general and specific event observers experience.  Obviously, the 
valence of an event’s outcome or the degree to which people have something “riding on” 
the outcome may lead to a wide range of potential affective reactions (e.g., happiness 
following a desirable outcome or disappointment following an undesirable outcome).  
When observing an event, people may also experience feelings of empathy or feelings of 
joy that are attached to the targets of an event, especially when their level of 
identification or affiliation with the target (e.g., the target is an in-group member) is 
particularly high (Smith, 1993, 1999) or the target is similar to oneself (Houston, 1990; 
Magee, & Tiedens, 2006; Stotland, 1969; Westmaas & Silver, 2006).  Although affective 
reactions were not measured in the current experiments, it seems likely that both sources 
of affect (i.e., valence of the outcome and identification with the target) were present in 
 150
                                                                                           
some of the experiments and that affective reactions were experienced.  For instance, 
Experiment 1 involved targets with whom participants were likely to identify, 
Experiment 3 asked participants to take the perspective of one of the event targets, and 
the other experiments involved chances for participants to win money based on their 
performance on a task.  Furthermore, watching an entire sporting event is likely to 
produce a greater level of excitement than simply reading about it or watching highlights.    
Affective involvement in an event is relevant to the current model of reactions to 
general and specific events to the extent that it may be another consequence of 
counterfactual thought responses.  The link between counterfactual thinking and its 
influence on affective reactions is well established (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994) 
and is consistent with predictions based on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion 
(Schachter & Singer, 1962; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Weiner, 1986).  However, affective 
involvement in an event may also serve as an antecedent to counterfactual thinking itself.  
As Roese and Olson (1995) have argued, the motivation (e.g., frequency and vigor) 
behind counterfactual thinking is in fact one’s involvement in the event (i.e., an event’s 
potential to affect an individual personally in some way) and general tendencies to avoid 
aversive stimuli and approach desirable stimuli.  These notions are consistent with 
contemporary theories of affect that conceptualize affect as something that can influence 
and be influenced by cognitive and behavioral responses (see Russell, 2003).  Thus, 
subsequent studies should account for affective reactions in addition to cognitive ones.  It 
may also be fruitful to determine how cognitive and affective reactions to general and 
specific events interact to influence decisions regarding similar, future events.  
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These considerations, in addition to considerations of counterfactual thought 
confidence, suggest that an improved measure of counterfactual thought may be designed 
for future experiments that examine reactions to general and specific events, and how 
they affect decision making.  Such a measure may also better address criticisms such as 
Anderson’s (2003), who argued that particular characteristics of counterfactual thinking 
may be more potent predictors of reactions to events than the simple frequency of 
counterfactual thought generations.   
An improved measure might include an assessment of the confidence that an 
observer holds in their counterfactual thoughts in at least two respects.  In their 
discussion of the various factors that affect counterfactual thought generation, Roese and 
Olson (1995) made the distinction between antecedent-based and outcome-based 
determinants.  That is, aspects of the event characteristics that led up to the outcome, as 
well as characteristics of the outcome itself, may influence the likelihood that 
counterfactual thoughts will be generated.  Similarly, counterfactual thought confidence 
may have two distinct origins.  When people generate a counterfactual statement, and 
they think about that statement, they may feel confident that the target of the event could 
have done something different.  This type of counterfactual thought confidence may be 
termed antecedent-mutability confidence, as it represents the degree to which a person 
feels confident that a particular event antecedent could or should have been different.  
That is, the target (or targets) of the event had some ability to control the outcome and 
might have, could have, or should have, done something different.  Antecedent-
mutability confidence can be high (e.g., “He really could have selected the other door.”) 
or it may be low (e.g., “He almost won, but he really didn’t have much choice in the 
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matter.”).  Another type of counterfactual thought confidence that is possible relates to 
the extent that one is confident that a change in an event’s antecedent would have 
actually led to a different outcome (e.g., a more desirable outcome).  This type of 
counterfactual thought confidence may be termed outcome-mutability confidence, as it 
represents the degree to which a person feels confident that a particular outcome would 
have resulted had the event antecedent they mentally simulated actually taken place.  In 
addition to antecedent and outcome mutability confidence, some attention should be 
placed on the measurement of the feasibility or the likelihood of a counterfactual 
alternative occurring.  Finally, a measurement of affective dimensions could also prove to 
be useful as they may influence the tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking, or 
augment the influence that counterfactual thinking has on decisions regarding subsequent 
events.   
Functional and Dysfunctional Reactions to General and Specific Events  
 In their attempt to reconcile predictions about general and specific cases inferred 
from Petty and Cacioppo’s (1981, 1986) ELM with Epstein’s (1983, 1985) CEST, 
Sherman et al. (1999) considered extensive processing to be more strongly associated 
with reactions to specific cases than with reactions to general cases.  Sherman et al. went 
further to conclude that more extensive processing does not always lead to more accurate 
and rational decisions.  Perhaps this tendency was observed in the current experiments.  
In any case, such considerations partially overlap the emerging debate of counterfactual 
thinking as functional or dysfunctional.   
Many experimenters engaged in counterfactual thinking research agree that 
counterfactual thinking is most often quite functional.  For instance, downward 
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counterfactual thinking may have a negative-affect regulatory effect by making people 
feel relatively better (relieved in most cases), whereas upward counterfactual thinking has 
been associated with preparations for the future and intentions to perform success-
facilitating behaviors for future tasks (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994).  To the extent 
that it is related to attributions of causality (Wells & Gavanski, 1989), counterfactual 
thinking may lead to better understandings of the causal structure of a chain of events as 
well as feelings of controllability for future events (Markman et al., 1995).  Upward 
counterfactual thinking may also enable people to mentally experience alternative, more 
desirable, worlds as in the case of what McMullen (1997) has referred to as the 
experiential mode of counterfactual thinking.  Thus, counterfactual thinking appears to 
have several functional consequences.   
 However, not all theorists have agreed with such notions.  Sherman and 
McConnell (1995) suggested that under some conditions counterfactual thinking can be 
dysfunctional.  For instance, they argued that counterfactual thoughts can sometimes lead 
to illusions of control (Langer, 1975) to the extent that people expect the probability of 
success to be greater than that objectively possible.  Furthermore, upward counterfactual 
thinking may lead to “emotional costs” such as self-blame, regret, resentment, guilt, and 
depression, whereas downward counterfactual thinking can lead to feelings of fear and 
vulnerability.       
It seems feasible to conclude that counterfactual thoughts in response to an event 
may strengthen an illusion of control.  Several studies, conducted by Langer (1975) and 
Langer and Roth (1975), demonstrated that, when people are engaged in a chance 
oriented task such as a lottery, and they are encouraged to engage in behaviors consistent 
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with skill events, they tend to exhibit the illusion of control.  In fact, the more similar a 
chance event is to a situation involving skill, the greater is the likelihood that an illusion 
of control will emerge.  If this illusion occurs for purely chance events, it seems almost 
certain to operate during skill-related situations or for situations that involve both chance 
and skill (e.g., playing gambling games that involve luck and skill, such as blackjack or 
betting on horse races).  Thus, it is possible that the illusion of control was operating in 
some of the experiments within the current investigation, especially those in which 
participants were actively involved in the decisions (i.e., Experiments 2, 4, and 5).  
Indeed, participants did possess control over their decisions, and chance was only a 
partial determinant of the outcome.  However, it seems likely that the more frequently an 
observer entertains what could have been, what would have been, or what should have 
been, the stronger the illusion may become.  Thus, counterfactual thinking may lead to 
riskier decisions by contributing to a perceiver’s subjective sense that they have more 
control over their outcomes than they actually do.  With respect to this reasoning, it 
comes as no surprise that upward counterfactual frequency was more strongly related to 
betting behavior in experiments that placed participants in positions where they could 
partially control the outcomes of the events (e.g., Experiment 4 – playing blackjack and 
Experiment 5 – placing bets on horse races) than in experiments that did not (e.g., 
Experiment 1 – observing a miniature golf competition and Experiment 3 – observing a 
tennis match). 
Sherman and McConnell (1995) argued further that counterfactual thinking can 
also lead to inaccurate causal inferences, calling into question its functionality as a 
method of understanding the causal structure of a chain of events.  This possibility is 
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related to their doubt regarding the association between counterfactual thinking and 
preparation for the future as it relates to subsequent decision making.  Sherman and 
McConnell argued that counterfactual thinking can lead to better preparation for similar, 
future events to the extent that the causal attribution embedded in the counterfactual 
thought is accurate (i.e., correct).  It seems quite seductive to estimate the effectiveness of 
one’s judgments and decisions simply on the basis of the outcome or consequences that 
follow (i.e., whether they are desirable or undesirable).  However, good decision 
strategies can be followed by undesirable outcomes, and bad decision strategies can be 
followed by desirable outcomes.  Thus, poor judgments and decisions do not always lead 
to bad outcomes, and good judgments and decisions do not always lead to good 
outcomes.  If counterfactual thoughts lead people to make incorrect assumptions about 
the causal structure of an outcome, it could subsequently lead to changes in otherwise 
good decision strategies.   
Although outcomes of previous events and pre-event expectations were 
sometimes correlated with dependent measures for specific event participants of the 
current experiments (see especially Experiments 4 and 5), they were not as strongly 
correlated with the dependent measures as was upward counterfactual thought frequency 
after controlling for the type of event.  Expectations of fairness from flipping a coin 
should turn suspect if enough coin flips do not approximate the probabilities of an 
unbiased coin; that is, the coin does not meet pre-test expectations.  Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that expectations for any particular outcome may change as more and more 
event-relevant information is gathered (Olson et al., 1996).  Interestingly, this vital 
information may be thwarted by the mental simulation of alternatives following specific 
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events (subsequently increasing the chance of overconfidence for future, similar events).  
Clearly, not all of counterfactual thinking is dysfunctional.  However, if counterfactual 
thinking prevents people from adjusting their expectations for the future or their 
confidence in their own or other’s abilities by information gained from relevant events, it 
seems appropriate to categorize this type of counterfactual thinking as dysfunctional.  
Such cognitive responses may also be considered dysfunctional to the extent that 
decisions about similar, future events, as well as subjective confidence in those decisions, 
continue despite persistent expectancy disconfirmation.  Such dysfunction is likely to be 
more pronounced following exposure to specific events than to general events.  The 
strongest evidence for these notions comes from the significant interactions examined in 
Experiment 4 (see Figures 4.1-4.4). 
 Results of Experiments 4 and 5 suggest that people who gamble on and watch 
an event may bet more on the event, and on subsequent events, than people who gamble 
but do not watch the event.  Perhaps a gambler who bets on horse races at the track and 
watches may bet more in the future than a gambler who bets with a bookie on the phone 
and watches no races (even if they experience exactly the same outcomes).  Although 
persistence in gambling was not directly tested in the current investigation, it seems likely 
that such tendencies exist to the extent that the amount that one bets on an event is 
positively related to how long they may continue to gamble.  Counterfactual thinking 
would seem to be dysfunctional to the extent that it causes people to continue gambling 
despite consistent failure.  In any case, this possibility also warrants future investigation. 
A final speculation regarding the issue of dysfunctional versus functional 
reactions to general and specific events relates to how people explain unexpected 
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outcomes.  It is well established that people are more likely to seek explanations for 
unexpected outcomes relative to expected ones (Wong & Weiner, 1981).  Sometimes 
people appear to ignore statistics or feel as though they live outside of the probability of 
undesirable outcomes, as if immune to factors that lead to such outcomes (but there are 
potential benefits to these beliefs, see Taylor & Brown, 1988).  When such outcomes do 
occur, people’s reactions may be characterized by counterfactual responses that explain 
them away (Gilovich, 1983).  It appears that exposure to specific events makes it easier, 
in comparison to knowledge about the general outcome of the same events, to engage in 
such processing.  This difference in ease may be due to the fact that mutable features of 
specific events are more salient, and thus, easier to counterfactualize.  However, the 
follow-up to Experiment 5 suggests that an important difference may also lie in the 
degree of confidence that one has in their counterfactual thoughts generated in response 
to general and specific events.  Perhaps people fail to consistently employ base rate 
information in personally relevant situations because their own unique experiences are 
weighted more heavily, and some of these unique experiences are counterfactualized to 
“fit” biased pre-existing expectations or desired outcomes.  If this is the case, perhaps the 
bigger the discrepancy is between the expected outcome and the actual outcome 
(especially when unfavorable), the more motivated people are to counterfactualize the 
event (some evidence for this notion was observed in Experiment 4).  
Speculations on Applied Implications 
There are many areas in which the current conceptualization of reactions to 
general and specific events may be applied.  In fact, the current framework may be 
applied to almost any area of life that involves some degree of risk, whether it be 
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gambling behaviors or important daily decisions.  In these and other areas, many people 
may feel as though they “live outside of the statistics” associated with risk.  For instance, 
many people feel that smoking is bad for their health, yet smoke; many feel that exercise 
is good, yet fail to exercise; many feel that pornography is bad, yet continue to purchase 
it; many feel that it is a good idea to practice safe-sex, yet apparently fail to do so; and 
many agree that visiting their physician or dentist for normal check-ups is good for their 
health, yet vigorously resist doing so.  When people think of such things in the abstract, 
general sense, they may feel one way.  Yet, when they think about actually engaging in 
these specific behaviors, they may feel another way.  Are people simply hypocrites or do 
they process information about general and specific cases differently?  Such forms of 
apparent cognitive-behavioral ambivalence (or weak links between attitudes and 
behavior) may be better understood as reactions to general and specific cases become 
better understood.    
 The current research is also relevant to how people use available information to 
make decisions, such as those made by managers and business leaders.  Important 
decisions may be made on the basis of a single source or multiple sources of information.  
A policy decision, for example, may be made on the basis of an unfortunate event, 
whereas others may be made on the basis of a chronic problem, demand level, or 
continually sub-par revenues.  An important question, as it relates to the current 
conceptualization of reactions to general and specific events, is whether managers make 
their decisions based on the “bottom-line” or on the basis of abundant specific 
information (possibly coming from multiple sources).  For instance, a retail store 
manager may decide to discontinue the sale of sunglasses in his store on the basis of its 
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poor overall sales revenue record (i.e., a general event decision).  On the other hand, 
another manager may decide to continue the sale of sunglasses in her store due to her 
awareness of specific information, such as the fact that the sunglasses should not have 
been displayed next to the hunting merchandise, and would have had a better sales 
revenue record had they been displayed next to the rest of the Summer seasonal 
merchandise (i.e., a specific event decision).  A better understanding of whether or not 
people should make bottom-line decisions or invest time in making decisions based on a 
careful analysis of specific features of the relevant events may also be reached through 
continued study of reactions to general and specific cases in a wider arena.  The current 
dual-process model of reactions to general and specific events may prove to be relevant 
to the practices of any profession whose professionals uses both statistical information as 
well as their own unique experiences to make decisions (e.g., diagnostic methods 
employed by medical doctors).  With regard to making decisions when both sources of 
information are available (general/abstract/statistical vs. specific/individual), researchers 
(Dawes, 1993; Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000) have argued on behalf of implementing 
more statistical models into the decision making process. 
Finally, the current model may also be relevant to memory for general and 
specific event information.  Although Gilovich (1983) has shown that participants 
remembered more information about their losses than they did their wins in a football 
betting task as a function of processing losses longer and in more detail, Garry and 
Polaschek (2000) have estimated that people can misremember a counterfactualized 
outcome as a truth, as a function of source confusion, familiarity, or source monitoring.  
If people counterfactualize specific events more so than general events, counterfactual 
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thinking could serve to reduce memory recall for specific events.  However, because 
people may be less cognitively and emotionally engaged in general events, there may be 
several sources of recall reduction for general events as well.  Apparently, there seems to 
be at least two different forces that could influence the degree to which people recall the 
past, and they appear to have different effects.  One seems to be a focus on task failures 
due to counterfactuals, and thus, better memory for failures and a possible overestimation 
of failures; the other seems to be misremembering task successes that were nothing more 
than losses counterfactualized as a function of source confusion or familiarity and a 
possible overestimation of successes (i.e., recalling the counterfactual as what actually 
happened).  Perhaps there are some conditions that lead to an overestimation via 
counterfactual thinking in one direction and other conditions that lead to an 
overestimation via counterfactual thinking in the opposite direction.  In any case, these 
speculations warrant future experimentation to dissect such possibilities.   
Conclusion 
 The results of five experiments supported the hypotheses drawn from Sherman et 
al.’s (1999) dual-process account of reactions to general and specific events, such that 
counterfactual thinking was associated more strongly with judgments and decisions 
following specific events than general events.  Counterfactual thinking also tended to 
mediate the effects of event type on the dependent variables.  Some evidence suggests 
that standards of comparison for general events appear to be influenced by some 
combination of pre-event expectations and possibly information gained from recent, 
relevant events.  A follow-up to Experiment 5 provided evidence that counterfactual 
 161
                                                                                           
thought confidence is also associated with subjective confidence in decisions regarding 
similar, future events.    
The current investigation examined a cognitively-based model of reactions to 
general and specific events, while also examining how those reactions affect judgments 
and expectations for similar, future events.  In addition to testing other relevant models 
by pitting them against the current model, it may be fruitful to examine affective 
reactions to general and specific events.  Further, it is important to determine how 
cognitive and affective reactions to general and specific events combine to influence 
one’s decision making processes and ultimately one’s behavior.   
Several other possibilities should be examined in this relatively new area of 
investigation.  These include examination of how different aspects of counterfactual 
thought in response to events (i.e., level of counterfactual specificity, counterfactual 
thought confidence, and counterfactual thought accessibility) affect cognitive and 
affective reactions and decisions regarding similar, future events, as well as how memory 
for general and specific events is affected by these reactions.  Because the current model 
relates directly to decision making behavior, it should also be examined in other 
situations and areas of judgment (not just sports and games), as it may have several 
applied implications.       
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Footnotes 
P
1
PAdmittedly, because the available literature relevant to this hypothesis is not entirely 
clear (see: Seelau, Seelau, Wells, & Windschitl, 1995), confidence in this hypothesis was 
somewhat limited.  In one experiment conducted by Wells, Taylor, and Turtle (1987), the 
order of four events described in a scenario (any of which could be mutated to alter the 
outcome) was manipulated.  These researchers demonstrated that people prefer to mutate 
earlier events and showed no preference for mutating the subsequent events.  Importantly, 
the Wells et al. experiment described each event to participants as having caused the 
event that followed it.  Another experiment that examined the effect of the order of two 
events in a causal chain on judgments of legal responsibility (Johnson, Ogawa, Delforge, 
& Early, 1989) revealed similar primacy effects.  However, as Seelau et al. (1995) have 
suggested, it seems that an earlier event preference is significantly less likely when a 
causal chain is not strongly implied.  In fact, in experiments involving independent event 
sequences, researchers (Byrne, Segura, Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; Miller & 
Gunasegaram, 1990; Walsh & Byrne, 2004) have found evidence for a preference to 
mentally undo those features that come last (or occur most recently) in the temporal 
sequence.  Miller and Gunasegaram’s (1990) arguments may apply for events with clear 
casual chains.  However, Experiment 1 involved a non-causal chain of events.  In any 
case, it is important to determine if counterfactual responses to general and specific 
events differ with respect to different trajectories leading to the same outcome, and 
whether or not such differences translate to different post-event judgments.   
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P
2
PBecause participants were given false feedback regarding the correct answer to some of 
the trivia items, as well as their overall performance, two items (items 5 and 17) were 
specifically designed for the purpose of reducing any suspicions of false feedback.  Thus, 
participants were never given false feedback regarding the correct answers to these items 
(because it would not be believable).  The combined results of the two pilot tests (N = 61) 
showed that the correct response rate for these two items was 31.1% and 57.4% 
respectively. 
 
P
3
PIn the second pilot test, the correct responses rate for these particular items averaged 
33.3%.   
 
P
4
PTo minimize suspicion of the validity of the feedback by providing participants with too 
much false feedback toward the end of the trivia test, the 20 items were divided into four 
sets of five items.  Regardless of their responses to the first five items, they were 
informed that they had responded to two of them correctly.  The second and fourth set of 
five items followed this same format.  The third set of five items restricted the maximum 
correct to a single item.  Again, false feedback was only provided when necessary (e.g., if 
a participant actually responded to the first two items of the first set, they were informed 
that they responded correctly to the first two items and responded incorrectly to the next 
three items, regardless of their responses).       
  
P
5
PIt is important to note that these analyses did not necessitate that participants complete a 
thought-listing task, as opposed to the analysis of upward counterfactual frequency as a 
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moderator.  Thus, data from the entire sample was examined for these analyses.  As 
expected, these results were consistent with the ANOVA results displayed in Table 2.1. 
 
P
6
PWith regard to the Sniezek and Buckley (1991) and Sniezek et al. (1990) experiments, it 
is important to note that overconfidence in one’s abilities can develop through multiple 
routes, especially when people actively list their thoughts.  Participants in the Sniezek 
and Buckley and Sniezek et al. experiments were not asked to list their thoughts.  
Therefore, these experiments are only conceptually related to Experiment 2.  Participants 
were asked to list their thoughts (or not list their thoughts, depending on condition) after 
they received global or specific feedback about their performance.  It is possible that 
simply asking people to list their thoughts about answering a specific trivia item 
encourages them to generate reasons why their answer is likely to be right, and 
subsequently become overconfident for that item.  When asking people to list their 
thoughts about how they would perform overall (in general), they are likely to use their 
general knowledge of how they usually perform on trivia items -- and so they are not 
overconfident.  Thus, thought-listing could potentially lead to overconfidence under some 
conditions without counterfactual generations.     
 
P
7
PThe reasoning behind the expectations that these scenarios would lead to upward and 
downward counterfactuals respectively is based on Markman et al.’s (1995) findings with 
regard to the perceived control of the outcomes.  These researchers found that the 
direction of counterfactuals that people generate tend to correspond to the close outcomes 
associated with the aspects that they control.  That is, following the experience of almost 
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unfavorable and almost favorable outcomes, it is easier for people to generate downward 
and upward counterfactuals, respectively, when they perceived themselves to be in 
control of the perceived antecedents of those outcomes.    
 
P
8
PIn cases whereby the number of general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition 
participants was greater than the number of specific events condition participants who 
picked the same horse for a race, the thought-listing response sets originating from each 
of the specific events condition participants were used with equal frequencies when 
possible.  For example, in a case whereby seven general event + spoon-fed thoughts 
condition participants selected horse #3, but only two specific events condition 
participants selected horse #3, then four general event + spoon-fed thoughts condition 
participants were yoked to the thought-listing responses originating from one of the 
specific events condition participants and the other three general event + spoon-fed 
thoughts condition participants were yoked to the thought-listing responses originating 
from the other specific events condition participant.  In cases whereby the number of 
specific events condition participants was greater than the number of general event + 
spoon-fed thoughts condition participants who picked the same horse for a race, the 
thought-listing response set was randomly selected (without replacement) from the pool 
of specific events condition participants.  
 
P
9
PIt is important to note that total cash winnings was not significantly correlated with 
either of the dependent variables. 
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P
10
PA statistical explanation for these results (in both experiments) relates to the difference 
in sensitivity of the measures.  The subjective confidence scales ranged from one to 
seven, whereas the tickets betting scales ranged from 10 to 100.  In addition, although the 
two dependent measures were correlated significantly, there was still almost 50% of their 
variance that was not shared; suggesting at least some uniqueness as two different 
measures of confidence.   
 
P
11
PIn five of the six experiments, the overall degree to which participants 
counterfactualized the events was considered in light of the number of thoughts they 
listed.  This proportion was further corrected by the number of counterfactuals that was 
expected given a particular total number of thoughts listed (i.e., Bayesian corrected 
proportion).  Several of the analyses that involved counterfactuals were conducted with 
three slightly different measures of counterfactual frequency (i.e., the simple frequency, 
the proportion of counterfactuals, and a Bayesian corrected proportion), although only 
one is reported.  In general, these measures “behaved” similarly.  That is, regardless of 
the measure of counterfactual frequency, the conclusions were virtually the same.  In any 
case, these measures of counterfactual frequency and others are worthy of examination in 
this new area of investigation. 
 
P
12
PSee exceptions in experiments conducted by Roese and Maniar (1997), Roese and 
Olson (1996), and Sanna, Schwarz, and Stocker (2002). 
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P
13
PIn such examples, whereby general event observers also form counterfactual statements 
(e.g., “I shouldn’t have bet on that horse.”), counterfactuals generated by general and 
specific observers may differ in another very important way; that being the causal 
attribution embedded within the counterfactual.  In the case of a close loss, it is possible 
that the specific event observer may judge their decision as a good one and blame the loss 
on the horse, whereas the general event observer may judge their decision as a bad one, 
blaming the loss on themselves and subsequently shifting otherwise good strategies in the 
future. 
 
P
14
POther arguments for counterfactual thought confidence are addressed in the Discussion 
sections of Experiments 2 and 5.
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Table 1.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Event Expectations and Dependent Variables by 
Type of Event Condition, and Three-Way ANOVA Results for the Main Effects of Event 
Type (Experiment 1) 
            Event Type 
           GeneralPaP             SpecificPbP              
Variable       M      SD          M           SD       F(1, 330) 
Pre-event expectations    
    Expected skill 4.66 1.12 4.76 1.10 .63 
    Expected win 4.76 1.05 4.93 1.16 2.11 
    Expected bet 4.15 1.31 4.36 1.44 1.76 
    Hypothetical bet 37.02 24.20 38.01 22.33 .21 
Dependent variables 
    Satisfaction 3.42 1.75 3.89 1.57 6.46*  
    Perceived skill 4.28 1.27 4.50 .99 3.59* 
    Likelihood IU-WR 4.34 1.13 4.63 1.15 5.21* 
    Likelihood betting IU-WR 3.78 1.49 4.22 1.40 7.88** 
    Expected bet on IU-WR 29.09 19.23 33.66 23.58 4.74* 
Note. PaPn = 172, PbPn = 174, IU-WR = IU golfer to win in a rematch.   
*p < .05.  **p < .01.   
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Table 1.2 
Representative Selection of Counterfactual and Non-Counterfactual Responses to the 
Miniature Golf Competition from Participants in the Thought-Listing Conditions 
(Experiment 1) 
Counterfactual responses: 
“The IU player should have gotten a hole in one.”                                                               
“IU shouldn’t have hit so hard.” 
“IU could have gotten a birdie if he didn’t mess up the first shot.”  
“He would have done better but he wasn’t in control.” 
“IU could have done a better job at aiming on that one.” 
“I’m frustrated; he should have been more focused in the early holes.” 
“Just a few less mistakes and we would have had him!” 
“He should’ve picked up the pace for the red and white.” 
Non-counterfactual responses: 
 “The IU golfer can read the layout of the ground well; he is the man.” 
“I am not very happy; are you gonna just let Purdue hit his ball right past yours?” 
“Those engineers are good at angles, but Purdue will never beat IU at mini golf.” 
“People in West Lafayette are golf-obsessed; there are 12 golf courses there.” 
“I think they need tail-gaiting for miniature golf; it’s intense.” 
“It is tied again, how the tide can swing.” 
“Indiana lost to Purdue – even in the virtual world this is not something to be 
taken lightly – there must be riots and bloodshed over this atrocity.” 
“I’m gonna break his knee caps; Purdue stinks.” 
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Table 2.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Test Expectations and Dependent Variables by 
Type of Feedback Condition, and Two-Way ANOVA/ANCOVA Results for the Main 
Effects of Feedback (Experiment 2) 
         Feedback Type 
           GlobalPaP             SpecificPbP              
Variable       M      SD          M           SD       F(1, 130) 
Pre-test expectations    
    Expected number correct 12.61 2.60 13.39 2.51 3.13 
    Subjective confidence 4.58 .84 4.70 .96 .59 
Actual performance 6.34 2.01 6.80 1.95 1.74 
Suspicion of feedback 3.23 1.62 3.59 1.91 1.39 
Dependent variables 
    Expected number correct on NT 8.31 1.91 9.22 2.11 6.04*  
    Subjective confidence for NT 3.98 .94 4.52 1.23 7.52** 
    Hypothetical bet on new test 37.64 28.94 51.92 28.27 7.35** 
Note. PaPn = 66, PbPn = 66.  NT = new test.  Actual performance was included as a covariate 
in the test of differences between the feedback conditions among the dependent variables. 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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Table 2.2 
Representative Selection of Counterfactual and Non-Counterfactual Responses to Item 
Feedback from Participants in the Thought-Listing Conditions (Experiment 2) 
Counterfactual responses: 
  “I usually guess C when I don’t know - I should have guessed C.” 
“Damn it, I was going to pick that one; I should have known.” 
“Well if I knew the height of the Empire State Building I’d get it.” 
“I should have picked the largest number.” 
“Even though, I should’ve picked foot now that I think about it.” 
“I got mixed up; shouldn’t have been thinking of cheetah.” 
“I shouldn’t have picked greyhound because of their slow-ass bus service.” 
“I felt dumb; I am in anatomy now, so I feel like I should have known that.” 
“Duh...I should know this; I play cards all the time but usually it’s a drinking 
game...no wonder I don’t remember.” 
Non-counterfactual responses: 
“Just go ahead and guess Germany.”  
“The spine goes down your entire back and covers a lot of area.” 
“Either way it’s a lot of miles.” 
“Quarters are extremely heavy compared to dimes.” 
“I did the math to determine the answer.” 
“China is very good at many different sports and typically does well.” 
“Most weather moves from west to east.” 
“On ebay, anything is valuable.” 
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Table 3.1 
Representative Selection of Counterfactual and Non-Counterfactual Responses to the 
Tennis Match from Participants in the Thought-Listing Conditions (Experiment 3) 
Upward counterfactual responses: 
  “I took an early lead but, I should have kept it.”  
“I wish I wouldn’t have made those little mistakes.” 
“I could have won if I had just been more consistent.” 
“If only I could have done a little better during the match.” 
“If I only I had won the tie-breakers.” 
Downward counterfactual responses: 
“I’m relieved; I could have lost it all.” 
“It was a close match; it would have been closer had I not won the tie-breakers.” 
“It’s a good thing that I barely pulled through in the last 2 sets.” 
“Wow, that was close; I might have lost it had I not minimized my errors.” 
“I may have weakened and lost the match had there been a fifth set.” 
Non-counterfactual responses: 
“That guy has nothing on me.” 
“It sucks to lose.” 
“I think I am going to get a drink.” 
“I have an awesome drop shot.” 
“I wonder if I made SportsCenter.” 
“I’m the greatest, and I’m rich!” 
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Table 4.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Event Expectations and Dependent Variables by 
Type of Feedback Condition, and Two-Way ANOVA/ANCOVA Results for the Main 
Effects of Feedback Type (Experiment 4) 
         Feedback Type 
           GlobalPaP             SpecificPbP              
Variable       M      SD          M           SD       F(1, 98) 
Pre-event expectations    
    Expected number of wins 5.40 1.18 5.58 1.01 .67 
    Subjective confidence 4.88 .85 5.04 .78 .96 
Number of wins 4.08 1.51 4.16 1.57 .07 
Dependent variables 
    Likelihood of winning BG 3.94 1.09 4.40 .99 4.98*  
    Subjective confidence BG 3.98 1.04 4.44 1.13 4.54* 
    Tickets bet on winning BG 53.38 33.84 68.20 31.04 5.10* 
Note. PaPn = 50, PbPn = 50.  BG = bonus game.  Number of wins was included as a covariate 
in the tests of differences between the feedback conditions among the dependent 
variables; ANCOVA df = (1, 97).  Adjusted means and standard errors are displayed for 
the dependent variables. 
*p < .05.   
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Table 4.2 
Representative Selection of Counterfactual and Non-Counterfactual Responses to 
Blackjack Game Outcomes from Participants in the Thought-Listing Conditions 
(Experiment 4) 
Counterfactual responses: 
  “I should have taken another card.” 
“I should have stayed with the 19, but I lost to a 19 with a 15 before.” 
“I would have won had I not taken so many risks and busted.” 
“I should have won that one; I had a 20.” 
“I should have stopped earlier and took the Ace as an 11.” 
“I might win more games and it would be easier if there were more players with  
more cards exposed.” 
Non-counterfactual responses: 
“I was a little nervous in this round, but still I ended up winning with a 20.” 
“I had few thoughts, because right away I had blackjack.” 
“A 16 is high, but it’s worth risking another hit.” 
“I was not happy to get a 13 when the dealer had a Queen face up.” 
“These are bad odds, but I’m feeling risky.” 
“I’m reevaluating my idea of going to Vegas.” 
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Table 5.1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Pre-Event Expectations and Dependent Variables by 
Type of Event, and One-Way ANOVA/ANCOVA Results for the Main Effects of Event 
Type (Experiment 5) 
            Event Type 
              GeneralPaP   SpecificPbP          General+SFPcP           
Variable            M        SD          M        SD           M         SD      F(2, 141) 
Pre-event expectations    
    Exp. winning bets 3.25 1.10 3.02 1.10 3.50 1.17 2.18 
    Subj. confidence 4.14 1.22 4.13 1.23 4.46 1.27 1.08 
    Success 4.35 1.10 4.06 1.11 4.46 1.05 1.70 
Num. of winning bets 2.06 1.17 2.31 1.27 2.46 .85 1.55 
Total cash winnings 15.94 13.38 16.48 9.54 12.65 9.14 1.75 
Dependent variables 
    Tickets bet on BR 27.18BdB 4.15 43.50BeB 4.16 49.30BeB 4.18 7.51** 
    Subj. confidence 2.53BeB .21 3.06BdB .21 2.31BeB .22 3.68* 
Note. PaPn = 48, PbPn = 48, PcPn = 48.  SF = spoon-fed; BR = bonus race.  Means in the same 
row with different subscripts differ significantly at the .05 level of significance (or less) 
according to a Tukey HSD post-hoc test.  Number of winning bets and expected number 
of winning bets were included as covariates in the tests of differences between the event 
conditions among the dependent variables; ANCOVA df = (2, 139).  Adjusted means and 
standard errors are displayed for the dependent variables. 
*p < .05.  **p < .01. 
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Table 5.2 
Representative Selection of Counterfactual and Non-Counterfactual Responses to Horse 
Race Outcomes (Experiment 5) 
Counterfactual responses: 
  “I wish I would’ve bet my horse to win rather than to show.” 
“Yes, yes, go! Damn, he almost got it.” 
“He would have gained confidence and could have pulled it out had he gotten 
back into the pack.” 
“My horse should have made a harder charge there at the end.” 
“I should’ve gone with my gut and picked Baby Storm.” 
“I wish I would’ve picked show; then I would’ve won money.” 
“Why is he so slow? He should be better because he ran fast the race before.” 
“Damn! I almost picked Gulch Jumper [the winner of the race] for that race.” 
“I knew I should have researched the horses more carefully!” 
Non-counterfactual responses: 
“I felt proud when my chosen horse won the race.” 
“Okay, I can do this.” 
“I thought I’d do a little dance in my cubicle.” 
“It was exciting because everyone was passing my horse.” 
“I was already counting my winnings; it’s about damn time.” 
“I feel kind of bad for the horses.” 
“I don’t understand how you go from 2nd to 7th place in 2 seconds.” 
“I’m tired of putting in thoughts, I want to see another race.” 
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Figure 1.1.  Typical view of miniature golf course displayed to participants (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure 1.2.  Final scoreboard displayed to participants by the four trajectory sequences 
(Experiment 1). 
Near comeback: 
 
 
Blown lead: 
 
 
Last-hole defeat of even match: 
 
 
Back-and-forth lead: 
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Figure 1.3. Mean satisfaction with the IU golfer by event type and event trajectory 
conditions (Experiment 1).  T-bars are displayed at +1 SD. 
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Figure 1.4. Predicted regression equation means of perceived likelihood of the IU golfer 
to win in a rematch (IU-WR) by pre-event expectancy level and event type (Experiment 
1). 
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Figure 1.5.  Results of tests of mediation of the relationships between event type and the 
dependent variables by upward counterfactual frequency (Experiment 1). 
 
Type of 
event 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Likelihood that IU will 
win rematch 
(.12*) 
-.01 
.05 .34** 
 
 
Type of 
event 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Likelihood to bet IU to 
win rematch 
(.15*) 
-.01 
.20** .34** 
 
 
 
Type of 
event 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Hypothetical bet on IU 
to win rematch 
(.11*) 
 .08 
.20* .34** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 2.1. Predicted regression equation means of expected number correct on a new 
trivia test by upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 2.2. Predicted regression equation means of subjective confidence for a new trivia 
test by upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type (Experiment 2). 
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Figure 2.3. Predicted regression equation means of hypothetical bet on a new trivia test 
by upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type (Experiment 2). 
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
Low High
Frequency of Upward 
Counterfactuals
H
yp
ot
he
tic
al
 B
et
 o
n 
N
ew
 T
es
t 
Specific Feedback
Global Feedback
 
 
 
 200
                                                                                           
Figure 2.4.  Results of tests of mediation of the relationships between type of feedback 
and the dependent variables by upward counterfactual frequency (Experiment 2).  
 
Type of 
feedback 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Expected number 
correct on new test 
(.22*) 
.00 
.14 .57** 
 
 
Type of 
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Subjective confidence  
for new test 
(.24*) 
-.08 
.49** .57** 
 
 
 
Type of 
feedback 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Hypothetical bet  
on new test 
(.24*) 
 .01 
.10 .57** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 3.1.  Typical view of the tennis match displayed to participants (Experiment3). 
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Figure 3.2. Adjusted Bayesian corrected proportion means of counterfactuals by event 
type, thought-listing instructions, and type of counterfactual (Experiment 3).  T-bars are 
displayed at +1 SE.  
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Figure 4.1. Predicted regression equation means of perceived likelihood of winning the 
bonus game (BG) by upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type (Experiment 4). 
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Figure 4.2. Predicted regression equation means of subjective confidence in winning the 
bonus game (BG) by upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type (Experiment 4). 
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Figure 4.3. Predicted regression equation means of tickets bet on winning the bonus 
game (BG) by number of games of blackjack won and feedback type (Experiment 4). 
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Figure 4.4. Predicted regression equation means of perceived likelihood of winning the 
bonus game (BG) by wins + upward counterfactual frequency and feedback type 
(Experiment 4). 
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Figure 4.5.  Results of tests of mediation of the relationships between type of feedback 
and the dependent variables by upward counterfactual frequency (Experiment 4).  
 
Type of 
feedback 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Perceived likelihood of 
winning bonus game 
(.22*) 
.19 
.08 .63** 
 
 
Type of 
feedback 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Subjective confidence  
in winning bonus game 
(.21*) 
.11 
.14 .63** 
 
 
 
Type of 
feedback 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Tickets bet on winning 
bonus game 
(.23*) 
 -.07 
.43** .63** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Figure 5.1.  Finish position and payout schedule example (Experiment 5). 
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Figure 5.2.  Race program example (Experiment 5). 
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Figure 5.3.  Results of tests of mediation of the relationships between type of event and 
the dependent variables by upward counterfactual frequency (Experiment 5).  
 
Type of 
event 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Tickets bet on winning 
bonus race 
 (.28*) 
.17 
.27* .39* 
 
 
 
Type of 
event 
Upward counterfactual 
frequency 
Subjective confidence in 
bonus race bet 
 (.15) 
  .10 
.12 .39** 
*p < .01. 
 211
                                                                                           
Appendix A 
Trivia Items (Experiment 2) 
1. Of the following fruits, which contains the most calories?   (B) 
A. Orange 
B. Pear 
C. Plum 
 
2. Of the following states, which is the largest?   (A) 
A. Virginia 
B. Kentucky 
C. Tennessee 
 
3. Which king in a standard deck of cards doesn’t have a mustache?   (C) 
A. Diamonds 
B. Clubs 
C. Hearts 
 
4. Which of the following universities has the greatest number of students enrolled?   (B) 
A. Princeton 
B. Harvard 
C. Yale 
 
5. Which of the following soaps uses the “Clean as a whistle” slogan?   (A) 
A. Irish Spring 
B. Coast 
C. Zest 
 
6. Which of the following U.S. cities receives the highest annual average of inches of 
rainfall?   (B) 
A. Honolulu, Hawaii 
B. Boston, Massachusetts 
C. Seattle, Washington 
 
7. Of the following sandwiches, which contains the most calories?   (A) 
A. Burger King’s Whopper 
B. McDonald’s Quarter Pounder with Cheese 
C. Wendy’s Big Bacon Classic 
 
8. Which of the following animals can reach the fastest speed?   (A) 
A. lion 
B. kangaroo 
C. greyhound  
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9. Which of the following causes of death is most frequent in the United States among 
people of all ages?   (C) 
A. HIV/AIDS 
B. Homicide 
C. Influenza 
 
10. Which of the following amounts of U.S. coins possesses the greatest total weight?   
(B) 
A. 16 Quarters 
B. 20 Nickels 
C. 44 Dimes 
 
11. Which of the following countries was second to the United States in the total number 
of medals won in the 2004 Summer Olympics?   (B) 
A. China 
B. Russia 
C. Germany 
 
12. Of the following human body parts, which contains the greatest number of bones?   
(A) 
A. a single hand 
B. a single foot 
C. the spine 
 
13. Which of the following names is the most common among men in the United States?   
(A) 
A. William 
B. David 
C. Richard 
 
14. If one were to fly directly from Indianapolis to London, then fly directly from London 
to Miami, Florida, and then fly directly from Miami to Indianapolis, which of the 
following mile totals would he or she cover?   (C) 
A. 6007 miles 
B. 8231 miles 
C. 9437 miles 
 
15. Which of the following states was not named after a Native American tribe?   (A) 
A. Oregon  
B. Oklahoma 
C. Ohio 
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16. If a penny were dropped from the top of the Empire State Building, how long would 
it take before it hit the ground?   (C) 
A. 30 seconds 
B. 20 seconds 
C. 10 seconds 
 
17. Which of the following wrist watch companies uses the slogan, “It takes a licking and 
keeps on ticking”?   (C) 
A. Bulova 
B. Casio 
C. Timex 
 
18. Which of the following letters is the most common first letter for the names of 
countries of the world?   (B) 
A. A 
B. B 
C. C 
 
19. According to the Antiques Roadshow, which of the following antiques is most highly 
valued in price?   (A) 
A. a 1952 mint condition Mickey Mantle baseball card 
B. an authentic menu from the last luncheon served aboard the Titanic 
C. a mint condition Confederate Army officer Civil War era sword 
 
20. Which of the following weights is the closest approximation for the weight of a 
gallon of milk?   (C) 
A. 4 pounds 
B. 6.5 pounds 
C. 8 pounds 
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EDUCATION 
 
Ph.D., Social Psychology   Indiana University Bloomington  2002‐2007  
   (Degree expected May 2007)  Advisor: Steven J. Sherman 
Counseling Psychology  University of Georgia  1999‐2002          
M.A., Community Counseling  Slippery Rock University, PA   1997‐1999          
B.A., Psychology    Westminster College, PA  1993‐1997         
 
 
 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 
Instructor, Indiana University Bloomington:   
‐ Syllabus, lectures, assignments, examinations and grading   
• Statistical Techniques (K300): Summer 2006 
• Industrial/Organizational Psychology (P323): Spring 2006, Spring 2007 
• Introductory Psychology I (P101): Summer 2005 
• Advanced Statistics in Psychology Lab (P553): Fall 2006 
‐ Conducted a two‐hour lab session weekly; demonstrated procedures for calculating various 
statistical tests 
• Introduction to Psychology Laboratory II (P154 Sections: 24559, 24562, & 24565): Spring 2005 
• Supervised Research I (P493), Supervised Research II (P494), & Readings and Research in 
Psychology (P495): Fall 2003 ‐ present 
‐ Supervised and evaluated student lab assistants, conducted weekly lab reading/discussion 
meetings, supervised undergraduate theses projects  
• Social Psychology (P320): Spring 2004  ‐ present  
  ‐ Independent study/distance learning course; evaluation via correspondence 
 
Instructor, Ivy Tech Community College Bloomington:   
‐ Syllabus, lectures, assignments, examinations and grading   
• Introduction to Psychology (P101‐22 & P101‐64): Spring 2007 
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Instructor Assistant, Indiana University Bloomington: 
‐ Examinations, tutoring and grading 
• Advanced Statistics in Psychology (P553): Fall 2006, Professor: John K. Kruschke, Ph.D. 
• Social Psychology (P320): Spring 2006, Professor: Edward R. Hirt, Ph.D. 
• Social Influence Processes (P447): Fall 2005, Professor: Steven J. Sherman, Ph.D.  
• Intimate Relationships (P457): Fall 2005, Professor: Sharon S. Brehm, Ph.D. 
• Social Psychology (P320): Fall 2004, Professor: Scott Thompson, Ph.D. 
• Introduction to Psychology II (P102): Spring 2004, Professor: Alan Roberts, Ph.D.  
• Industrial/Organizational Psychology (P323): Spring 2004, Professor: Dominic Cooper, Ph.D.  
• Introduction to Psychology I (P101): Fall 2003, Professor: Gabriel P. Frommer, Ph.D. 
• Introduction to Psychology I (P101): Fall 2003, Professor: Joseph Farley, Ph.D. 
• Statistical Techniques (K300): Summer 2003, Professor: Cynthia Hoffman, Ph.D.  
• Introduction to Psychology II (P102): Fall 2002, Professor: Peter R. Finn, Ph.D. 
     
Instructor Assistant, Slippery Rock University, PA:  
‐ Examinations, tutoring and grading 
• Human Development and Educational Psychology: Fall 1997‐Spring1999, Professor: Ann H. 
Kemmerer, Ph.D. 
 
 
   
RESEARCH INTERESTS 
 
Social/cognitive processes that influence decision making, attitudes, resistance to persuasion, and inter‐
group perceptions and emotions; counterfactual thinking as it relates to reactions to general and specific 
events; the role of attitude certainty in resistance to persuasion and attitude change; formation of implicit 
and explicit group‐based emotions and how they influence approach/avoidance action tendencies.    
 
 
 
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE 
 
Research Lab Coordinator, Indiana University Bloomington: 
‐ Supervised undergraduate lab assistants and coordinated a research lab activities   
• Social Cognition Research Lab: Fall 2003 ‐ present,   Supervisor: Steven J. Sherman, Ph.D. 
   
Statistical Analyst, Indiana University Bloomington:     
‐ Conducted statistical analyses and reported results for publication 
• Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction: Fall 2004 ‐ Spring 2005,  
Supervisor: Erick Janssen, Ph.D. 
 
Statistical Database Manager, University of Georgia:   
‐ Assisted with the coordination of data collection and statistical analyses 
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Multi‐Site Violence Prevention Grant Project: Spring 
2001 Supervisors: Carl J. Huberty, Ph.D. and Arthur M. Horne, Ph.D. 
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PUBLICATIONS 
Social Psychology and Teaching of Psychology: 
 
Petrocelli, J. V. (in press). The utility of a computer‐assisted power analysis lab instruction.  Teaching of  
       Psychology. 
 
Kay, A. C., Jost, J. T., Mandisodza, A., Sherman, S. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Johnson, A. L. (in press).  
       Panglossian ideology in the service of system justification: How complementary stereotypes help us  
       to rationalize inequality. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. San Diego,  
       CA: Academic Press. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Unpacking attitude certainty: Attitude clarity  
       and attitude correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 30‐41. 
 
Johnson, A. L., Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., Rutchick, A. M., Hamilton, D. L., Ferreira, M., &         
       Petrocelli, J. V. (2006).  A functional perspective on group memberships: Differential need  
       fulfillment in a group typology.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 707‐719. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., & Smith, E. R.  (2005).  Who I am, who we are, and why: Links between emotions  
       and causal attributions for self and group‐discrepancies.  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,  
       31, 1628‐1642. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2003).  Factor validation of the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale:  
       Evidence for a short version.  Journal of Social Psychology, 143, 405‐413. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Where’s the ambivalence?  American  
       Psychologist, 57, 443‐444. 
 
Counseling/Clinical Psychology: 
 
Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Petrocelli, J. V., Bates, J. M., & Owens‐Hennick, L. A.  (2005).  Depression  
       and somatic complaints among male juvenile offenders: Differentiating somatizers from non‐ 
       somatizers with the Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (MACI).  Journal of Forensic Psychiatry  
       and Psychology, 16, 566 – 576. 
 
Cohen, P. J., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Bradshaw, C. P., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2005).  Examining  
       readiness for change: A preliminary evaluation of the University of Rhode Island Change  
       Assessment (URICA) with a male incarcerated adolescent sample.  Measurement and Evaluation in  
       Counseling and Development, 38, 45‐62.  
 
Strano, D. A., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2005).  A preliminary examination of the role of inferiority feelings  
       in the academic achievement of college students.  Journal of Individual Psychology, 61, 80‐89. 
 
Trusty, J., Thompson, B., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2004).  Practical guide for reporting effect size in the Journal  
       of Counseling & Development.  Journal of Counseling and Development, 82, 107‐110. 
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Scarborough, Z., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Stefurak, J., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2004).  Cluster‐derived  
       groupings of the Behavior Assessment System for Children among male juvenile offenders.   
       Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 39, 1‐17. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2003).  Hierarchical multiple regression in counseling research: Common problems  
  and possible remedies.  Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 36, 9‐22. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Calhoun, G. B., & Glaser, B. A.  (2003).  The role of general family functioning in the  
       quality of the mother‐daughter relationship of female African American juvenile offenders.  Journal  
       of Black Psychology, 29, 378‐392. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  Effectiveness of group cognitive‐behavioral therapy for general  
       symptomatology: A meta‐analysis.  Journal for Specialists in Group Work, 27, 92‐115. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  More on the consequences of savage reviews.  APS Observer, 15(2), 7. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  Processes and stages of change: Counseling with the transtheoretical model  
  of change.  Journal of Counseling and Development, 80, 22‐30. 
 
Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  Personality characteristics of male juvenile  
  offenders by adjudicated offenses as indicated by the MMPI‐A.  Criminal Justice and Behavior, 29,  
  83‐201. 
 
Glaser, B. A., Campbell, L. F., Calhoun, G. B., Bates, J. M., & Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002).  The  Early  
  Maladaptive Schema Questionnaire–Short Form: A construct validity study.  Measurement and   
  Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 35, 2‐13. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2001).  Personality and affect  
       characteristics of outpatients with depression.  Journal of Personality Assessment, 77, 162‐175. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2001).  Cognitive schemas as  
       mediating variables of the relationship between the self‐defeating personality and depression.   
       Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 23, 183‐191. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2001).  Early maladaptive schemas of  
       personality disorder subtypes.  Journal of Personality Disorders, 15, 546‐559. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2000).  [Review of the book Scientist‐practitioner perspectives on test interpretation].   
       Psychotherapy: Theory/Research/Practice/Training, 37, 106. 
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PRESENTATIONS 
Social Psychology: 
 
Sherman, S. J., Petrocelli, J. V.,  Johnson, A. L., & Jost, J. T. (2005, October). The poor are honest, but  
       people who are poor are not: System justification and implicit associations of general and specific  
       cases of rich and poor.  Paper presented at the annual Society of Experimental Social Psychology  
       Conference: San Diego, CA. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., & Sherman, S. J.  (2005, May).  Reactions to general and specific events and the role of  
       counterfactual thinking.  Paper presented at the 77th annual meeting of the Midwestern  
       Psychological Association: Chicago, IL.  
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2003, April).  Principles of impression formation in decision making.  Paper presented at  
       the biennial meeting of the Social Psychologists of Indiana, Purdue, IN. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2003, February).  How happy were you last year? Beliefs about autobiographical  
       memory and subjective well‐being.  Poster session presented at the 4th annual conference of the  
       Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Los Angeles, CA. 
 
Counseling/Clinical Psychology: 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Calhoun, G. B., & Glaser, B. A.  (2002, May).  Examination of family functioning  
       variables in predicting African American female juvenile offenders’ relationships with their  
       mothers.  Poster session presented at the annual meeting of the Georgia Psychological  
       Association, Savannah, GA. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., & Calhoun, G. B.  (2002, May).  The role of sensation seeking in the  
       personality patterns, family discord, and delinquent predisposition of male juvenile offenders.  Poster  
       session presented at the annual meeting of the Georgia Psychological Association, Savannah, GA. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2002, May).  Preliminary  
evidence of four subtypes of affect and personality characteristics of adults with depression.  Poster  
session presented at the annual meeting of the Georgia Psychological Association, Savannah, GA. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2002, March).  Personality characteristics of depressed adults: Evidence  
of four distinct subtypes of affect.  Paper presented at the annual midwinter meeting of the Society for 
Personality Assessment, San Antonio, TX. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (2001, August).  Meta‐analysis of the effectiveness of group cognitive‐behavioral  
       therapy.  Poster session presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological  
       Association, San Francisco, CA. 
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Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2001, March).  Domains of  
       psychopathology of empirically derived personality disorder subtypes.  Poster session presented  
       at the 2001 conference of the American Psychological Association: Division 17 (Counseling  
       Psychology), Houston, TX.  
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., & Calhoun, G. B.  (2001, March).  A discriminant analysis of  
       adjudicated  offenses of juvenile delinquent males with the MMPI‐A.  Poster session presented at the  
       2001 conference of the American Psychological Association: Division 17 (Counseling Psychology),  
       Houston, TX.  
 
Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F.  (2001, March).  Comorbidity of  
       personality disorders and depression among outpatients.  Poster session presented at the annual  
       convention of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Atlanta, GA. 
 
Petrocelli, J.  (1997, October).  Temporal focus and stereotypes.  Invited lecture presented at Westminster  
       College, New Wilmington, PA.  
 
Gray, D., Dymond, A., Towers, J., Petrocelli, J., & Rothenberger, S.  (1997, June).  A first examination of  
       the simultaneous construct validation of belief in equality and social dominance orientation.   
       Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology,  
       Krakow, Poland. 
 
Petrocelli, J. V.  (1997, May).  The role of temporal focus on risk behaviors in college students.   
       Unpublished bachelor’s thesis, Westminster College, New Wilmington, PA.  Paper presented at the  
       annual meeting of the Western Pennsylvania Undergraduate Conference, Edinboro, PA. 
 
 
 
 
REFEREEING/EDITING EXPERIENCE 
Ad Hoc Editor:    Social Behavior and Personality – An International Journal: 2006 
    Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: 2006 
 
Associate Editor:    Journal of Counseling and Development: July 2002‐June 2005  
 
Editorial Review Board:    Journal of Counseling and Development: July 2001‐June 2002 
 
Editorial Assistant:   Journal of Counseling and Development: Aug. 1999‐Dec. 2001 
        Supervisor: Earl J. Ginter, Ph.D., Editor 
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ACADEMIC HONORS, AWARDS AND FUNDING 
 
APF/COGDOP Research Scholarship (2004):  
  American Psychological Foundation/Council of Graduate Departments of Psychology  
College of Arts and Sciences Graduate Student Travel Grant (2003): 
  College of Arts and Sciences, Indiana University Bloomington 
SPSP Student Travel Award (2003): 
  Society for Personality and Social Psychology 
Diversity Fund Travel Award ‐ Honorable Mention (2003):  
  Society for Personality and Social Psychology 
Ruth G. and Joseph D. Matarazzo Graduate Research Scholarship (2002):  
  American Psychological Foundation/Council of Graduate Departments of Psychology  
Graduate Teaching Assistantship (2002 – present): 
   Department of Psychology, Indiana University Bloomington  
Mary S. Cerney Memorial Award (2002):  
  Society of Personality Assessment  
College of Education Graduate Student Travel Grant (2002): 
  College of Education, University of Georgia 
APA Science Directorate Student Travel Award (2001): 
  American Psychological Association Science Directorate 
College of Education Graduate Student Travel Grant (2001): 
  College of Education, University of Georgia 
Graduate Research Assistantship (1999 – 2002): 
   Department of Counseling and Human Services Development, University of Georgia 
Academic Scholar Award (1999):  
  Department of Counseling and Educational Psychology, Slippery Rock University, PA 
Charles M. Bennett Memorial Scholarship (1998):  
  College of Education, Slippery Rock University, PA 
 
 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
Association for Psychological Science (APS) – Member since 2000 
American Psychological Association (APA) – Member since 1999 
Midwestern Psychological Association (MPA) – Member since 2002 
Society for the Teaching of Psychology (STP), APA Division 2 – Member since 2000 
Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP), APA Division 8 – Member since 1999 
